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I. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this study is to develop a methodology for the 
identification and flagging of significant trends related to the safety 
and availability of U. S. commercial nuclear power plants with en^hasis 
on human factors contributions. The development is to assist in reduc-^ 
ing the likelihood of operator errors and to help reduce the frequency 
of significant human errors. Quantitative human error analysis is con­
cerned with identifying the weaknesses and strengths of human response in 
performing operation and maintenance tasks and with determining relevant 
human reliability characteristic such as human error rates. 
In the first stage the significance criteria are developed. Use is 
made of developed criteria by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center CNSAC) 
and other work (WASH-1400). The following factors are considered; 
1. Loss of safety function 
2. Abnormal or unexpected transient 
3. Loss of indication 
4. Overriding engineered safety features 
5. Operation degradation 
A classification scheme was used to extract numerically coded data 
from the Licensee Event Reports (LERs). The Transient Analysis Classifi­
cation and Evaluation (TRACE) scheme, developed by Sabri et al. (1), was 
designed to provide appropriate means of encoding and quantification of 
human errors. 
The classified data are collated to identify possible types of pro­
blems and to find means for statistical analysis using tabulating, 
2 
plotting, and histograms. In addition, the human error rates are esti­
mated and tabulated. The learning period of the human in nuclear plants 
is found by checking the slopes of intensity error rate curves. After 
reviewing the classified data and the tabulated results, methodologies 
for statistical analysis are reviewed and a methodology is developed for 
trend analysis. 
The methodology includes analysis of clustering and multiway contin­
gency tables. 
The K-Means algorithm was selected as the clustering methodology. 
Data clustering is used to provide reduced data for the analysis of multi-
way contingency tables by grouping of the plants of similar age groups. 
A computer program is developed to accommodate a clustering algorithm 
developed by McQueen as cited in (2). 
The analysis of multiway frequency tables is performed to describe 
the relationship between the human factors in the tables by forming a 
model for the data and by testing and ordering the importance of the in­
teractions between the factors. The analysis is based on fitting a log-
linear model to the cell frequencies. 
The following factors for multiway contingency tables are combined 
in several different ways: 
1. Reactor type (PWR and BWR) 
2. Plant age (earlier failure and chance failure status) 
3. Reactor mode (steady state, startup, and shutdown) 
4. Initiating action (response, behavior, and others) 
5. Significance In event consequence (significant, potentially 
significant, and insignificant event) 
3 
6. Significance in human deficiency (significant, potentially 
significant, and insignificant event) 
7. Component (valve, switch, control rod, radiation monitor, etc.) 
Utilizing the clustering program developed and the selected program 
from Biomedical Data Programs (3) for the cross-classified data, gener­
ic problems are identified where human error dominates and significant­
ly contributes to the risk. Means are recommended to mitigate those 
problems. Recomnendatlons include redesign of certain aspects of con­
trol rooms, training, and improvement of man-man and man-machine com­
munication. 
After the Three Mile Island accident the need for analyzing the op­
erating experience became more evident. The operation experience used 
in the present work for nuclear power plants has been extracted from 
the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and monthly outage reports. Several 
attempts (1, 4-7) have been made to identify significant problem areas 
using LERs and most of them have based the significance on the basis of 
a high number of reported events. However, the number of events occur­
ring is not a sufficient index in itself because it lacks a base for 
comparison. Husseiny et al. (4) suggested the analysis of sparse con­
tingency tables to identify the categories of action that are highly 
associated with the particular components that are generlcally involved 
in the reactor systems during maintenance and testing (M&T) using the 
LERs. In a contingency table of two dimensions, the number of cells 
was high while the average number of observations per cell was small 
and many cells had zero entries, because of the large number of com-
4 
blnatlons for components and systems. To overcome this sparsity, it is 
necessary to cluster the data according to similarity of the data. 
The recommendations and conclusions of the IEEE Myrtle Beach Con­
ference (8) on human factors in nuclear power plants stress the need for 
the development of a human error data bank encoded in a standard, compre­
hensive, and accurate method of event classification system. The need for 
the development of a computer package to retrieve and update information 
on a periodic basis was also identified. Computer packages for LER Re­
trieval (LERIŒTS) and DATACHEC (9-10) were developed to facilitate the 
systematic review and analysis of the LERs. The LERRETS written in COBOL 
was designed to retrieve information on the documented LERs and numeric 
data extracted from the LERs. Retrieval of certain data can be accom­
plished by submitting key word index cards. The DATACHEC was designed to 
provide consistent data for the LERRETS as an input source. The computer 
package can assist in data screening, storing, updating, and retrieval of 
information. The I£RRETS can provide Information relevant to statistical 
analysis, such as plant name, reactor type, vendor, architecture, con­
structor, event date, system and component Involved, etc. 
Efforts to collect and update meaningful data are of prime importance 
to extract statistical trends from the compiled data of occurrences in 
nuclear power plants. In recent years, the LERs have been reviewed to 
assess the impact of human factors on nuclear power plant's performance 
and reliability (10). As a first phase, operator errors reported for the 
18-year period (1961-1978) were analyzed. It was concluded that all hu­
man errors need to be analyzed including M&T for a complete and meaningful 
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evaluation of the Impact of human factors on the plant's performance. It 
also stressed that the frequency count of errors alone cannot provide any 
meaningful conclusions. Classification schemes and a data bank were de­
veloped to evaluate operator errors based on oast commercial nuclear plant 
experience reflected In LERs. The data bank can provide data encoded by 
the General Event Classification System (GENCIASS), The GENCLASS provided 
Information related to the environment In which errors have occurred, 
types of errors, consequences and the impact on component failure, etc. 
The objectives of the developed LERRETS and DATACHEC were to support the 
analysis of the data bank. 
Under contract with Sandla Laboratory the Light Water Reactor Mainte­
nance and Testing Classification System (LWR-MTC3) was developed by A. A. 
Husselny et al. (4). This classification system was updated and developed 
with past experience on the development GENCLASS. The study was to iden­
tify means to Improve the performance of the M&T tasks and to reduce the 
recurrence problems. LERRETS and DATACHEC were updated to compile data 
encoded by LWR-MTC3 classification. WORD-TERM was developed to encode 
numeric data into readable Information and to include a table of keyword 
system for LWR-MTC3. Pattern classification by distance functions was 
proposed and utilized to identify M&T generic problems and to cluster the 
event frequencies for the assessment of the main causes. The K-Means 
clustering algorithm was used to determine the frequencies of events per 
reactor year for the various causes in two different clustered group of 
plants; high and low frequency groups. 
Swain (11-13) developed Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
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(THERP) to estimate the effect of human performance on equipment or system 
reliability and operational procedures. The technique consists of five 
steps: (1) define the system or sub-system failure which Is to be evalu­
ated, (2) Identify and list all the human operations performed and their 
relationships to system tasks and functions, (3) predict error rates for 
each human operation or group of operations pertinent to the evaluation, 
(4) determine the effect of human errors on the system, and (5) recommend 
changes necessary to reduce the system or subsystem failure rate as a con­
sequence of the estimated effects of the recommended changes. In recent 
years, THERP was used in the analysis of human performance related to the 
engineered safety features of nuclear power plants (14-18). In those 
cases, THERP was not used as a design tool to indicate the weak point in 
the design, but as a method of evaluation or reliability under given 
system conditions. 
Emon and Becar (19) utilized the GO method, developed by Kanan Sci­
ences Corp., to evaluate the reliability of a gas-cooled reactor scram 
system Including the human interface. In the GO code, all possible op­
erational modes are considered rather than those producing a specific 
failure as in the fault tree analysis (18). The general human performance 
data for the GO code to estimate human reliability were obtained from 
WASH-1400. 
One of the key limitations on those applications was that it did not 
rely on nuclear plants related data but on predictions based on the ex­
perience of other industries Involving tasks comparable to those found in 
nuclear power plants. Sabri et al. (20) investigated the human factor im­
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pact on HTGR safety. Fort St. Vraln data were reviewed to calculate the 
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for both routine and vigilance tasks. 
Husselny et al, (21) have suggested that continuous updating and smoothing 
techniques be performed to produce time-dependent operator performance 
data over the operating life of a given plant. The Kalman filter tech­
nique was applied to predict and update human error rates. Sabrl et al. 
(22) identified and integrated an exponential operator model in the con­
trol and protection systems. Reliability and availability using the error 
rate for the operator evaluation were introduced during training, operat­
ing life, and retirement stages. Cho et al. (23) applied the Welbull 
probability plotting method to verify the representation of operator reli­
ability by a Welbull distribution model. Three commercial nuclear power 
plants; namely. Hatch I (BWR), Oconee 1 (PWR), and Fort St. Vraln (HTGR) 
were selected. Appropriate field data were extracted from information re­
trieved from LERs using the LERRETS. This study showed that the Welbull 
plotting method can provide a good estimate for Welbull parameters (scale 
and shape) for operator reliability. Joos et al. (24) showed the validity 
of the proposed exponential failure model using the human error data from 
LERs. Human errors and error rates with 95% confidence interval were 
tabulated. Sabrl and Husselny (25) also used the exponential model to 
apply to the prediction of operator performance. The Kalman filter tech­
nique has also been proposed for prediction and updating of operator error 
rates in executing vigilance tasks. Azarm et al. (26) developed a model 
to estimate and predict a hazard function utilizing the recursive Kalman 
filtering algorithm. The static least squares method and Impulse moment 
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updating provided prior estimators while Kalman filtering provided poste­
rior estimators. Operator data from LERs for all U, S. commercial light 
water reactor for the period between 1972 and 1977 was used to compute er­
ror rates and then employed to examine effects due to age, power level, 
and reactor type on the operator hazard function. A Bayes methodology 
was proposed to apply to available scarce data to update, predict, and 
smooth failure rates (27). It has been assumed that the performance of a 
given component or system follows a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. The 
methodology can be applied to human error data. To Identify significant 
deviations an approach based on the order statistics was developed by 
Burns III (28). The reasons for the variations In the number of LERs for 
the period 1976 through 1978 from nuclear unit to unit were explored. 
Results Indicated that variations due to randomness In the frequency of 
submission of LERs from unit to unit dominated. Wong et al. (29) pro­
posed the Freeman-Tukey (F-T) deviates to identify generic problems in 
a sparse contingency table. The inconsistencies in the pattern of as­
sociation among the various components, systems, and reactor types were 
investigated. The M&T data extracted from LERs for 23 nuclear power 
plants from 1972 to 1978 were reviewed and categories of action that 
were highly associated with particular components involved in the reactor 
systems were identified. Husselny et al. (4) suggested that fitting a 
model essentially smooths the information provided by the sparse data 
set across the entire contingency table yielding better estimates of 
the probabilities. Several authors (4, 10, 18, 23, 26, 27, and 29) in­
dicated that the total available human error data were somewhat scarce 
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for human reliability analysis. Therefore, for the appropriate analysis 
It Is better to use a clustering technique for the data reduction so that 
each cell In the cross-classified categorical data has more frequencies 
and the zero entries In the table also can be reduced. 
In Chapter 2, the reasons for selecting cluster analysis, background 
theory on how to cluster using the K-Means algorithm, and descriptions of 
available programs for the algorithm are presented. Then, an Introduc­
tion to analysis of cross-classified categorical data Is presented. The 
evaluation of SAS and BMDP of the multlway contingency table for the 
categorical data Is followed. Finally, some formulae are Introduced to 
estimate the failure rate. 
Chapter 3 presents an approach to Identifying and flagging signifi­
cant trends or problem areas. It Includes a block diagram for the ap­
proach. Figure 1.1 shows an approach paradigm of the plan of this study. 
The events are classified by the TRACE scheme based on the developed 
crl-erla. In the second stage, data collation and clustering are used 
to identify possible types of problems and to provide reduced tables for 
the multlway contengency analysis, respectively. In the third step, 
analysis of cross-classified categorical data is Implemented with the 
program BMDP3F (3). Significance criteria are developed in Chapter 3. 
The classification scheme (TRACE) is introduced in the same chapter. 
The scheme provides a useful taxonomy to obtain gross human errors. More 
detailed descriptions on important items in the scheme are followed. In 
Chapter 4 analyses for human error data classified by TRACE are per­
formed. Learning trends are examined by the investigation of the several 
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histograms (age versus error rate). Human error rates for plant age, 
reactor mode, initiating action, event consequences, and human deficiency 
are also tabulated. The computer program for the K-Means algorithm, de­
veloped here, is used to distinguish an age group between learning and 
stationary periods considering important factors; initiator (2), reactor 
mode (7), initiating action (5), event consequence (3), and human defi­
ciency (3) where the numbers in the parentheses are the number of vari­
ables used as an input data for the program. The results are shown in 
Chapter 5. Then according to the results plant age groups are divided 
by two groups (learning and stationary status). Tables for the observed, 
fitted and F-T deviates for each multlway contingency table are given 
in Chapter 5. Generic associations among factors listed above are 
identified. Summary and conclusions are given in Chapter 6 and recom­
mendations for further work are also drawn in Chapter 6. 
11 
OBJECTIVES 
CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
DATA COLLATION 
DATA CLUSTERING 
SIGNIFICANCE CRITERIA 
DEVELOPMENT 
OF K-MEANS 
CLUSTERING 
PROGRAM 
USE OF 
BMDP3F 
PROGRAM 
PREPARATION 
OF MULTIWAY 
CONTINGENCY 
TABLES 
ANALYSIS OF EVENTS 
BY PATTERN RECOGNITION 
ANALYSIS OF CROSS-
CLASSIFIED 
CATEGORICAL DATA 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
PROBLEM MITIGATION 
FLAGGING SIGNIFICANT 
TRENDS OR PROBLEM 
AREAS 
Figure 1.1 Approach paradigm 
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II. DESCRIPTION OF STATISTICAL METHODS FOR TREND ANALYSIS 
In this section different methods for trend analysis are evaluated 
as to their applicability and the rationale for selecting an appropriate 
method Is given. 
A. Introduction to Cluster Analysis 
The objective of cluster analysis Is to separate a set of objects 
Into constituent groups so that the members of any one group differ 
from one another as little as possible, according to a chosen criterion. 
The purpose Is to enable one to recognize and to interpret an existing 
structure of such a set of objects. Clustering, called unsupervised 
pattern recognition and classification. Is an Important tool In 
exploratory data analysis. 
Hartlgan (30) Indicated that one meaning of clustering Is the 
computation of multivariate histograms, which may be useful and revealing 
even If there are no "real" clusters. 
The reasons for using cluster analysis for human error data for 
commercial nuclear power plants are as follows : 
1. To Identify significant problems on human performance for the 
facilities by checking out of ordered age groups 
2. To provide reduced data for the analysis of multlway contingency 
tables by clustering of similar plant age groups 
3. To investigate existence of distinct clusters of nuclear power 
plants. 
Recently, a clustering algorithm was recommended by Bayne et al. 
(31). Monte Carlo methods were used to estimate the probability of mis-
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classification of 13 clustering algorithms for six types of parameter­
ization of two bivariate normal populations. The K-Means partitioning 
method was found to be the best with the smallest probability of mis-
classification . 
B. K-Means Algorithm for Clustering 
K-Means algorithm minimizes a performance index which is defined 
as the sum of the squared distances from all points in the cluster do­
main to the cluster center (2, 32). The input data is represented by 
arranging measurements in the form of a matrix: X - (X^^) where X^^ 
denotes the value of the kth variable (k - 1 &) of the ith object 
(i - 1, ..., m). A partition of n groups (0 < n m) of the set 
M - 1^1, ..., m^ of the m objects is a set of index sets pj^, p^, ..., 
p^cM where each of the n groups is assigned to one and only one of 
the j groups. The minimum variance criterion is described by 
n I _ 2 
e - E E E (X - X )' (2.1) 
j-1 iepj k-1 ^ 
Thus, the sum of the sum of the squared Euclidean distances of the clus­
ter members from their centroids is minimized by using an algorithm 
to assign cases to clusters. The K-Means algorithm is to search for a 
partition with small e by moving cases frcm one cluster to another. 
The search ends when no such movement reduces e. Optimal solution 
is not guaranteed, but a near optimum is almost always found with the 
K-Means algorithm. 
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The advantage of the K-Means algorithm is that, with a predefined 
data matrix x(m, &) whose rows are processed in sequence, K-Means can 
be reorganized so that those rows can be stored sequentially on an ex­
ternal medium (tape or disk) and also processed sequentially at each 
pass. As a result there is no practical limitation on m and & because 
of storage requirements. 
Several programs have been developed utilizing the K-Means al­
gorithm. These Include: 
1. K-Means clustering program developed by McRae (33) in 1971. 
2. The program FKM in Biomedical Computer Programs (BMDP) (3) 
developed recently (1978 or 1979). This program proceeds in 
a stepwise manner. The algorithm is based on the Euclidean 
distance measure between the cases and the centers of the 
clusters. 
In the present study, a computer program will be developed based 
on previous K-Means algorithms. The program is specially designed to 
be compatible with the application of the human error data available 
from the nuclear power Industry. 
C. Multiway Contingency Table Analysis 
The analysis of contingency tables can provide good chance to 
identify combinations of factor categories which have relatively high 
probabilities of occurring. 
BMDP (3) and SAS (34) can be used to analyze a multidimensional con­
tingency table. The method is based on the theory of a log-linear model. 
When we look at several categorical variables simultaneously, a 
multidimensional contingency table with each variable corresponding to 
15 
one dimension of the table is formed. In recent years, the statistical 
analysis of cross-classified data using log-linear models is performed 
especially in the multidimensional situation, using computers (35). 
Let X .. be the observation in ith row, jth column, and kth layer of 
ijit 
the table. 
To answer the question, "What are the interesting models in a 
IxJxK table?", an appropriate notation should be introduced. Consider 
a IxJxK three-dimensional table and the estimated expected count for 
the (1, j, k) cell under the model of Independence is given by 
where N « X... - total number of counts in the sang)le set 
J K 
X... " Z Z X^j, - row total numer 
j" i++ k-1 
I K 
X . - E Z X - column total number (2.4) 
J 1-1 k-1 
I J 
X. - Z Z X... - layer total numer 
1-1 j-1 
After taking logarithms Equation (2.3), it reduces to Equation (2.5) 
with parameter (20). 
Log - u + + «3(1) <2-5) 
.here "3*) ' » (2-6) 
The general log-linear model with all combined interactions among 
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factors is given by 
°ijk • " "l(i) "2(j) "3(k) "l2(ij) "l3(ik) 
* "23(jk) + "l23(ijk) (^^7) 
where Z - E "2(j) " [ "3(k) " °' 
I "l2(ij) " j "l2(lj) • I "l3(ik) " ^ "l3(lk) 
" J "23(ik) " ^ "23(Jk) " ° 
Z u 
i 
'l23(ijk) • j "l23(ljk) " ^ "l23(ijk) " ° 
The above model is called as the saturated models since it contains all 
possible effects and *^223(ljk) termed the three way or second order 
inateraction. 
For models which do not include all variables in the table the 
hierachical model can be fitted. In a hierachical model, a higher 
order effect cannot be present unless all lower order effects show 
that factors are subsets of the higher order; inclusion of (123) in 
the model implies that u, u^, u^, u^, u^g, u^^ are all in the 
model. By a minimal set of effects, which is defined as the set of 
highest order interactions whose presence imply those of the remain­
ing effects, the models are described. As an example, (24), (34), (1) 
defines the model u + u^ + Ug + u^ + u^ + u^^ + u^^ where the indices 
17 
In a four-dlmenslonal IxJxKxL contingency table pertain to variables 1, 
2, 3, 4, respectively. For the goodness-of-flt of the model the Pearson 
chl-square statistic 
<*i]k - (2 9) 
or the likelihood ratio statistic 
IjlC 
can be used. 
Let us consider two models; model (a) with and model (b) with 
where and Ky are the numbers of parameters to be fitted. 
2 The model (b) contains model (a). The difference in G between two 
models is defined by 
2 2 2 
^diff " ®model (a) ^model (b) (2.11) 
where degrees of freedom (df) - (g) " «^^niodel (b) ' 
(Ky - K^)/K Is small where K is the number of cells, then the chl-square 
2 
approximation for provides a reasonable accurate test (36). The 
2 2 
Gdfff has an asymptotic chl-square distribution while Pearson X does 
not have the property. 
A test that the marginal association for K-factor interaction is 
zero can be defined as a test that the K-factor Interaction is zero in 
the marginal sub-table indexed by the K factors: e.g. procedures 
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for the test for marginal association for "12(j) ® four-dimensional 
table; 
1. Collapse the table over categories of all other variables 
2. For this collapsed table, test If Uj^2(lj) " ® all (Ij) 
by comparing the following two models 
(I) log (m^j^) - u + + U2(j) + "12(Ij) (2-12) 
(II) log (m^j^) - u + ui(i) + U2(j) (213) 
- ^ ^(11) ~ ^ ^(1) with (I-1)(J-1) degree of freedom. (2.14) 
Procedures for the test that the partial association for "j^2(ij) 
as follows: 
Use the original table and compare the following two models. 
(I) all possible u-terms when "12(Ij) " ® for all (Ij) 
(II) same as model (1) with "^2(1]) Included. 
The two test statistics of marginal and partial association Indicate 
the relative magnitude of the difference which is likely to be found 
and can be used to determine whether they are required In the model, 
whether not required, or questionable; if both are small, the interaction 
is not needed, while for large two statistics the K.-factor interaction is 
needed in the model. If one test is significant (large value) and the 
other is not significant, then it is doubtful whether the interaction is 
needed or not in the model. Thus models can be fitted with required 
u-terms are reasonable combinations of uncertain terms (37). 
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If we consider small samples such as data In the sparse contingency 
tables. It is not very useful that the distribution of the test statistic 
is known for large samples. Thus some authors (29 and 38) have 
suggested to use transformations to make the standardized deviations in 
each cell closer to normal deviates with zero mean and unit variance. 
Among them the Freeman-Tukey transformation normalizes variables 
with a Poisson distribution (38). Individual deviates may be examined 
to detect important patterns in the data, A large positive deviate or 
residual suggests that controlling variables have a significant 
association. 
The Freeman-Tukey residual in a four-dimensional table is defined 
by: 
D. Evaluation of SAS and BMDP on the Analysis of 
Multiway Contingency Table 
BMDP (3) and SAS (34) are well known and are widely available sta­
tistical computer packages. Both packages were reviewed as to their cap­
abilities and limitations. The following is a summary of the findings: 
+ 1 (2.15) 
where = observed frequency in a four-dimensional table 
"ijkJl " expected frequency 
The sum of these squared deviates. 
» llZl r 
ijkJl 
is asymptotically distributed as chi-square 
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1. P3F in BMDP 
The program P3F analyzes data in a multlway table by fitting a hier-
achical log-linear model to the cell frequencies in order to obtain a 
parsimonious description of the data. The program provides a test for 
the appropriateness of models by testing the Pearson and likelihood 
ratio goodness-of-fit. There are some limitations on P3F: 
1. The sampling scheme should be multinomial. Poisson, or product 
multinomial. 
2. There is no facility for employing structural zeros. The 
program does not allow cells where the frequency is constrained 
to be zero. 
2. FREQ in SAS 
The program FREQ constructs multiway frequency and crosstabulation 
tables. Cell chi-square test is provided for each two-way table by 
specification of CHISQ in a TABLE statement. There are no model build­
ing procedures. 
3. FUNCAT in SAS 
The program uses the Newton-Raphson algorithm (weighted least 
squares method) and non-iterative procedures to model functions of 
categorical data as a linear model. The assumptions for this method: 
1. A multinomial response 
2. A dense sample with all cells filled with observations 
3. For a zero value for logarithm, the FUNCAT provides 0.5/N 
(N • sample numbers) to the zero value. 
The FUNCAT is adequate if all observed frequencies are at least 10. 
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It Is useful to use the program P3F In BMDP called by a SAS program 
because SAS has more convenient facilities to manage data files than 
those of BMDP package. 
E. Human Error Rate Estimation 
Operator performance can be represented by three phases for 
Instantaneous error rate X : decreasing, constant, and increasing (39). 
For the second model the operator is assumed to have adequate training, 
knowledge for the plant performance and the operation tasks. The model 
* 
with constant error rate X involves the homogeneous Poisson process 
while other two models can be assumed by the non-homogeneous Poisson 
processes, with exponentially decreasing and Increasing intensity 
parameter X^^^* If the error rate decreases with time, the operator 
is assumed to have a learning phase which accounts for inexperience, 
newness of plant and operation. If the rate Increases with time, the 
operator does not pay attention to vigilance In monitoring or detec­
ting alarms, etc. 
In this study, the above conditions are assumed to be applicable to 
all human errors including maintenance personnel, and the technical group 
In the nuclear plants with the assumption of the homogeneous performance 
in each human group and in each plant age group. The error rate for a 
plant per year is defined by 
X - ^  (2.16) 
where X = the human error rate for operator, maintenance, and technical 
groups 
22-24  
n " the error count 
T - Nt 
N " number of nuclear power plants having the same reactor age 
t • reactor operation years in each reactor age group 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY FOR THE PRELIMINARY 
ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RELATED ERROR TRENDS 
A. Introduction 
The study Is aimed at the development of a methodology for the 
identification and flagging of significant trends for human initiated 
events reported in commercial nuclear power plants. The significance 
criteria is needed to carry out a preliminary selection of significant 
events. Further detailed analyses are used to flag significant problem 
areas through the analysis of cross-classified categorical data. 
B. Development of Significance Criteria 
Significance of an event is a relative subject which differs from 
one study to another, however, it is required that the crltlerla should 
be systematic and practical to assure consistency in flagging events and 
be included to develop an appropriate classification scheme. 
Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) has developed an approach to 
conducting a Significant Event Evaluation and Information Network (SEE-
IN) (40). The functions of SEE-IN include eight steps to screen, evalu­
ate, and identify significant plant events and problem areas. Eight 
functional steps are: 
1. Provision of basic event report (LER and monthly outage reports) 
by utilities 
2. Preliminary selection of significant events 
3. Provision of additional backup data by utilities 
4. Action analysis for the significant events 
5. Communication with utilities 
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6. Decision analysis for Implementation of recommended remedial 
actions 
7. Feedback and evaluation of Implemented actions 
8. Periodical evaluation of the effectiveness of the steps 1-7 
For coarse screening of events three categories of criteria were designed 
by NSAC: significant, conditionally significant, and not significant. 
For an example, significant events Include multiple failures, cause 
failures, etc. 
Criteria was developed and based on developed criteria by NSAC (40) 
and other work (WASH-1314) (41), 
The following factors were considered: loss of safety function 
(LOSF), abnormal or unexpected transient (A/U), overriding engineered 
safety features (OESF), loss of indication (LOI), and operation degradation 
(OD). Three degrees of significance were classified: 
1. Significant (S): Any event that results in LOSF, A/U, LOI, 
OESF, and OD. 
2. Potentially Significant (P): Any event that could have led to 
LOSF, A/U, LOI, OESF, and OD. 
3. Insignificant (I): Any event that leads to no potential effect 
on plant safety/availability but which constitute a literal 
violation of the technical specifications. 
C. Classification Scheme 
A Transient Analysis Classification and Evaluation (JBACE) scheme 
was developed by Sabri et al. (1) to compile information extracted from 
the LERS and to assess event significance. The TRACE was the com­
bination of several revisions including General Event Classification 
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System (GENCLASS), Operator Error Classification System (OPERCLASS), 
and Maintenance and Testing Classification System (MTC), etc. In 
fact, TRACE has been developed in an attempt to provide a standard 
format for gathering error population relevant to safety system, 
availability as well as plant operation performance. 
The detailed classification In Table 3.1 includes reference 
number items, and description. The comments section in the coding 
sheet (Figure 3.1) plays a role in recording such events for further 
consideration. More sample data recorded in work sheet are given in 
Appendix C. 
1. Reactor Mode 
Reactor mode considers the following items: steady state, startup, 
hot standby, hot shutdown, cold shutdown, and refueling. Steady state 
means normal power operation of the station. Usually startup of the 
plant is manually controlled by the operator. After refueling startup 
is Initiated from a cold condition while for a restart following a turbine 
trip startup Is started from a hot condition. Shutdown is Initiated 
by inserting control rods for power reduction. If the reactor is to 
be kept in hot standby, crltlcallty Is maintained but fission power 
Is reduced to a very low level. The reactor Is Isolated from the turbine 
and the balance of plant during hot shutdown. In the hot shutdown period 
the reactor Is normally not critical but the residual decay power re­
mains (less than 1.5% of full power). Cold shutdown is an extended 
shutdown of long duration such as those repaired for refueling and other 
plant maintenance. 
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Figure 3.1 Sample of the human error data bank classified by TRACE 
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0% 0.23 Z s 
S 
Same description in Réf. No. 127932. 
73: 
1 
R.A. 1 
I 
A drop in outside ambient temperature 
caused a drop in component cooling water 
temperature servin* the containment recir­
culation fans. The containment temperature 
was less than 100*F during a power escala­
tion. This violated the order for license 
modification. The fans were secured and 
service water to the component cooling heat 
exchangers was throttled back to raise 
component cooling water temperature. 
90: 13.73 X 1 
S 
After a 2-hour shutdown, the reactor was 
operated in a restricted region (negative 
imbalance) for 1.25 hours and in another 
restricted region (rod index limit) for S.S 
hours exceding the 2-hour time limit. TT*e 
operators felt that reducing power would 
aggrfvate the situation and result in a 
trip. The plant superintendent issued a 
directive that Tech. Specs, must be com­
plied with. 
95% 
1 
0.23 z s 
s 
During an investigation of noise on tur­
bine pressure channel 447, a technician 
did not deenergiie the power supply to the 
feedwater heater bypass valve. High steam 
flow bistables were placed in a trip con­
dition. In about 30 minutes indication in 
control room showed the feedwater heater 
bypass valve being opened. This resulted 
in low steam-generator feedwater pump suc­
tion pressure. A safety injection occurred 
when the bistables tripped. A manual reac­
tor trip was performed. 
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Table 3.1 TRACE (1) 
NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION 
1 Reference Number 
2 Facility 
Reactor Type 
Vendor 
A-E 
3 Event Date 
Report Date 
4 Reactor Mode 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
5 Initiator 
NSIC event accession number. 
Plant name. Exampler Pilgrim 1 
BWR/PWR BWR 
NSSS supplier, GE 
Firm name Bechtel 
Date of event occurrence. 
Date of reporting the event. 
Status of reactor system prior to event. 
Steady state 
Startup 
Hot standby 
Hot shutdown 
Cold 
Refueling 
Direct root cause of event 
Example : operator error 
maintenance fault 
procedure 
etc. 
Initiating Event 
Initiating Action 
Action that resulted in the occurrence 
of the event. 
Example: Did not start 
Failure to open 
Inadvertent actuation 
Improper assembly 
Nature of human deficiencies. 
Example: perception 
cognition 
decision 
response 
behavior 
unknown 
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Table 3,1 (continued) 
NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION 
Hardware Involved Systems/components Involved with the 
Initiating event. 
System 
Component 
Component ID 
Number 
Status of System 
Hardware Affected: 
System 
Component ID 
(name plate 
date) 
Component Fail­
ure Mode 
Number of 
Components 
Name plate data Including manufacturer 
and Identification number. 
Number of components Involved. 
Example : RFS 
Switch 
Yarway Model 4320 
Conditions of the system Involved In 
the Initiation of the event. 
Example: Standby 
Test 
Normal operation 
Systems/components affected by the 
initiating event and which may act as 
a source/outlet of radioactivity release. 
The letter R is used to identify system/ 
component involved in release of radio­
activity. A code R preceding the system/ 
component affected refers to a source 
(outlet). 
Example 1: ADS depressurization 
Pressure relief valve 
B21-F013E 
Failure to close properly 
1 
Example 2: R-RCS 
PORV 
Failure to close 
1 
Example 3: Gaseous waste processing - R 
Vent 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Power Level 
Event Duration 
Abnormal/Unexpected 
Transient (A/U) 
Operation Degradation 
(OD) 
Loss of indication 
(LOI) 
Symptomatic 
Override Engineered 
Safety Features 
(OESF) 
Loss of Safety 
Function (LOSF) 
Significance 
(consequence/ 
human deficiency) 
Percentage of full power 
Duration of event in hours including 
time of detection. 
X Event led to. A/U 
Y Event could have led to 
Operation in a degraded mode which may 
or may not be permitted by limiting 
conditions of operation (LCD). 
X Event led to OD. 
Y Event could have led to OD. 
X Event led to LOI. 
Y Event could have led to LOI. 
Event is a symptom of a behavior or 
attltudinal pattern. 
X Event is symptomatic. 
Y Event may be symptomatic. 
X Event caused by override of ESF. 
Y Event may have been caused by 
override of ESF. 
Total LOSF or severely degraded safety 
function. 
X Event led ot LOSF. 
Y Event could have led to LOSF. 
Preliminary identification of the 
event consequence or human deficiency 
as significant, potentially signifi­
cant, or insignificant. This deter­
mination is to flag events for further 
retrospective analysis. 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION 
Example: S - significant 
P " potentially signifi­
cant 
I " insignificant 
The upper space is reserved for level 
of significance of event consequence. 
The significance of human deficiency is 
identified in the lower space. 
18 Event Description Description of the event in a clear, 
concise manner. The history of the 
event and any corrective action pro­
vided or recommended will be noted. 
If possible, any indication of stress 
of human performance will be indicated. 
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2. Initiator 
Operators, technical group, maintenance group, and others are 
considered for initiator. Typical nuclear power station organization 
can be found in (42). Operators Include shift supervisors, senior 
control operators, control operators, equipment operators and 
attendants. The operators perform the operating functions at the plant. 
The technical group provides the operating procedures, evaluates.and 
analyzes the operating data. The group includes reactor engineers, 
power plant engineers, chemical engineers, radiation protection 
engineers, chemists, chemical f^chnicians, health physicists, and 
radiation protection technicians. The duties of maintenance group are 
to maintain, calibrate, and operate equipment in their respective areas. 
The maintenance group is shown below: 
• Instrument, electrical and mechanical foreman, and technicians 
• welders 
• helpers 
• storekeepers 
• stockmen 
3. Initiating Action 
Initiating actions are defined as the nature of human deficiencies 
and categorized as: 
1. Perception - those errors which involve failure to perceive 
stimuli or information. 
2. Cognition - those errors which have occurred due to misinter­
pretation or misunderstanding. 
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3. Decision - those errors which are referred to as 
inferential errors given differential and 
reliance on a repertory of experience. 
4. Response - those errors which are related to ask of 
omission such as oversight; and commission such 
as negligence, substitution, sequential, etc. 
5. Behavior - those errors which are initiated by behavior 
not requiring stimuli. 
Table 3.2 lists some of the errors extracted from LEKs which may 
appear for each category. Errors on perception, cognition, decision, 
and response involve external stimuli, however, behavioral errors may 
result from arbitrary action without an external stimulus (1). 
D. Data Collation and Clustering 
Data collation is to identify possible types of problems and 
find means for statistical analysis using tabulating, plotting, and 
making histograms. A sample of collated data is given in Table 3.3. 
Age group, reactor mode, initiator, and status of system involved are 
tabulated in sequential for the collation. 
Data clustering is used to look for data patterns, the similarity 
of cases and the similarity of variables. One of the main purposes in 
using clustering here is to provide reduced tables with a large number of 
frequencies for the analysis of multlway contingency tables by matching 
and grouping of plant experience into reasonably homogeneous identifi­
able groups. 
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Table 3.2 Human error categorization according to the nature of human 
deficiencies (1) 
Error Category Errors 
Perception 
Cognition 
failure to note leak, crack, dirt 
failure to detect signal, read gauges, 
read tag, radiation level 
failure to note warning light, alarm 
detection of wrong signal, false alarm 
Incorrect interpretation of instrument, 
meter readings 
failure to relate signal to state of 
system 
misunderstanding of procedures 
misunderstanding of tech. specs, 
misunderstanding of alarm 
Decision inferior choice from several alternate 
actions 
failure to act in appropriate time 
given all necessary Information, poor 
strategy selection 
Response incorrect adjustment 
Inadvertent manipulation of a valve 
failure to complete a checklist in 
sequence 
Incorrect calibration 
Behavioral use of incorrect procedure 
disregard of procedure 
Table 3.3 Sample of collated data. 
Human related reportable occurrences for the (less than 1 
year) in PWRs, 1977 
No. Age 
Re­
actor 
Mode Initiator* 
Initiat­
ing b 
Action 
Status of 
System ^ 
Involved Consequences 
1 1 Op Beh Nor Sym(y) 
2 1 Op Beh Nor Sym(y) 
3 1 Op Per Test A/u(x) 
4 1 Op Dec Nor 
0.0 < X < 1.0 
5 1 Main Res Nor 
6 1 Tech N/A Nor 
7 3 Main Res Nor 
8 5 Op Res Test 
9 N/A Tech Res Nor 
^Initiator (Op - Operator, Main - Maintenance Personnel, Tech • 
Technical Group). 
^Initiating Action (Beh - Behavior, Per • Perception, Dec • Deci­
sion, Res • Response). 
^Status of System Involved (Nor " Normal). 
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Significance 
Initiating 
Event 
System/ 
Component 
Involved Facility 
Architech/ 
Engineer 
IP Failure to 
tag 
CVCS/Valve Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
IP Failure to 
tag 
CCS/Valve Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
OESF(x) SS Failure to 
monitor 
CRS/Controlled Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
II Exceeded 
time limit 
RCIS/Indicator Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
II Improper 
Repair 
CRS/Connector Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
II N/A PSS/Gas 
Chromatograph 
Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
IP Improper 
Calibration 
HPCIS/Switch Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
II Failure to 
follow pro­
cedures 
RHR/Switch Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
II Failure to 
follow pro­
cedures 
PSS/None Crystal 
River 3 
Gilbert Ass 
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E. Other Items Listed In the Approach Paradigm 
The analysis for multiway contingency tables is shown in Chapter 5. 
Significant trends are tabulated in the last part of the Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 includes conclusions and recommendations for problem mitigation. 
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IV. TRENDS IN REPORTABLE HUMAN ERRORS IN LIGHT WATER REACTWS 
The dual purposes of this chapter are to Identify human related 
errors or error trends In commercial nuclear power plants and to Identify 
generic factors among reactor type, plant age, Initiating action, and 
other variables in classification scheme for the construction of 
multlway contingency tables. In this chapter, gross error rates are 
estimated based on the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for various vari­
ables selected in classification scheme. 
The LERs reported during the recent two year period from January 
1977 to December 1978 were reviewed and summarized. The 365 human 
related LERs (out of 3875 events) concerning occurrences at 60 com­
mercial nuclear power plants (35 PWRs and 25 BWRs) were reviewed and 
extracted from Trace fll. 
A. Overall Human Error Trends as a Function of Plant Age 
The amount of LWR operating experience h#s increased quite rapid­
ly in recent years. Therefore, it appears to determine whether a trend 
can be Isolated In the complex operations of a nuclear power plant. This 
section focuses on trending human errors or human error rates with a 
comparison of PWR and BWR plants in four separate ways: 
1. Initiator trends 
2. Initiator trends for reactor mode 
3. Significance trends for event consequence and human deficiency 
4. Consequence trends 
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If a trend can be identified, one of the key elements in the 
planning sequence will be achieved; the identification of the problem 
its magnitude, and its anticipated variation with time. 
To examine a learning trend plant age is introduced. Age, which is 
reactor operation years from commercial operation date to December 31, 
1977 or December 31, 1978 for the information of 1977 or 1978, 
respectively. The commercial operation date can be obtained from (43). 
Using the stem-and-leaf display (39) of human error data for each one 
year age Interval Tables 4.1 through 4.4 are sunnarlzed. In those tables 
the letter x is represented as the various function times in years. 
Table 4.1 shows the number of plants and cumulative operation 
years applicable to calculate human error rate (error/plant-year). 
The plants vary in age from less than 6 months to more than 17 years 
and then a comparison of trends in human errors as a function of calendar 
year. Thus, a comparison among the plants based on the age of the units 
rather than on the calendar year of operation may be more useful. Such 
a comparison may indicate if there is an inherent variation in human 
performance as a plant increases in age from the initial training 
period to a useful life of operation. The key parameter in isolating 
trends for the human performance reliability is the age of a plant. For 
this study each of the plants of a given age included in the population 
is treated equivalently despite the variations in their size and design. 
1. Trends in Errors Related to Initiator 
From the analyses of collected data on initiator (operators, main­
tenance personnel, and other groups; technical group, vendor, admlnis«-
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Table 4.1 Age and number of plants for PVR and BVR, 1977/1978 
Number of plants 
Reactor 
1977* 1978 
Operation Years PVR BVR PVR BVR 
0 < X < 1 5(2.16)^ 2(1.66) 2(1.0) 0 
1 < X < 2 3(3.0) 0 5(5.0) 2(2.0) 
2 < X < 3 4(4.0) 5(5.0) 3(3.0) 0 
3 < X < 4 8(8.0) 4(4.0) 4(4.0) 5(5.0) 
4 < X < 5 4(4.0) 2(2.0) 8(8.0) 4(4.0) 
5 < X < 6 4(4.0) 3(3.0) 4(4.0) 2(2.0) 
6 < X < 7 2(2.0) 3(3.0) 4(4.0) 3(3.0) 
7 < X < 8 2(2.0) 0 2(2.0) 3(3.0) 
8 < X < 9 0 3(3.0) 2(2.0) 0 
9 < X < 10 0 0 0 3(3.0) 
10 £ X < 11 2(2.0) 0 0 0 
11 £ X < 12 0 0 2(2.0) 0 
12 < X < 13 0 0 0 0 
13 < X < 14 0 0 0 0 
14 < X < 15 0 2(2.0) 0 0 
15 < X < 16 1(1.0) 0 0 2(2.0) 
16 < X < 17 0 0 1(1.0) 0 
17 < X < 18 0 1(1.0) 0 0 
Total 35(32.16) 25(24.66) 37(36.00) 25(25.00) 
^Calendar year. 
^Cumulated reactor operation years. 
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tratlve personnel), the following Is observed: 
1. The learning trend for the first three years operation of 
reactors in both PWRs and BWRs. 
2. Comparison of operator and maintenance personnel error rates 
between PWRs and BWRs in 1977 and 1978. 
Table 4.2 lists the number of errors and error rates for operator, 
maintenance group, and other groups for PWR and BWR occurred in 1977 and 
1978. For both years the gross average human error rates for PWRs and 
BWRs are very low. Overall average operator error rates for PWRs are 
higher than those of BWRs for both years. However, overall maintenance 
error rates for both reactor types are approximately the same. The other 
groups include technical group, administrative graup, vendor, etc. and 
have very low error rates less than 1 error/plant-year. Operator, main­
tenance, and other group error ratio to total errors in PWRs are 55.5%, 
33.0%, and 7.9%, respectively. For BWRs maintenance or operator errors 
are identified as the most common human errors, the former representing 
50.7% and the latter 34.8% of all human errors in BWRs. Other group in 
BWRs occupies 14.5% of all human errors in BWRs. 
The frequency polygon is formed by joining the midpoints at the tops 
of the rectangles formed for the frequency histogram. The polygon pro­
vides not only an estimate of the average value but also an idea of the 
amount of variability present in the data. The polygons (Figures 4.1 
through 4.6) are represented for Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Comparison of frequencies and rates for human error in PWR 
and BWR 
OPBIATOR 
AGE PWR BWR 
77^ 78 77 78 
0.0 < X  < 1.0 5 c 
(2.32)= 
17 
(17.00) 
0 — —  
1.0 < X  < 2.0 5 
(1.67) 
20 
(4.00) 
— —  5 
(2.50) 
2.0 < X  < 3.0 12 
(3.00) 
9 
(3.00) 
15 
(3.00), 
— 
3.0 < X  < 4.0 10 
(1.25) 
6 
(1.50) 
2 
(0.50) 
10 
(2.00) 
4.0 < X  < 5.0 9 
(2.25) 
7 
(0.88) 
2 
(1.00) 
4 
(1.00) 
5.0 < X  < 6.0 0 5 
(1.25) 
1 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.50) 
6.0 < X  < 7.0 6 
(3.00) 
8 
(2.00) 
0 5 
(1.67) 
Over 7.0 3 
(0.60) 
4 
(0.57) 
1 
(0.17) 
4 
(0.50) 
Total 50 
(1.55) 
76 
(2.11) 
21 
(0.85) 
27 
(1.08) 
^OTHERS include other human groups except operator and maintenance 
groups (ex. technical group, administrative personnel, vendor, etc.) 
^Calendar year (77 - 1977 and 78 • 1978). 
'^Error Rate, error/plant-year. 
44 
MAINTENANCE GROUP OTHERS* 
PWR BWR PWR BWR 
77 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 
2 
(0.93) 
3 
(3.00) 
1 
(0.60) 
— 1 
(0.46) 
0 1 
(0.60) 
— 
2 
(0.67) 
8 
(1.60) 
— 3 
(1.50) 
2 
(1.50) 
0 — 1 
(0.50) 
10 
(2.50) 
1 
(0.33) 
18 
(3.60) 
— 1 
(0.25) 
2 
(0.67) 
7 
(1.40) 
— 
11 
(1.38) 
5 
(1.25) 
3 
(0.75) 
6 
(1.20) 
5 
(0.63) 
0 1 
(0.25) 
0 
7 
(1.75) 
2 
(0.25) 
3 
(1.50) 
3 
(0.75) 
0 0 1 
(0.50) 
0 
2 
(0.50) 
6 
(1.50) 
8 
(2.67) 
0 1 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 1 
(0.50) 
5 
(2.50) 
1 
(0.25) 
6 
(2.00) 
3 
(1.00) 
0 0 4 
(1.33) 
2 
(0.67) 
5 
(1.00) 
5 
(0.71) 
9 
(1.50) 
7 
(0.88) 
4 
(0.80) 
0 0 2 
(0.25). 
44 
(1.37) 
31 
(0.86) 
48 
(1.95) 
22 
(0.88) 
14 
(0.44) 
4 
(0.11) 
14 
(0.57) 
6 
(0.24) 
45 
Table 4.2 (continued) 
N/A 
AGE PV« 
77 78 77 78 
0.0 < X  < 1.0 1 
(0.46) 
0 0 — 
1.0 £ X  < 2.0 1 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.20) 
— 1 
(0.50) 
2.0 £ X  < 3.0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 — 
3.0 < X  < 4.0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 2 
(0.40) 
4.0 < X  < 5.0 0 0 0 0 
5.0 < X  < 6.0 0 0 0 0 
6.0 < X  < 7.0 1 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 0 
Over 7.0 1 
(0.20) 
0 0 0 
Total 5 
(0.16) 
3 
(0.08) 
0 3 
(0.12) 
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The frequency polygons (figures 4,1 through 4,6) show learning trends 
except age Interval zero to two for maintenance group In PWRs In Figure 
4.1. For the first three years the error rates rapidly decrease and then 
fluctuate with constant means In the range from 0.5 to 1.5. Figure 4.2 
shows the comparison of human error rates among operator, maintenance, and 
other human group in PWRs» 1978* In the.learning period (monotonous 
decreasing) In the first three years operator errors are dominant factor 
in human errors. For stationary status, maintenance group and operator 
error rates are almost the same shapes and values. Other human errors are 
the least important factor in human errors. The highest error rate 
(17.0 errors/plant year) among Figures 4.1 throu^ 4.6 is given in the 
age group 0. <_ x <1 of Figure 4.2 which compares the himan error rates 
among operator, maintenance, and other human groups in PWRs, 1978. The 
highest error rate is due to cook 2 (52% of total errors) and North Anna 1 
(48% of total errors). During that age interval, operator errors.of 
total human errors are occupied by 81%, while maintenance errors by only 
14%. This results in more frequent operator actions than those of 
maintenance during the first year of commercial operation. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the error rates versus age for BWRs in 
1977 and 1978. The pattern of error rates in BWRs of 1978 is similar to 
the case of PWRs. However, in 1977, the maintenance group error rates are 
higher than operator error rates in general for the age period between 
two and seven years. Specially for the maintenance group the age group 
(x), 5 _<x < 6, significant deviation of pattern has occurred, however, 
the difference of frequency between operator and maintenance group is only 
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seven. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show operator and maintenance error rates, 
respectively, for PUR and BWR in 1977 and 1978. The operator error 
rates of FWR in 1977 and 1978 are a little higher than those of BWR for 
the learning period, while maintenance error rates of PWR in 1977 and 
1978 are lower than those of PWR for the learning period. 
2. Trends in Event Initiator at Different Reactor Modes 
Operator, maintenance personnel, and other group errors (error 
rates) are examined under different reactor modes; steady state, startup, 
hot standby, hot shutdown, cold shutdown and refueling. Reactor mode 
is related to human stresses or situational conditions for operation, 
maintenance, and testing. 
Table 4, 3  presents the errors caused by initiators (operator, 
maintenance, and other groups) occurred in reactor modes (steady state, 
startup, hot standby, hot shutdown, cold shutdown, and refueling) for 
PWRs for the period between 1977 and 1978. For the first three years 
operator and maintenance error rates in steady state show learning trend 
(monotonous decreasing). In other reactor modes, the data are too 
sparse. For the average operator error rates in 1977 and 1978 steady 
state, startup, and cold shutdown are ordered by higher rates. However, 
for the average maintenance error rates steady state, cold shutdown, 
refueling and startup are orderly identified. The operator error rates 
in steady state for both years are approximately the same, while the 
maintenance error rates are reduced by twice (from 1.00 to 0.50) 
error/plant-year). The human errors on steady state, cold shutdown. 
Table 4.3 Number of error counts and rates for Initiators occurring in 
each reactor mode and ages in PWRs between 1977 and 1978 
AGE Operator 
• Jxa tw t  a im*  
Maintenance Others 
a 
77b 78 77 78 77 78 
V
 
X
 
V
 
o
 1.0 4 
(1.85)C 
11 
(11.0) 
1 
(1.0) 
2 
(2.0) 
1 
(1.0) 
1 
(1.0) 
1.0 < X < 2.0 4 
(1.33) 
11 
(2.20) 
1 
(0.33) 
4 
(0.80) 
% 
(0.67) 
0 
2.0 < X <  3.0 6d 
(1.50) 
2 
(0.67) 
7" 
(1.75) 
0 0 2 
(0.67) 
3.0 < X < 4.0 5 
(0.63) 
5 
(1.25) 
7 
(0.88) 
3 
(0.75) 
4 
(0.50) 
0 
4.0 < X < 5.0 f  
(1.75) 
4 
(0.50) 
6 
(1.50) 
2 
(0.25) 
0 0 
5.0 < X < 6.0 0 2 
(0.50) 
2 
(0.50) 
3 
(0.75) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 
6.0 < X < 7.0 4 
(2.00) 
4 
(1.00) 
3 
(1.50) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 0 
Over 7.0 3 
(0.60) 
2 
(0.29) 
5 
(1.00) 
3 
(0.43) 
3 
(0.60) 
0 
Total 33 
(1.03) 
41 
(1.14) 
32 
(1.00) 
18 
(0.50) 
11 
(0.34) 
3 
(0.08) 
including Technical Group, Administrative Personnel, Programmers, 
Workman, Manufacturer, and Unknown Personnel. 
^Calendar year. 
^rror Rate, error/plant-year. 
^Source from the same LER, but classified two different initiators. 
^Includes two different information on each initiator but the source 
from one LER. This actual total number is increased by three (cf. Table 
2.3). 
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STARTUP 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 2 
(2.0) 
0 0 0 0 
0 4 
(0.80) 
1 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.20) 
0 0 
4 
(1.00) 
0 0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 
1 
(0.13) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 0 
1 
(0.25) 
2 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 0 
0 2 
(0.50) 
0 0 0 1 
(0.25) 
2 
(1.00) 
2 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.50) 
0 0 0 
0 1 
(0.14) 
0 0 0 0 
8 
(0.25) 
14 
(0.39) 
2 
(0.06) 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
Table 4.3 (continued) 
HOT STANDBY 
AGE 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 < X  <  1.0 0 1 
(1.0) 
1 
(0.46) 
0 0 0 
V
 
X
 
V
| o
 
2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.0 < X  <  3.0 0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 
3.0 £ X  < 4.0 1 
(0.13) 
0 0 0 0 0 
o
 
1 
A
 
X
 
A
 
5.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.0 < X  <  6.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.0 < X  <  7.0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 0 
Over 7.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 
(0.03) 
2 
(0.06) 
2 
(0.06) 
0 0 0 
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HOT SHUTDOWN 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 3 
(3.0) 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 
(0.67) 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 
(0.50) 
0 0 0 
0 1 
(0.14) 
0 0 0 0 
0 6 
(0.17) 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 0 
Table 4.3 (continued) 
COLD SHUTDOWN 
Operator Maintenance Others 
AGE 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 1 X  <  1.0 1 
(0.46) 
0 0 ] 
(1.0) 
0 0 
1.0 < X  <  2.0 1 
(0.33) 
4 
(0.80) 
0 2 
(0.40) 
0 0 
V
 X 
V
| o
 
CM 
3.0 0 4 
(1.33) 
2 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.33) 
0 0 
3.0 £ X  < 4.0 2 0 2 0 0 0 
(0.25) (0.25) 
4.0 f X  <  5.0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
(0.25) (0.13) (0.25) 
5.0 £ X  < 6.0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
(0.50) 
6.0 < X  < 7.0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
(0.25) 
Over 7.0 0 0 0 2 
(0.29> 
1 
(0.20) 
0 
Total 5 10 5 8 1 0 
(0.16) (0.28) (0.16) (0.22) (0.03) 
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REFUELING N/A 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(1.0) 
0 
0 1 
(0.20) 
0 1 
(0.20) 
0 0 1 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.20) 
2 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.33) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 
1 
(0.13) 
0 2 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.13) 
0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 
(0.25) 
0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.20) 
0 
3 
(0.09) 
3 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.06) 
3 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 5 
(0.16) 
3 
(0.08) 
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startup, and refueling occupies 60.8%, 12.8%, 11.9%, 5.3%, respectively, 
of all human errors for PWRs for both years. The rest is unknown. 
Errors on operator, maintenance, and other groups during steady 
state of the reactors are involved in 53.6%, 36.2%, and 10.1% of all 
human errors at steady state in PWRs for both years. 
Table 4.4 presents the corresponding data for BWRs in 1977 and 
1978. For the average error rates for operator in 1977 and 1978, steady 
state, startup, and cold shutdown are ranked by error rates. 
For maintenance error rates, steady state, refueling, cold shutdown, 
and startup are ranked. For the steady state, learning trend is observed 
for the first three years. Operator error rates in steady state of BWRs 
in 1977 and 1978 are much smaller than those of PWRs by 52.4% and 40.4%, 
respectively. For maintenance group, the error rates of BWRs in steady 
state for both years are approximately the same as those of PWRs. How­
ever, the error rates for both reactor types decreased with calendar year. 
Maintenance errors under steady state for both years are identified 
as the most frequent errors and operator errors during the same condition 
are the next, the former representing 29.1% and the latter 20.6% of all 
human errors in BWRs for both years. 
3. Trends in Significance Related to Event Consequence and Human 
Deficiency 
An event can be classified by the significance criteria in Chapter 3. 
Those classified events are conglomerated for event consequences and 
human deficiencies in PWRs and BWRs for the calendar years 1977 and 1978. 
Comparisons are made for reactor type, calendar year, and plant age. 
Table 4.4 Number of error counts and rates for initiators occurring In 
each reactor mode and ages in BWRs between 1977 and 1978 
STEADY STATE 
AGE Operator Maintenance Others* 
77^ 78 77 78 77 78 
0.0 < X  <  1.0 0 — 0 —— 1 
(0.60)® 
—— 
1.0 < X  <  2.0 — 3 
(1.50) 
0 — 1 
(0.50) 
2.0 < X  <  3.0 8 
(1.60) 
— 12 
(2.40) 
—— 4 
(0.80) 
— 
3.0 < X  <  4.0 1 
(0.25) 
7 
(1.40) 
3 
(0.75) 
3 
(0.60) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 
V
 
X
 
v
| o
 
5.0 2 
(1.00) 
3 
(0.75) 
2 
(1.00) 
2 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.50) 
0 
V
* b
 
1 A
 
X
 
A
 
6.0 0 0 6 
(2.00) 
0 0 1 
(0.50) 
6.0 < X  <  7.0 0 2 
(0.67) 
4 
(1.33) 
1 
(0.33) 
2 
(0.67) 
2 
(0.67) 
Over 7.0 1 
(0.17) 
2 
(0.25) 
4 
(0.67) 
4 
(0.50) 
0 2 
(0.25) 
Total 12 
(0.49) 
17 
(0.68) 
31 
(1.26) 
10 
(0.40) 
9 
(0.36) 
6 
(0.24) 
^Including Technical Group, Administrative Personnel, Computer 
Operator, Designer, Construction Worker, Plant Personnel, Contractor, and 
Unknown Personnel, etc. 
^Calendar year. 
^rror rate, error/plant-year. 
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STARTUP 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 — 0 — 0 — 
— 0 — 0 — 0 
2 
(0.40) 
— 0 — 0 — 
0 2 
(0.40) 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
(0.33) 
0 1 
(0.33) 
0 0 0 
0 1 
(0.33) 
2 
(0.67) 
2 
(0.67) 
2 
(0.67) 
0 
0 0 1 
(0.17) 
0 0 0 
3 
(0.12) 
3 
(0.12) 
4 
(0.16) 
2 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.08) 
0 
Table 4.4 (continued) 
HOT STANDBY 
Operator Maintenance Others 
AGE 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0.0 < X < 1.0 0 — 0 —— 0 — 
1.0 < X < 2.0 — 0 — 0 — 0 
V
 X 
v
| o
 
CM 
3.0 1 
(0.20) 
— 0 — 0 — 
3.0 < X < 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4.0 £ X < 5.0 0 1 
(0.25) 
0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 
t
n
 
b
 
1 A
 
X
 A
 
6.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6.0 < X < 7.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Over 7.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 1 
(0.04) 
0 0 
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HOT SHUTDOWN 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 
1 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.60) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.20) 
— 1 
(0.20) 
— 0 — 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
2 
(0.08) 
0 0 0 
Table 4.4 (continued) 
COLD SHUTDOWN 
AGE 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 . 0  < x  <  1.0 0 — 0 — 0 — 
b
 
1 A
 
X
 
A
 
2.0 — 1 
(0.50) 
— 2 
(1.00) 
— 0 
2.0 £ X < 3.0 0 — 1 
(0.20) 
— 0 — 
3.0 < X < 4.0 1 
(0.25) 
0 0 
(0?40) 
0 0 
V
 
X
 
V
| o
 5.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.0 ^  X  <  6.0 0 1 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.33) 
0 0 0 
o
- b
 
1 A
 
X
 
A
 
7.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Over 7.0 0 0 2 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.13) 
0 0 
Total 1 
(0.04) 
2 
(0.08) 
4 
(0.16) 
5 
(0.20) 
0 0 
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REFUELING N/A 
Operator Maintenance Others 
77 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.50) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.50) 
3 
(0.60) 
— 4 
(0.80) 
— 3 
(0.60) 
— 0 — 
0 1 
(0.20) 
0 1 
(0.20) 
0 0 0 2 
(0.40) 
0 0 1 
(0.50) 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 2 
(0.33) 
2 
(0.25) 
0 0 0 0 
3 
(0.12) 
1 
(0.04) 
7 
(0.28) 
4 
(0.16) 
3 
(0.12) 
0 0 3 
(0.12) 
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4. Trends In Event Consequences 
While consequences are major contributors to Judge significance In 
an event, the purpose of this section Is to place the effects of con­
sequences In more quantitative terms. Consequences considered In this 
study Includes: 
1. Symptomatic (SYM) 
2. Loss of Safety Function (LOSF) 
3. Abnormal/Unexpected Transient (A/U) 
4. Loss of Indication (LOI) 
5. Overriding Engineered Safety Features (OESF) 
6. Operational Degradation (OD) 
Table 4.5 lists the number of frequencies for plant ages and con­
sequences occurred In PWRs and BWSs for the period of 1977 and 1978. The 
criteria for preliminary determination of the significance of the re­
portable event under study are based on the statement of work provided 
by NSAC and WASH-1400. In consequence, the notation of x means that 
event could have led to the corresponding event consequence (A/U, LOSF, 
OD, and LOI) or human deficiency (LOSF, A/U, LOI, OESF, and SYM) . Sig­
nificant events (x) have led to SYM, A/U, LOSF, LOI, OESF, and OD in 8.4%, 
7.5%, 4.8%, 3.5%, and 2.2%, respectively, of all human errors in PWRs, 
while potentially significant events (y) could have led to the corres­
ponding consequences in IS.9%, 1.3%, 15.4%, 4.0%, and 4.8%, respectively. 
Table 4.5 Number of frequencies and rates for significant events on 
event consequence and human deficiency In PWR and BWR, 1977/ 
1978 
CONSEQUENCE 
77® 78 77 78 
0.0 < X  < 1.0 1 h 
(0.46)* 
5 
(5.00) 
1 
(0;60) 
— —  
1.0 < X  < 2.0 3 
(1.00) 
5 
(1.00) 
— 1 
(0.50) 
2.0 < X  < 3.0 6 
(1.50) 
2 
(0.67) 
6 
(1.20) 
—— 
3.0 < X  < 4.0 2 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.25) 
4 
(0.80) 
4.0 £ X < 5.0 1 
(0.25) 
0 1 
(0.50) 
2 
(0.50) 
5.0 < X  < 6.0 1 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.33) 
0 
6.0 < X  < 7.0 4 
(2.00) 
0 3 
(1:00) 
0 
Over 7.0 4 
(0.80) 
1 
(0.14) 
1 
(0.17) 
1 
(0.13) 
Total 22 
(0.68) 
15 
(0.42) 
14 
(0.57) 
8 
(0.32) 
^Calendar year (77 • 1977 and 78 - 1978). 
^( ) for event rate, event/plant-year. 
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HUMAN DEFICIENCY 
PWR BWR 
77 78 77 78 
1 
(0.46) 
6 
(6.00) 
1 
(0.60) 
— 
3 
(1.00) 
6 
(1.20) 
— —  1 
(0.50) 
11 
(2.75) 
4 
(1.33) 
6 
(1.20) 
— —  
3 
(0.38) 
1 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.25) 
4 
(0.80) 
3 
(0.75) 
2 
(0.25) 
2 
(1.00) 
3 
(0.75) 
1 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.25) 
2 
(0.67) 
0 
5 
(2.50) 
0 3 
(1.00) 
0 
4 
(0.80) 
1 
(0.14) 
1 
(0.17) 
2 
(0.25) 
31 
(0.96) 
21 
(0.58) 
16 
(0.65) 
10 
(0.40) 
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Table 4.5 through 4.9 list events and event rates for significant 
(S), potentially significant (P), and insignificant events (I), 
respectively on event consequence (E.G.) and human deficiency (H.D.) 
for LWRs, PWRs and BWRs in 1977 and 1978. The significance criteria 
were based on consequences and causes of such events. The total 368 
events include three more doubly classified events for H.D. or E.G. 
Seventy-eight events and fifty-nine events are found to be significant 
for H.D. and E.G., respectively. Potentially significant events for 
H.D. and E.G. totaled 117 events and 75 events, respectively. Signifi­
cant events on H.D. and E.G. correspond to 22.9%, 16.3%, respectively, 
of all events for PWRs and 18.4%, 15.6%, respectively, of all events 
for BWRs for both years. Potentially significant events on H.D. and 
E.G. for PWRs and BWRs involve in 30.0%, 18.9%, 34.8%, and 22.7%, 
respectively. Figure 4.7 shows the event rates (event/plant-year) for 
significant E.G. and H.D. for PWRs and BWRs in 1977 and 1978. Usually 
event rates of H.D. are higher than those of E.G. for both years. The 
graph presents random chance events for the age group between 6 years 
and 7 years, however, the values are not high enough to show significant 
observance (less than 2.5 events/plant-year). Figures 4.8 through 4.12 
show the event rates for P and I for PWRs and BWRs in 1977 and 1978. 
A consistent trend of declli lag event rates with age is observed and a 
constant rate is usually for ages larger than 3 years. The graphs 
(Figures 4.8, 4.10, and 4.12) with higher event rates in the range from 
5 to 9 events/plant-year for the first year of reactor operation present 
much smoother than those (less than 2.5) in Figures 4.9 and 4.11. 
Table 4.6 Number of frequencies and rates for potentially significant 
events on event consequence and human deficiency in PWR 
and BWR. 1977/1978 
CONSEQUENCE 
AGE pro BTO 
77« 78 77 78 
0.0 < X  < 1.0 0 
(7.00)^ 
0 —— 
1.0 < X  < 2.0 1 
(0.33) 
6 
(1.20) 
—— 1 
(0.50) 
2.0 < X  < 3.0 2 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.33) 
7 
(1.40) 
—— 
3.0 < X  < 4.0 5 
(0.63) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 6 
(1.20) 
4.0 < X  < 5.0 2 
(0.50) 
7 
(0.88) 
1 
(0.50) 
1 
(0.25) 
5.0 < X  < 6.0 0 5 
(1.25) 
2 
(0.67) 
2 
(1.00) 
6.0 < X  < 7.0 2 
(1.00) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 3 
(1.00) 
Over 7.0 2 
(0.40) 
1 
(0.14) 
1 
(0.17) 
8 
(1.00) 
Total 14 29 11 21 
(0.44) (0.81) (0.45) (0.84) 
^Calendar year (77 - 1977 and 78 • 1978). 
^( ) for event rate, event/plant-year. 
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HUMAN DEFICIENCY 
FWR BWR 
77 78 77 78 
3 
(1.39) 
6 
(6.00) 
0 — —  
4 
(1.33) 
10 
(2.00) 
—— 2 
(1.00) 
4 
(1.00) 
0 13 
(2.60) 
—— 
7 
(0.88) 
2 
(0.50) 
2 
(0.50) 
10 
(2.00) 
4 
(1.00) 
7 
(0.88) 
1 
(0.50) 
2 
(0.50) 
0 8 
(2.00) 
4 
(1.33) 
2 
(1.00) 
4 
(2.00) 
4 
(1.00) 
0 5 
(1.67) 
2 
(0.40) 
3 
(0.43) 
1 
(0.17) 
7 
(0.88) 
28 
(0.87) 
40 
(1.11) 
21 
(0.85) 
28 
(1.12) 
Table 4.7 Number of frequencies and rates for Insignificant events on 
event consequence and human deficiency in PWR and BWR, 
1977/1978 
CONSEQUENCE 
AGE PWR BWR 
77® 78 77 78 
0.0 < X < 1.0 8 9 1 
(3.70)^ (9.00) (0.60) 
1.0 < X < 2.0 6 18 — 8 
(2 80) (3.60) (4.00) 
2.0 < X < 3.0 16 9 27 
(A.00) (3.00) (5.40) 
3.0 < X < 4.0 19 10 5 8 
(2.38) (2.50) (1.25) (1.60) 
4.0 < X < 5.0 13 2 4 4 
(3.25) (0.25) (2.00) (1.00) 
5.0 < X < 6.0 2 6 6 0 
(0.50) (1.50) (2.00) 
6.0 < X < 7.0 6 9 7 5 
(3.00) (2.25) (2.33) (1.67) 
Over 7.0 7 7 8 4 
(1.40) (1.00) (1.33) (0.50) 
Total 77 ^ 70 ^ 58 29 
(2.39) (1.94) (2.35) (1.16) 
^Calendar year (77 • 1977 and 78 • 1978). 
^( ) for event rate, event/plant-year. 
^Includes two more unidentified events or N/A. 
^Includes one more unidentified event or N/A. 
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HUMAN DEFICIENCY 
PWR BWR 
77 78 77 78 
5 
(2.32) 
9 
(9.00) 
1 
(0.60) 
— —  
3 
(1.00) 
13 
(2.60) 
7 
(3.50) 
9 
(2.25) 
9C 
(3.00) 
21= 
(4.20) 
16 
(2.00) 
9" 
(2.25) 
3d 
(0.75) 
4 
(0.80) 
9 
(2.25) 
0 3 
(1.50) 
2 
(0.50) 
2 
(0.50) 
3 
(0.38) 
3 
(1.00) 
0 
3 
(1.50) 
6 
(1.50) 
7*^ 
(2.33) 
3d 
(1.00) 
7*^ 
(1.40) 
4 
(0.57) 
8 
(1.33) 
4 
(0.50) 
54 
(1.68) 
53 
(1.47) 
46 
(1.87) 
20 
(0.80) 
Table 4.8 Number of frequencies and rates for significance on event 
consequence and human deficiencies in LWR, 1977/1978 
Usbl 
AGE Con.^ H.D. 
77® 78 77 78 
o
 
b
 
1 A
 
X
 
A
 1.0 2 . 
(0.53)* 
5 
(5.00) 
2 
(0.53) 
6 
(6.00) 
1.0 < X < 2.0 3 
(1.00) 
6 
(a. 86) 
3 
(1.00) 
7 
(1.00) 
2.0 < X < 3.0 12 
(1.33) 
1 
(0.33) 
17 
(1.89) 
4 
(1.33) 
3.0 < X < 4.0 3 
(0.25) 
5 
(0.56) 
4 
(0.33) (0.56) 
4.0 < X < 5.0 2 
(0.33) 
2 
(0.17) 
5 
(0.83) 
5 
(0.42) 
5.0 < X < 6.0 2 
(0.29) 
1 
(0.17) 
3 
(0.43) 
1 
(0.17) 
6.0 < X < 7.0 7 
(1.40) 
0 8 
(1.60) 
0 
Over 7.0 5 
(0.45) 
3 
(0.20) 
5 
(0.45) 
3 
(0.20) 
Total 36 (0.63) 23 (0.38) 47 (0.83> 31 (0.51) 
*Slg. " Significance, Pot. Sig. • Potentially Significant, and 
Insig. - Insignificant. 
^Con. " Consequence and H.D. " Human Deficiency. 
^Calendar year (77 • 1977 and 78 • 1978). 
^( ) for event rate, event/plant-year. 
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Pot. Slg. Inslg. 
Con. H.D. Con. H.D. 
77 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 7 
(7.00) 
3 
(0.79). 
6 
(6.00) 
9 
(2.36) 
9 
(9.00) 
6 
(1.57) 
9 
(9.00) 
1 
(0.33). 
7 
(1.00) 
4 
(1.33) 
12 
(1.71) 
6 
(2.00) 
26 
(3.71) 
3 
(1.00) 
20 
(2.86) 
9 
(1.00) 
2 
(0.67) 
17 
(1.89) 
0 43 
(4.78) 
9 
(3.00) 
30 
(3.33) 
9 
(3.00) 
5 
(0.42) 
7 
(0.78) 
9 
(0.75); 
12 
(1.33) 
24 
(2.00) 
18 
(2.00) 
19 
(1.58) 
13 
(1.44) 
3 
(0.50) 
8 
(0.67) 
5 
(0.83) 
9 
(0.75) 
17 
(2.83) 
6 
(0.50) 
12 
(2.00) 
2 
(0.17) 
2 
(0.29) 
7 
(1.17) 
4 
(0.57) 
10 
(1.50) 
8 
(1.14) 
6 
(1.00) 
5 
(0.71) 
3 
(0.50) 
2 
(0.40) 
4 
(0.57) 
4 
(0.80) 
9 
(1.29) 
13 
(2.60) 
14 
(2.00) 
10 
(2.00) 
9 
(1.29) 
3 (0.27) 8 (0.53) 
3 (0.27) 
10 
(0.67) 
15 
(1.36) 
11 
(0.73) 
15 
(1.36). 
8 
(0.53) 
25 (0.44) 50 (0.82) 49 (0.86) 
68 
(1.11) 135 (2.38) 99 (1.62) 
100 
(1.76) 
73 
(1.20) 
Table 4.9 Number of frequencies and rates for plant ages and consequence* 
occurring In FWR between 1977 and 1978 
Consequence 
U.O < X < 1.0* 1.0 < X < 2.0 2.0 < X < 3.0 3.0 < X < 4.0 
77^ 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 
SYM (y) 2 c 
(0.93) = 
0 3 
(1.00) 
6 
(1.20) 
3 
(0.75) 
1 
(0.33) 
2 
(0.25) 
2 
(0.50) 
(x) 0 1 
(1.0) 
0 3 
(0.60) 
6 
(1.50) 
2 
(0.67) 
1 
(0.13) 
1 
(0.25) 
LOSF (y) 
(x) 
0 
0 
5 
(5.0) 
2 
(2.0) 
2 
(0.67) 
0 
5 
(1.00) 
1 
(0.20) 
1 
(0.25) 
3 
(0.75) 
1 
<0.33) 
2 
(0.67) 
4 
(0.50) 
0 
1 
(0.25) 
0 
A/U (y) 
(X) 
0 
1 
(0.46) 
1 
(1.0) 
3 
(3.0) 
0 
2 
(0.67) 
0 
3 
(0.60) 
1 
(0.25) 
2 
(0.50) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.13) 
0 
1 
(0.25) 
LOI (y) 
(x) 
0 
0 
1 
(1.0) 
0 
0 
1 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.20) 
1 
(0.20) 
3 
(0.75) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 
0 
2 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.13) 
0 
0 
OESF (y) 
(x) 
0 
1 
(0.46) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.13) 
0 
0 
0 
OD (y) 
(x) 
0 
0 
3 
(3.0) 
1 
(1.0) 
0 
0 
2 
(0.40) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.13) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 
Subtotal(y) 
(x) 
2 
(0.93) 
2 
(0.93) 
10 5 
(10.0)(1.67) 
7 3 
(7.0) (1.00) 
14 
(2.80) 
8 
(1.60) 
8 
(2.00) 
12 
(3.00) 
2 
(0.67) 
4 
(1.33) 
9 
(1.13) 
4 
(0.50) 
4 
(1.00) 
2 
(0.50) 
Total 4 
(1.85) 
17 8 
(17.0)(2.67) 
22 
(4.40) 
20 
(5.00) 
6 
(2.00) 
13 
(1.63) 
6 
(1.50) 
®Plant age. 
^Calendar year (77 • 1977 and 78 - 1978). 
Event rate, event/plant-age. 
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0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
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(0.25) (0.13) (1.00) (0.50) 
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1 
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(0.25) 
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(2.50) 
10 
(1.25) 
0 2 
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2 
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1 0 
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10 9 2 10 IS 5 2 6 4 2 
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The event rates related to the age group and consequences for both 
X and y are ranked for PWRs In Table 4.10. It Includes major con­
tributors for each age group. Each age group corresponds to each group 
power plants ranging from two to eight plants. Table 4.11 includes 
number of events for each plant age group and consequences (x/y) for 
BWRs in 1977 and 1978. The most frequent significant events are OD in 
6.4% of total events for BWRs. Potential significant events could have 
led to SYM, LOSF, OD and LOI in 16.3%, 13.5%, 8.5%, and 7.1%, respectively, 
of the total events for BWRs. Table 4.12 presents ranking order by 
event rates for reactor age groups and consequences. The rates couqiared 
to those in Table 4.10 are lower. For the event rates over 1.5 events/ 
plant-year in PWRs and BWRs the first three years age groups occupy 
58% of total ranked age groups. This results in higher consequence event 
rates during the learning period for both PWRs and BWRs. For consequence 
(x/y), events on y are likely to occur as many as those of x for the 
learning period with over 1.6 events/plant-year for PWRs on both years 
(64% and 36% of total values, respectively). The major contributors 
are ranked in each age group. The event rate related to the age group, 
0 < x < 1.0, is the highest for the PWRs in 1977 and 1978 and LOSF (y) 
(5.0 events/plant-year) is the most major contributor in that age group. 
Significant categories are ordered by drawing histograms for each 
age group and reactor types for the determination of age group specific 
and generic problems (examples. Figures 4.13 through 4.16). By visual 
comparison of the histograms, one can easily identify whether a significant 
category is generic or age group specific. When a category, for example. 
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Table 4.10 Ranking order by event rates for the consequence (x/y) and 
reactor age In PWR, 1977/1978 
Consequence Eygnt 
Order x y Age Group 1977 1978 Rate Major Contributor* 
1 / 0.0 < X < 1.0 / 10.0 1. L0SF(y)(5.0)b 
2. 0D(y) (3.0) 
2 / 0.0 < X < 1.0 / 7.0 1. A/U(x) (3.0) 
2. L0SP(x)(2.0) 
3 / 6.0 < X < 7.0 / 5.00 1. SYM(x), LOSF(x), 
0D(x) (1.00) 
4 / 2.0 < X < 3.0 / 3.00 1. SYM(x) (1.50) 
2. LOSF(x), A/U(x) 
(0.75) 
5 / 1.0 < X < 2.0 / 2.80 1. SYM(y) (1.20) 
2. LOSF(y)(1.00) 
3. 0D(y) (0.40) 
6 / 6.0 < X < 7.0 / 2.50 1. L0SF(y)(1.50) 
2. SYM(y) (1.00) 
7 / 5.0 < X < 6.0 / 2.25 1. SYM(y) (1.00) 
2. LOSF(y), LOI(y) 
(0.50) 
8 / 7.0 < X < 8.0 / 2.00 1. OD(y) (1.00) 
2. SYM(y). LOSF(y) 
(0.50) 
8 / 2.0 < X < 3.0 / 2.00 1. SYM(y), LOI(y) 
(0.75) 
10 / 1.0 < X < 2.0 / 1.67 1. SYM(y) (1.0) 
2. L0SF(y)(0.67) 
11 / 1.0 < X < 2.0 / 1.60 1. SYM(x), A/U(x) 
(0.60) 
*MaJor contributor for each age group: SYM^synptomatlc in human de­
ficiency, LOSF-loss of safety features, A/U-abnomal/unexpected transient, 
LOI"loss of indication, OESF-overriding engineered safety features, OD" 
operation degradation. 
^Event rate, event/plant year. 
Table 4.11 Number of frequencies and rates for plant ages and consequences 
occurring in BWR between 1977 and 1978 
0,0 <x < 1.0* 1.0 1 X < 2.0 2.01 X < 3.0 3.0 < X < 4.0 
Consequence 77^ 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 
SYM (y) 0 — 1 
(0.50)^ 
6 — 
(1.20) 
2 
(0.50) 
5 
(1.00) 
(x) 0 — — 0 0 — 0 1 
(0.20) 
LOSF(y) 0 — — 0 2 — 
(0.40) 
0 5 
(1.00) 
(x) 0 — — 1 
(0.50) 
1 — 
(0.20) 
1 
(0.25) 
2 
(0.40) 
A/U (y) 0 — 0 2 
(0.40) 
0 0 
(x) 1 
(0.60) 
— 0 1 — 
(0.20) 
0 1 
(0.20) 
LOI (y) 0 — — 1 
(0.50) 
4 — 
(0.80) 
0 0 
(x) 0 — 1 
(0.50) 
4 — 
(0.80) 
0 2 
(0.40) 
OESF(y) — — 0 0 — 0 0 
(x) 0 — — 1 
(0.50) 
1 — 
(0.20) 
0 0 
a
 
o
 0 1 
(0.50) 
0 — 0 
(0.80) 
(x) 0 — — 0 3 — 
(Û.60) 
1 
(0.25) 
0 
Subtotal (y) 0 — 3 14 — 2 14 
(x) 1 
(1.50) 
— 3 
(2.80) 
10 
(0.40) 
2 
(2.80) 
6 
(0.60) (1.50) (2.00) (0.40) (1.50) 
Total 1 — — 6 24 4 20 
(0.60) (3.00) (4.80) (1.00) (4.00) 
*Plant age. 
^Calendar year. 
'^Event rate, event/plant-age. 
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4.0 < X < 5.0 5.0 < X < 6.0 6.0 < x < 7.0 7.0 < x < 8.0 Over 8.0 
77 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 77 78 
0 2 2 0 1 4 — 0 0 0 
(0.50) (0.67) (0.33) (1.33) 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
(0.25) (0.33) (0.17)(0.20) 
0 1 1 2 0 1 3 1 3 
(0.25) (0.33) (1.00) (0.33) (1.00) (0.17)(0.60) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 — 0 0 0 
(0.33) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0.33) 
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
(0.50) (0.25) (0.33) 
1 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 
(0.50) (0.33) (1.00) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0.33) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(0.50) (0.33) 
0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 
(0.50) (0.67) (0.67) (0.20) 
0 1. 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 
(0.25) (1.00) (0.20) 
1 5 4 2 1 8 8 1 4 
(0.50) (1.25) (1.33) (1.00) (0.33) (2.67) (2.67) (0.17)(0.80) 
2 3 4 0 4 0 — 0 1 2 
(1.00) (0.75) (1.33) (1.33) (0.17)(0.40) 
3 8 8 2 5 8 8 2 6 
(1.50) (2.00) (2.67) (1.00) (1.67) (2.67) (2.67) (0.33)(1.20) 
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Table 4.12 Ranking order by event rates for the consequence (x/y) and 
reactor age In BWR, 1977/1978 
Consequence 
Event 
Order x y Age Group 1977 1978 Rate Major Contributor* 
1 / 2.0 < x < 3.0 / 2.80 1. SYM(y) (1.20)^ 
2. LOI(y) (0.80) 
3. LOSF(y), A/U(y) 
(0.40) 
1 / 3.0 ^  X < 4.0 / 2.80 1. SYM(y), LOSF(y) 
(1.00) 
3. OD(y) (0.80) 
3 / 6.0 < X < 7.0 / 2.67 1. SYM(y) (1.33) 
2. OD(y) (0.67) 
3 / 7.0 < X < 8.0 / 2.67 1. LOSP(y), LOI(y) 
(1.00) 
3. 0D(y) (0.67) 
5 / 2.0 < X < 3.0 / 2.00 1. LOI(x) (0.80) 
2. 0D(x) (0.60) 
6 / 1.0 < X < 2.0 / 1.50 1. LOSF(x), LOI(x) 
OESF(x)(0.50) 
6 / 1.0 < X < 2.0 / 1.50 1. SYM(y), LOI(y) 
0D(y) (0.50) 
8 / 3.0 < X < 4.0 / 1.50 1. LOSF(x), LOI(x) 
(0.40) 
*Major contributor: the abbreviations, SYM, LOSF, A/U* LOI, OESF, 
and OD are defined In the footnotes of Table 4.10. 
^Event rate, event/plant year. 
MOTE: ^No operating power plants In the following age groups: 0 < x < 1.0 
In 1978; 1.0 _< x < 2.0 In 1977; 2.0 < x < 3.0 In 1978; 7.0 < x < 8.0 in 
1977. 
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appears In several age groups at a comparative frequency, then It Is 
generic; while If the category appears In association with a specific 
age group, then it is age group specific. Category, SYM (y) seems 
to be generic; while others are more age group specific types. 
B. Event Consequence for the Various Reactor Operation Modes 
This section provides a perspective on the event consequence for 
the various reactor operation modes. The event consequence used in 
this study are presented in Chapter 3. 
The reactor mode is defined as the status of reactor system prior 
to event. The mode includes: steady state, startup, hot standby, hot 
shutdown, cold shutdown, and refueling. Events and event rates on con­
sequences (x/y), SYM, LOSF, A/U, LOI, OESF, and Œ) are listed In Table 
4.13 for PWRs in 1977. Significant events in steady state and in start­
up occupy 26.4% and 6.2%, respectively, of total events for PWRs in 1977. 
Potentially significant events which occurred during steady state occupy 
19.5% (22 events). Table 4.14 presents number of events and event rate 
for the above consequences (x/y) for PWRs in 1978. Among the total 114 
events for PWRs in 1978, significant events during steady state have the 
most frequent events and occupy 14.0%. Significant events for other 
reactor modes are observed with small numbers (less than 4). During 
steady state, startup, and cold shutdown potentially significant events 
occurred with 22.8%, 12.3%, and 10.5%, respectively, of the total 
events for PWRs in 1978. Potentially significant events totaled 
95 
Table 4.13 Number of frequencies and rates for consequences occurring 
during each reactor mode in PWR, 1977 
Reactor Mode 
Consequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A Total 
SYM (y) 
(X) 
9 
(0.28) 
6 
(0.19) 
(0.06)" 
3 
(0.09) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
4 
(0.12) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
16 
(0.50) 
11 
(0.34) 
LOSF(y) 
(x) 
8 
(0.25) 
4 
(0.12) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
2 
(0.06) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
14 
(0.44) 
5 
(0.16) 
A/U (y) 
(x) 
1 
(0.03) 
5 
(0.16) 
0 
3 
(0.09) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
(0.06) 
9 
(0.28) 
LOI (y) 
(x) 
3 
(0.09) 
8 
(0.25) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
(0.06) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
(0.16) 
9 
(0.28) 
OESP(y) 
(x) 
1 
(0.03) 
4 
(0.12) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
4 
(0.12) 
OD (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(x) 3 
(0.09) 
0 1 
(0.03) 
0 0 0 0 4 
(0.12) 
Subtotal (y) 22 
(0.68) 
(x) 30 
(0.93) 
3 
(0.09) 
7 
(0.22) 
0 
3 
(0.09) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
9 
(0.28) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
2 
(0.06) 
2 
(0.06) 
38 
(1.18) 
42 
(1.31) 
Total 52 
(1.62) 
10 
(0.31) 
3 
(0.09) (oto3) 
9 
(0.28) 
1 
(0.03) (otl2) 
80 
(2.49) 
*Event rate, event/plant-year. 
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Table 4.14 Number of frequencies and rates for consequences occurring 
during each reactor mode In PWR, 1978 
Reactor Mode 
Consequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A Total 
SYM (y) 
(x) 
10 
(0.28) 
5 
(0.14) 
5 
(0.14)® 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
3 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.06) 
2 
(0.06) 
0 
0 
0 
20 
(0.56) 
8 
(0.22) 
LOSF(y) 
(x) 
10 
(0.28) 
4 
(0.11) 
3 
(0.08) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
6 
(0.17) 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
21 
(0.58) 
6 
(0.17) 
A/U (y) 
(x) 
1 
(0.03) 
5 
(0.14) 
0 
2 
(0.06) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
M 
(0.22) 
LOI (y) 
(x) 
2 
(0.06) 
0 
2 
(0.06) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
(0.11) 
1 
(0.03) 
OESF(y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(x) 2 
(0.06) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(0.06) 
OD (y) 
(x) 
3 
(0.08) 
0 
4 
(0.11) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
3 
(0.08) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
0 
11 
(0.31) 
1 
(0.03) 
Subtotal (y) 26 
(0.72) 
(x) 16 
(0.44) 
14 
(0.39) 
3 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
4 
(0.11) 
12 
(0.33) 
2 
(0.06) 
3 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
57 
(1.58) 
26 
(0.72) 
Total 42 
(1.17) 
17 
(0.47) 
1 
(0.03) 
4 
(0.11) 
14 
(0.39) 
4 
(0.11) 
1 
(0.03) 
83 
(2.31) 
*Event rate, event/plant-year. 
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46 for PWRs In both years, out of which 19 involved symptomatic, 18 
involved LOSF, and 9 involved others. 
Table 4.15 lists ranking orders based on the event rates related 
to reactor mode and consequences (x/y). The events occurred during 
steady state, startup, and cold shutdown are the major contributors for 
consequences (x/y). SYM (y) seems to be generic problems for these 
three reactor modes. 
Tables 4.16 and 4.17 present events and event rates for each re­
actor mode with different consequences (x/y) for BWRs in 1977 and 1978 
respectively. Events in steady state increased from 36.1% of all events 
for BWRs in 1977 to 53.4% of all events for the BWRs in 1978 with 
calendar year. Significant events in steady state decreased from 15.7% 
to 5.2% of the corresponding events, while potentially significant events 
increased from 20.5 to 48.3%. 
For BWRs reactor modes with calendar years 1977 and 1978 for the 
consequences (x/y) are ranked by event rates in Table 4.18. Events in 
steady state and cold shutdown are ranked. 
For event rates over 0.2 event/plant year for both reactor types 
in 1977 and 1978, events related to steady state with consequences x and 
y occupy 50% of total ranked reactor modes for consequence (x/y). For 
startup and cold shutdown, occupancies are the same 25% each. This means 
that more frequent human activities are performed at steady state. 
Figure 4.17 and 4.18 show comparison of event rate of SYM (x/y) for 
reactor types in 1977 and 1978. Even though reactor mode with x-axis 
is not sequential variable, connected polygons are useful to compare 
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Table 4.15 Ranking order by event rates for the consequence (x/y) and 
reactor node in PWR, 1977/1978 
Consequence 
Order x y Reactor Mode 1977 1978 
Event 
Rate Major Contribution* 
Steady 
State 
/ Steady 
State 
/ Steady 
State 
/ Steady 
State 
/ Startup 
/ Cold 
Shutdown 
/ Cold 
Shutdown 
/ Startup 
/ 0.93 1. LOI(x) (0.25) 
2. SYM(x) (0.19) 
3. A/U(x) (0.16) 
/ 0.72 1. SYM(y), LOSF(y) 
(0.28) 
3. OD(y) (0.08) 
/ 0.68 1. SYM(y),(0.28) 
2. LOSF(y)(0.25) 
3. LOW(y) (0.09) 
/ 0.44 1. SYM(x), A/U(x) 
(0.14) 
3. LOSF(x)(0.11) 
/ 0.39 1. SYM(y) (0.14) 
2. OD(y) (0.11) 
/ 0.33 1. LOSF(y)(0.17) 
2. SYM(y), OD(y) 
(0.08) 
/ 0.28 1. SYM(y) (0.12) 
2. LOSF(y), LOI(y) 
(0.06) 
/ 0.22 1. SYM(x), A/U(x) 
(0.09) 
^ajor contribution for each ractor mode: the abbreviation for SYM, 
LOSF, A/U, LOI, OESF, and OD are given in the footnotes of Table 4.10. 
^Event rate, event/plant-year. 
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Table 4.16 Number of frequencies and rates for consequences occurring 
during each reactor mode in BWR, 1977 
Reactor Mode 
Consequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
SYM (y) 7 
(0.28) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 0 3 
(0.12) 
0 11 
(0.08) 
(x) 0 1 
(0.04) 
0 0 1 
(0.04) 
0 2 
(0.08) 
LOSF(y) 4 
(0.16) 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
(0.16) 
(x) 2 
(0.08) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(0.04) 
3 
(0.12) 
A/U (y) 1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 1 
(0.04) 
0 0 3 
(0.12) 
(x) 2 
(0.08) 
0 0 2 
(0.08) 
0 0 4 
(0.16) 
LOI (y) 5 
(0.20) 
0 0 0 0 0 5 
(0.20) 
(x) 3 
(0.12) 
0 0 0 1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
5 
(0.20) 
OESF (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(x) 2 
(0.06) 
0 0 0 0 1 
(0.04) 
3 
(0.12) 
OD (y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(x) 4 
(0.16) 
3 
(0.12) 
0 0 0 0 7 
(0.28) 
Subtotal (y) 17 
(0.69) 
2 
(0.08) 
0 1 
(0.04) 
3 
(0.12) 
0 23 
(0.93) 
(x) 13 4 0 2 2 3 24 
(0.53) (0.16) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.97) 
Total 30 6 0 3 5 3 47 
(1.22) (0.24) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (1.91) 
^vent rate, event/plant-year. 
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Table 4.17 Number of frequencies and rates for consequences occurring 
during each reactor mode in BWR, 1978 
Reactor Mode 
Consequence 1 2 3 4 5 6 N/A Total 
SYM (y) 
(X) 
6 
(0.24) 
0 
2 
(0.08) 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
2 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.04) 
12 
(0.48) 
3 
(0.12) 
LOSF(y) 
(X) 
11 
(0.44) 
0 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
3 
(0.12) 
(0^04) 
0 
(0^04) 
0 
0 
15 
(0.60) 
(0?12) 
A/U (y) 0 0 0 0 G 0 0 0 
(x) 1 
(0.04) 
0 1 
(0.04) 
0 0 0 0 2 
(0.08) 
LOI (y) 
(x) 
4 
(0.16) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
5 
(0.20) 
3 
(0.12) 
OESF(y) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(x) 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.04) 
0 0 1 
(0.04) 
OD (y) 
(x) 
7 
(0.28) 
2 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
0 
2 
(0.08) 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
0 
13 
(0.52) 
2 
(0.08) 
Subtotal 
'''A:, 
(x) 3 
(0.12) 
3 
(0.12) 
1 
(0.04) 
2 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
6 
(0.24) 
4 
(0.16) 
2 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.08) 
44 
Cl.76) 
14 
CO.56) 
Total 31 
(1.24) 
4 
(0.16) 
4 
(0.16) 
1 
(0.04) 
10 
(0.40) 
4 
(0.16) 
4 
(0.16) 
58 
(2.32) 
^vent rate, event/plant-year. 
101 
Table 4.18 Ranking order by event rates for the consequence (x/y) and 
reactor mode in BWR, 1977/1978 
Order 
Consequence 
X y Reactor Mode 1977 1978 
Event 
Rate Major Contribution 
1 / Steady 
State 
/ 1.12 1. 
2. 
3. 
LOSF(y)(0.44)b 
0D(y) (0.28) 
SYM(y) (0.24) 
2 / Steady 
State 
/ 0.69 1. 
2. 
3. 
SYM(y) (0.28) 
LOI(y) (0.20) 
LOSP(y)(0.16) 
3 / Steady 
State 
/ 0.53 1. 
2. 
OD(x) 
LOI(x) 
(0.16) 
(0.12) 
4 / Cold 
Shutdown 
/ 0.24 1. 
2. 
LOSF(y)(0.12) 
0D(y) (0.08) 
5 
5 
/ 
/ 
Startup 
Cold 
Shutdown 
/ 
/ 
0.16 
0.16 
1. 0D(x) (0.12) 
7 / Cold 
Shutdown 
/ 0.12 1. SYM(y) (0.12) 
7 / Startup / 0.12 SYM(y) (0.08) 
7 / Steady 
State 
/ 0.12 1. OD(x) (0.08) 
7 / Refueling / 0.12 
^Major contribution for each reactor mode is given in Table 4.10. 
''Event rate, event/plant-year. 
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FOR CONSEQUENCE. PHR 
SYH(X), 1977 
SYM (XI, 1978 
SYMtYI, 1977 
SYMCYJ, 1978 
—o 
0(0 ~ 
LU 
Œ 
CC 
UJ 
5.00 y.oo 1.00 2.00 
REACTOR MODE 
3.00 
Figure 4.17 Comparison of event rate for 1977 and 1978 for 
human deficiency Csynptomatlc) in each reactor 
mode occurred in PWR 
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FOR CONSEQUENCE, BWR 
SYM(X). 1977 
SYMCXI, 1978 
SYM(T), 1977 
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REACTOR MOD'E 
3.00 1.00 
Figure 4.18 Comparison of event rate for 1977 and 1978 for 
human deficiency (symptomatic) in each reactor mode 
occurred in BWR 
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event rates for each reactor mode. Steady state, cold shutdown, and 
startup are the major factors in SYM (x/y), errors that result from 
specific behavior are frequently occurring for both reactor types in 
two year period of 1977 and 1978. 
LOSF Is safety related errors causing loss of safety function. 
Figures 4.19 and 4.20 presents comparison of the event rates of LOSF 
in each reactor mode for PWRs and BWRs, respectively, for the period 
between 1977 and 1978. Steady state, cold shutdown and startup are 
major reactor modes in LOSF (x/y) of PWRs, while steady state and cold 
shutdown are the factors for BWRs. 
Event rates on OD (x/y), which is production related error causing 
operation degradation is shown in Figure 4.21 for BWRs. 
Steady state and startup are selected as major factors contributing 
to LOSF (x/y) of BWRs. Event rates versus reactor mode on consequence 
(x/y) in PWRs and BWRs are shown In Figures 4.22 and 4.23, respectively. 
Considering average event rates for consequence (x/y) and calendar 
year (1977 and 1978), steady state, startup, and cold shutdown for 
PWRs and steady state, cold shutdown and startup for BWRs are ordered 
in sequence and are identified as major factors in consequence event 
rates. 
C. Trends In Initiating Action 
The nature of human deficiencies can be deduced from examination of 
specifiable type such as perception, cognition, decision, motor response 
and behavior. The first four categories Involve the presence of stimuli, 
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FOR CONSEQUENCE, PHfl 
LOSF(X), 1977 
LOSFfXl, 1978 
LQSFCYl, 1977 
LOSF(Y), 197B 
—a 
CM 
CE 
CO 
•zr. 
UJO 
5.00 Z.OO 3.00 
REACTOR MODE 
1.00 
Figure 4.19 Comparison of event rate for 1977 and 1978 for 
consequence (Loss of Safety Functions) In each 
reactor mode occurred In PWR 
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FOR CONSEQUENCE. BWR 
L05F(XI. 1977 
LOSFCXI, 197B 
L03F(YI, 1977 
LOSFm. 107B 
a 
Œ 
OC 
UJO 
> 
lU 
5.00 
REACTOR MODE 
3.00 1.00 
Figure 4.20 Comparison of event rate for 1977 and 1978 for 
consequence (Loss of Safety Function*) for each 
reactor mode occurred in BWR 
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FOR CONSEQUENCE. BHR 
00 (X), 1977 
00 (X), 1978 
00 (YJ, 1977 
00 (Y). 1978 
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CE 
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UJO 
UJ 
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Figure 4.21 Comparison of event rate for 1977 and 1978 for 
consequence (Operation Degradation) In each reactor 
mode occurred in BWR 
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FOR CONSEQUENCE, PWR 
CONSEQ(X), 1977 
CONSEO(XI, 1978 
CONSEQ(Y), 1977 
C0N5E0(Y), 1978 
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Z'X 
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UJ 
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Figure 4.22 Comparison of event rate for 1977 and 1978 for 
consequence (x and y) In each reactor mode occurred 
in PWR 
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S 
FOR CONSEQUENCE, BNR 
CONSEQ (X) . 1977 + 
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CONSEQ (Y) , 1977 X 
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Figure 4.23 Comparison of event rate for 1977 and 1978 for 
consequence (x and y) in each reactor mode occurred 
in BWR 
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however, behavior errors are human initiated and may result from an 
arbitrary action on the part of human which does not require an external 
stimulus (3). Those four can be improved by human engineering design 
since they receive and process information, while the behavior errors 
can not be reduced by design change since it is affected by organismic 
factors. The data used here are obtained from the data bank classified 
by TRACE. 
The evaluation of events is performed to identify the most frequent 
events under a specific combination of categories; such as: 
• Initiator (operator/maintenance personnel (others) related to 
the differential status of systems involved in the initiation 
of the event; normal operation, test, and other including 
standby) 
• Plant age in years for the analysis of trending 
• Significance of human deficiency and consequence involved in 
system/component for reactor type and initiator 
Specific reasons for the events are not apparent in most cases and some 
are related to equipment and work environment. 
Errors and error rates on initiator for the nature of human 
deficiencies related to the status of system involved are provided in 
Tables 4.19 and 4.20 for PWRs and BWRs, respectively. Errors caused by 
response and behavioral deficiency are identified as major contributors. 
Overall, 52.8% of all classified human deficiencies for PWRs resulted 
in response errors and 26.8% resulted in behavioral errors. Response and 
behavioral errors are Involved in 37.8% and 32,4% of all classified 
Table 4.19 Human error counts and rates for the nature of human 
deficiencies In PWR, 1977/1978 
Operator 
Year R* B D C ? U 
1977 Normal^ 
Test 
d 
Other 
R 
(0.25)C 
6 
(0.19) 
0 
9 
(0.28) 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
2 
(0.06) 
0 
0 
3 
(0.09) 
2 
(0.06) 
0 
2 
(0.06) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Subtotal 14 
(0.44) 
11 
(0.34) 
2 
(0.06) 
5 
(0.16) 
3 
(0.09) 
0 
1978 Normal 
Test 
Other 
15 
(0.42) 
4 
(0.11) 
3 
(0.08) 
11 
(0.31) 
2 
(0.06) 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
3 
(0.08) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
1 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.03) 
0 
0 
Subtotal 22 
(0.61) 
14 
(0.39) 
1 
(0.03) 
4 
(0.11) 
2 
(0.06) 
1 
(0.03) 
TOTAL 36 
(0.53) 
25 
(0.37) 
3 
(0.04) 
9 
(0.13) 
5 
(0.07) 
1 
(0.01) 
^-response, B-behavior, D-declsion, C-cognition, P-perception, U-
unknown, or N/Â. 
^Status of system involved (normal, test, and other). 
^Error rate, error/plant-year. 
'^Other Includes repair, maintenance, out of service, inspection, 
inoperable, and isolated. 
112 
Maintenance Personnel 
R B D C ? u 
9 5 0 1 0 1 
(0.28) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) 
12 2 0 0 0 1 
(0.37) (0.06) (0.03) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
(0.03) 
22 7 0 1 0 2 
(0.68) (0.22) (0.03) (0.06) 
6 2 0 0 0 3 
(0.17) (0.06) (0.08) 
4 2 0 0 0 1 
(0.11) (0.06) (0.03) 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
(0.03) 
10 5 0 0 0 4 
(0.28) (0.14) (0.11) 
32 12 0 1 0 6 
(0.47) (0.18) (0.01) (0.09) 
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Table 4.19 (continued) 
Other Personnel 
Sub­
Year R B D C p u total 
1977 Normal 5 1 0 0 0 1 47 
(0.16) (0.03) (0.03) (1.46) 
Test 3 0 0 0 0 0 28 
(0.09) (0.87) 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(0.06) 
Subtotal 8 1 0 0 0 1 77* 
(0.25) (0.03) (0.03) (2.39) 
1978 Normal 0 0 0 0 0 1 44 
(0.03) (IJ.22) 
Test 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
(0.36) 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 
(0.03) (0.22) 
Subtotal 0 0 0 0 0 2 65^ 
(0.06) (1.81) 
TOTAL 8 1 0 0 0 3 142 
(0.12) (0.01) (0.04) (2.08) 
®Total number for 1977 includes three more classifications for ini 
tiator and two more classifications for initiation action. 
^It includes three more initiating actions. 
Table 4.20 Human error counts and rates for the nature of human deficien­
cies In BWR, 1977/1978 
Operator 
Year R* B D C P U 
1977 Normal^ 
Test 
Other^ 
3 
(0.12)® 
2 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.04) 
6 
(0.24) 
2 
(0.08) 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
3 
(0.12) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
Subtotal 6 
(0.24) 
9 
(0.36) 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
4 
(0.16) 
1 
(0.04) 
1978 Normal 
Test 
Other 
7 
(0.28) 
2 
(0.08) 
3 
(0.12) 
7 
(0.28) 
3 
(0.12) 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
0 
2 
(0.08) 
2 
(0.08) 
0 
4 
(0.16) 
0 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
1 
(0.04) 
0 
Subtotal 12 
(0.48) 
10 
(0.40) 
1 
(0.04) 
4 
(0.16) 
5 
(0.20) 
2 
(0.08) 
TOTAL 18 
(0.36) 
19 
(0.38) 
2 
(0.04) 
5 
(0.10) 
9 
(0.18) 
3 
(0.06) 
^-response, B-behavior, D-declslon, C-cognltlon, P-perceptlon, U-
unknown, or N/A. 
^Status of system Involved (normal, test, and other). 
^Event rate, event/plant-year. 
*^Other Includes repair, maintenance, standby. Inspection, calibra­
tion and N/A. 
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Maintenance Personnel 
R B D C P u 
16 6 0 1 0 3 
(0.65) (0.24) (0.04) (0.12) 
11 3 1 1 0 1 
(0.45) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
3 1 0 1 0 1 
(0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
30 10 1 3 0 5 
(1.22) (0.41) (0.04) (0.12) (0.20) 
3 4 0 0 0 3 
(0.12) (0.16) (0.12) 
3 2 0 0 0 0 
(0.12) (0.08) 
1 6 0 0 0 1 
(0.04) (0.24) (0.04) 
7 12 0 0 0 4 
(0.28) (0.48) (0.16) 
37 22 1 3 0 9 
(0.75) (0.48) (0.02) (0.06) (0.18) 
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Table 4.20 (continued) 
Other Personnel 
Year R B D C 
1977 Normal 1 2 1 3 
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.: 
Test 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 2 0 1 
Sub-
U total 
0 1 48 
(0.04) (1.95) 
0 3 26 
(0.12) (1.05) 
0 0 11 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.45) 
Subtotal 1 4 1 4 0 4 85® 
(0.04) (0.16) (0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (3.45) 
1978 Normal 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
(0.12) 
Test 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
(0.08) 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.04) 
Subtotal 0 3 0 0 0 3 63^ 
(0.12) (0.12) (2.52) 
TOTAL 1 7 1 4 0 7 148 
(0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.08) (0.14) (2.98) 
®Total number for 1977 includes two additional classifications for 
Initiating action. 
^It includes five more initiating actions. 
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human deficiencies for BWRs. Response errors caused by operator during 
normal operation are identified as the most frequent errors overall and 
response errors caused by maintenance personnel are observed as the most 
frequent errors during test for PWRs, the former representing 16.29% 
and the latter 16.2% of all human deficiencies for PWRs. For BWRs 
response errors during normal operation and response errors during test 
caused by maintenance personnel for both cases are observed as the most 
frequent errors. These cases are involved in 12.8% and 9.5%, respective­
ly, of all human deficiencies for BWRs. 
Error rates of initiating actions (response and behavior) by 
initiators (operator, maintenance, and other groups) are drawn in 
Figures 4.24 and 4.25 for PWRs and BWRs. It is assumed that high, medium, 
and low error rates are over 0.35, between 0.10 and 0.35, and under 0.10 
error/plant-year. Considering operation and maintenance groups, the high 
groups are: response by operator at normal in 1978 and response by 
maintenance group at test in 1977 for PWRs, and response at normal and 
test by maintenance group in 1977 for BWRs while the low groups include : 
behavior by operator and maintenance groups at test in 1977 and 1978 
for PWRs, behavior by maintenance group at normal in 1978 for PWRs, be­
havior by operator at test in 1977 for BWRs, response by operator at test 
in 1977 and 1978 for BWRs, behavior by maintenance group at test in 1978 
for BWRs. The above results show response action is more responsible 
than behavior for operator or maintenance errors. 
Number of human errors and rates for initiating action versus age 
are tabulated in Tables 4.21 and 4.22 for PWRs and BWRs, respectively. 
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PVR 
RESPONSE AT NORMAL. 1977 
1978 
AT TEST, 1977 
1978 
BEHAVIOR AT NORMAL. 1977 
1978 
AT TEST, 1977 
1978 
O.F. G.H 
Operator Malntananca 
Initiator 
Othara 
Figure 4.24 Comparison of event rate for response and behavior at 
different status in PWR for the period of 1977 and 
1978. 
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Bm 
nSPOMSE AT MOBMAL, 1977 A 
1978 B 
AT TEST. 1977 C 
__ 1978 D 
WBAVIOT AT MORMAL, 1977 E 
1978 r 
AT TEST, 1977 G 
1978 H 
B.E.F 
B.D.C 
Operator Malncananca 
Initiator 
Other* 
Figure 4.25 Comparison of event rate for response and behavior 
at different status in BWR for the period of 1977 
and 1978. 
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Table 4.21 Human error counts and rates for each initiating action in 
PWR, 1977/1978 
Initiating Action 
Age Per® Cog^ Dec*^ Res'* Beh® 
0.0 < X < 1.0 1 
(0.32)f 
2 
(0.63) 
2 
(0.63) 
12 
(3.80) 
11 
(3.48) 
1.0 < X < 2.0 0 4 
(0.50) 
2 
(0.25) 
26 
(3.25) 
7 
(0.88) 
2.0 < X < 3.0 0 2 
(0.29) 
5 
(0.71) 
17 
(2.43) 
12 
(1.71) 
3.0 < X < 4.0 0 3 
(0.25) 
1 
(0.08) 
21 
(1.75) 
9 
(0.75) 
b
 
1 A
 X
 
A
 5.0 2 
(0.17) 
1 
(0.08) 
0 12 
(1.00) 
10 
(0.83) 
V
 
X
 
V
 1 
o
 
m
 6.0 2 
(0.25) 
0 0 9 
(1.13) 
2 
(0.25) 
6.0 < X < 7.0 1 
(0.17) 
2 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.17) 
11 
(1.83) 
7 
(1.17) 
7.0 < X < 8.0 1 
(0.25) 
0 1 
(0.25) 
4 
(1.00) 
2 
(0.50) 
8.0 < X < 9.0 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.50) 
Over 9.0 0 2 
(0.33) 
0 7 
(1.17) 
3 
(0.50) 
Total 7 16 12 119 64 
®Per " Perception 
^Cog - Cognition. 
^Dec " Decision. 
^Sles " Response. 
®Beh ~ Behavior. 
^( ) for error rate, error/plant-year. 
121 
Table 4.22 Human error counts and rates for each Initiating action in 
BWR, 1977/1978 
Initiating Action 
Age Per* Cog^ Dec^ Res^ Beh* 
0.0 < X < 1.0 0 
(0.60)f 
0 1 
(0.60) 
0 
1.0 < X < 2.0 2 
(1.00) 
3 
(1.50) 
0 1 
(0.50) 
3 
(1.50) 
2.0 < X < 3.0 4 
(0.80) 
3 
(0.60) 
1 
(0.20) 
14 
(2.80) 
14 
(2.80) 
V X 
V 1 
o
 
m
 4.0 0 1 
(0.11) 
1 
(0.11) 
12 
(1.33) 
10 
(1.11) 
4.0 < X < 5.0 1 
(0.17) 
0 0 6 
(1.00) 
4 
(0.67) 
5.0 £ X < 6.0 1 
(0.20) 
1 
(0.20) 
0 7 
(1.40) 
4 
(0.80) 
6.0 _< X < 7.0 1 
(0.17) 
1 
(0.17) 
0 7 
(1.17) 
3 
(0.50) 
7.0 < X < 8.0 0 0 0 1 
(0.33) 
3 
(0.10) 
8.0 _< X < 9.0 0 1 
(0.33) 
1 
(0.33) 
0 0 
Over 9.0 0 1 
(0.13) 
0 7 
(0.88) 
7 
(0.88) 
Total 9 12 3 56 48 
®Per • Perception. 
^Cog - Cognition. 
^Dec " Decision. 
^es " Response. 
®Beh " Behavior. 
( ) for error rate, error/plant-year. 
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Errors on response and behavior are higher than other initiating actions 
In both reactor types. For PWRs the slope of response error rate is 
more slowly decreasing over age than that of behavior. This means that 
response is more a generic factor in initiating action than behavior. 
For BWRs, it Is somewhat difficult to determine it because of lack of 
data in the first two-year period. 
D. Initiating Actions Affecting Key Subsystems and Components for LURs 
For all general LWR system categorizations, the initiating actions 
are describing all or at least the principal contribution to the operation 
or maintenance and testing system related events. This section is 
tailored to present the LWR operating experience in a way which will 
clarify components within specific systems of nuclear plants which are 
involved in significant and potentially significant events affecting 
systems and which are caused by human deficiencies. 
Tables 4.23 and 4.26 show initiating action versus system Involved 
for significant (Slg.) and potentially significant (Pot. Slg.) event 
consequence caused by operation (Op.) and maintenance personnel (Mp.) 
for LWR in 1977 and 1978. Total number of errors on the combination 
of response and behavior for operator and maintenance group in Slg. are 
29 and 20. For Pot. Slg. the corresponding errors are 35 and 31. The 
results show sparse data in those tables with respect to the principal 
components (valve, pump, control rods, etc.). 
Subsystems and components involved in the Slg. and Pot. Slg. human 
deficiency caused by Op. and Mp. are shown in Tables 4.27 through 4.30. 
The data for LWRs for the two-year period of 1977 and 1978 are used. 
Table 4.23 Subsystems and components Involved in the significant event 
consequence caused by operator errors for LWR between 1977 
and 1978 
Initiating Action 
System Perception Cognition Decision Response 
AEPS EPS-AC/Pump EPS-EQP/Breaker 
ASNO RWCUS/Valve 
CSRS 
CS 
ECCIS ADS/Unknown ADS/Unknown 
CVCS/Pump eves/Demineralizer 
seals 
ADS-ICS/Logic power 
supply 
IMS LDS/Switch 
RPCS CRS/Control CRS/Control CRS/Control rod (5)* 
rod rod 
MRCS RFWS/Pump (2) RCS/Switch 
RPS RPLS/Unknown 
SNS MFWS/Valve (2) 
MFWS/Switch 
AFWS/Valve 
AFWS/Punq) (2) 
PCS/Turbine 
WPS WPS-GH/Valve 
WPS-GH/Decay tank 
Total 1 1 5 22 
"( ) for number of occurrences. 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
EPS/Switch 3 
1 
SHAS/Fuse 1 
CPES/Valve 1 
5 
IMS/Process computer 2 
CRS/Control rod 8 
3 
1 
7 
WPS-LH/Draln 
WPS-LH/Valve 
7 0 36 
Table 4.24 Subsystems and components involved in the significant event 
consequence caused by maintenance personnel errors for LWR 
between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
System Perception Cognition Decision Response 
AEPS 
ÂSNO 
CSRS 
CS 
ECCIS 
IMS 
RPCS 
MRCS 
RPS 
SNS 
WPS 
NONE 
SWS/Thermal 
Breaker 
EPS-EQP/Transformer 
RWCUS/Demineralizer 
ADS/Vacuum breaker 
ADS/Valve (4)» 
PRMS/Iodine test source 
IMS/Radiation monitor 
RFWS/Flow controller 
AFWS/Valve 
Total 11 
) for number of occurrences. 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
1 
2 
0 
CIS/Valve controller 1 
ADS/Valve CVCS/Switch 10 
eves/Pump seal LPCIS/Logic wire 
ADS-ICS/Switch 
RWRS/Fuse RWRS/Coupling 2 
MSLS/Valve 2 
RPS/Switch 1 
TBS/Valve 2 
0 
None 1 
9 3 24 
Table 4.25 Subsystems and components Involved in the potentially signifi­
cant event consequence caused by operator errors for LWR be­
tween 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
System Perception Cognition Decision Response 
AEPS AEPS/Braker EPS-AC/Valve (2) 
EPS-AC/DG« 
EPS-EQP/Relay contact 
EPS-EQP/Breaker 
AEPS/Relay 
ASNO RWCUS/Valve RWCUS/Valve (2)» 
CCS/Heat exchanger 
CSRS 
CS 
ECCIS CSIS/Valve RHR-SHC/ CSIS/Valve 
Breaker 
CSIS/Pump CSIS/Pump 
eves/Switch 
RCICS/Flow eves/Valve 
Controller 
RHR/Swltch 
IMS 
RFCS 
MRCS RCS/None RCS/Steam drum 
RPS RPLS/Sensor 
RPLS/Annunclator 
SNS MFWS/Breaker 
WPS 
Total 4 2 1 18 
- abbreviation for diesel generator. 
) for number of occurrences. 
^BAST - abbreviation for boric acid storage tank. 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
EPS-AC/Valve 
EPS-AC/Swltch 
AEPS/Relay 
10 
SWS/Valve 
CCS/Heat exchanger 
6 
SCS/Alrlock door 
RCICS/Flow controller 
0 
1 
15 
CVCS/BAST^ 
RHR-SCH/Fuse holder 
RHR-SHC/Valve 
HPIS/Valve 
CSIS/Valve motor 
PRMS/Stop button 1 
CRS/Control rod 1 
RCS/Pressurlzer controller 4 
RCS/Valve 
2 
PCS/Glands 2 
0 
17 0 42 
Table 4.26 Subsystems and components Involved in the potentially signi­
ficant event consequence caused by maintenance personnel 
errors for LWR between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
System Perception Cognition Decision Response 
AEPS 
ASNO 
CSRS 
CS 
ECCIS CVCS/Valve 
IMS 
RPCS 
EPS-EQP/Relay 
EPS-EQP/Jumper 
EPS-OFF/Breaker 
EPS/Brush 
CCS/Valve operator 
CVCS/Switch 
CSIS/Switch 
LPCIS/Valve 
HPCIS/Pump speed 
controller 
ADS-ICS/Valve 
ADS/Switch 
ADS/Vapor operator 
RHR-SHC/Flow controller 
SIS/Valve 
CRS/Cable CRS/Filter 
MRCS 
RPS 
SNS 
WPS 
RPLS/None 
PSS/Valve 
MCS/Water box 
Total 18 
a SG tubes • steam generator tubes. 
^Total number includes two more classification for initiating 
action and one more for subsystem/component (totally, three). 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
EPS-AC/Diesel fuel line EPS-AC/Switch 
CIS/Valve 
HPCIS/Valve 
ECCS-ICS/Trip mechanism 
1 
0 
1 
12 
RINMS/Cable IMS/Switch 2 
CRS/Cable 5 
CRS/Filter 
RPCS/Switch 
MSLS/Indicator 2 
RCS/SG tubes* 
RPCRS/Trip mechanism 3 
RPCRS/Control rod blade 
AFWS/Valve inlet 3 
0 
13 2 35^ 
Table 4.27 Subsystems and components Involved in the significant human 
deficiency caused by operator errors for LWR between 1977 
and 1978 
Initiating Action 
System Perception Cognition Decision Response 
AEPS EPS-AC/Pump EPS-EQP/Breaker 
AEPS/Relay 
EPS-AC/Potentiometer 
ASNO RWCUS/Valve 
CSRS 
CS CIS/Valve 
ECCIS ADS/Unknown ADS/Unknown 
eves/Pump CVCS/Demineralizer 
seals 
ADS-ICS/Logic power 
supply 
SIS/Valve 
RHR-SHC/Valve 
IMS PRMS/Valve LDS/Switch 
PRMS/Valve 
RPCS CRS/Control CRS/Control CRS/Switch CRS/Control rod (5) 
rod (2)3 rod 
CRS/CMI CRS/Control 
rod 
MRCS RFWS/Pump (2) RCS/Switch 
RPS RPLS/Unknown 
SNS MFWS/Unknown MFWS/Valve (2) 
MFWS/Switch 
AFWS/Valve 
AFWS/Pump (2) 
PCS/Turbine 
MFWS/Unknown 
WPS WPS-GH/Valve 
WPS-GH/Decay tank 
Total 3 3 8 28 
) for number of occurrences. 
Total number includes one more classification for ini­
tiator, eight more for initiating action, and one more for subsystem/ 
component (totally, 10 more classifications). 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
EPS/Switch 7 
AEPS/Relay 
EPS-DC/Battery charger 
1 
SHAS/Fuse 1 
CPES/Valve 3 
CIS/Valve 
IMS/Process computer 4 
CRS/Control rod 12 
2 
1 
MCS/Pump strainer 11 
PSS/Unknown 
WPS-LH/Draln 
WPS-LH/Valve 
12 0 
Table 4.28 Subsystems and components Involved in the significant human 
deficiency caused by maintenance personnel errors for LWR 
between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
System Perception Cognition Decision Response 
AEPS 
ASNO 
CSRS 
CS 
ECCIS 
IMS 
RPCS 
MRCS 
RPS 
SNS 
WPS 
NONE 
SWS/Thermal 
breaker 
EPS-EQP/Trans­
former 
RWCUS/Demineral-
izer 
CIS/Airlock door 
ADS/Vacuum breaker 
ADS/Valve (4)* 
SIS/Valve 
PSMS/Iodine test 
source 
IMS/Radiation 
monitor 
CRS/CMlb 
CRS/Pilter 
RFWS/Flow 
controller 
AFUS/Valve 
Total 0 1 0 15 
) for number of occurrences. 
^CMI • abbreviation for control motion Inhibit. 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
1 
2 
0 
CIS/Valve controller 2 
ADS/Valve eves/Switch 11 
eves/Pump seal LPCIS/Loglc wire 
ADS-ICS/Switch 
2 
RWRS/Fuse RWRS/Coupllng 6 
CRS/Fllter 
RPCS/Switch 
MSLS/Valve 2 
RPS/Switch 2 
RPCRS/Control rod blade 
TBS/Valve 2 
0 
NONE 1 
12 3 31 
Table 4.29 Subsystems and components Involved in the potentially signifi­
cant human deficiency caused by operator errors for LWR be­
tween 1977 and 1978 
System 
AEPS 
ASNO 
CSRS 
CS 
Initiating Action 
Perception Cognition Decision 
AEPS/Breaker 
RWCUS/Valve SWS/Valve CCS/Valve 
CSIS/Pump 
Response 
E^S-AC/Valve (2)a 
EPS-AC/DG 
BPS-EQP/Relay contact 
EPS-EQP/Breaker 
EPS-DC/Battery 
charger 
RWCUS/Valve (2) 
CCS/Heat exchanger 
SWS/Valve 
CIS/Valve 
ECCIS CSIS/Valve 
CSIS/Pump 
RCICS/Flow 
controller 
RHR-SHC/ 
Breaker 
SIS/RWST 
CSIS/Valve 
CSIS/Pump 
CVCS/Switch 
eves/Valve 
RHR/Switch 
SIS/Tank 
IMS 
RPCS 
MRCS 
RPS 
SNS 
WPS 
NONE 
PRMS/Pump 
CRS/Control 
Rod 
RINMS/Instru- PRMS/None 
mentation 
IMS/Monitor 
RCS/None 
PSS/None MCS/Pump 
WPS-LH/Tank WPS-LH/Tank 
CRS/Control rod (2) 
RCS/Steam drum 
RPLS/Sensor 
RPLS/Annunc iator 
MFWS/Breaker 
WPS-LH/MCA 
Total 24 
*( ) for number of occurrences. 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
EPS-AC/Switch 10 
EPS-AC/Valve 
EPS-OFF/None 
SWS/Valve 11 
CCS/Heat exchanger 
CCS/Valve 
RWCUS/Valve 
1 
SCS/Airlock door 4 
CPES/Fan 
CPES/Valve 
RCICS/Flow controller 19 
eves/BAST 
eves/Valve 
RHR-SHC/Fuse holder 
RHR-SHC/Valve 
RHR-SHC/Gasket 
HPlS/Valve 
CSIS/Valve motor 
PSMS/Pump, stop button 
PRMS/None 
CRS/Control rod 4 
RCS/Pressurizer controller 5 
RCS/Valve 
RCS/Valve operator 
2 
PCS/Glands 5 
FTS/Detector lead 
WPS-GH/Valve 4 
None 1 
29 0 73 
Table 4.30 Subsystems and components Involved in the potentially signifi­
cant human deficiency caused by maintenance personnel errors 
for LWR between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
System Perception Cognition Decision Response 
AEPS 
ASMO 
CSRS 
CS 
ECCIS CVCS/Valve 
IMS 
RPCS 
MRCS 
CRS/Cable 
EPS-EQP/Relay 
EPS-EQP/Jumper 
EPS-OFF/Breaker 
EPS/Brush 
SUS/Gearing 
CCWS/Valve 
SPPCS/Cover 
VSS/Valve 
CPES/Valve 
eves/Switch 
CVCS/Pump 
eves/Motor 
CSIS/Switch 
LPCIS/Valve 
HPCIS/Pump speed con­
troller 
HPCIS/Relay 
HPClS/Switch 
ADS-ICS/Valve 
ADS/Switch 
ADS/Valve operator 
RHR-SHC/Flow control­
ler 
RCICS/Blank flange 
PRMS/Gas monitor 
connector 
RINMS/SRM* 
RFWS/Valve 
RPS 
SNS 
RPLS/None 
PSS/Valve 
MCS/Water box (2)«  
WPS 
Total 29 
SRM " abbreviation for source range monitor. 
S.G. • abbreviation for steam generator. 
'( ) for number of occurrences. 
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Initiating Action 
Behavior Unknown Subtotal 
EPS-AC/Diesel fuel line EPS-AC/Switch 6 
SWS/Piping 4 
1 
CIS/Valve 2 
HPCIS/Valve 16 
ECCS-ICS/Trip mechanism 
RINKS/Cable 3 
CRS/Cable 2 
MSLS/lndicator 3 
RCS/S.G.b tubes 
RPCRS/Trip mechanism 2 
AFWS/Valve inlet 6 
MCS/Switch 
WTS/Valve 
13 1 45 
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E. Identification of Generic Initiating Actions for Operator 
and Maintenance Personnel Related to Significant and 
Potentially Significant Events 
Systems involved generic initiating actions for LWRs are obtained 
in Table 4.31. The percentages of system involvement for the generic 
initiating action are provided in the Table. A list of system abbrevia­
tions used given in Appendix D, Generally events related to the 
emergency core cooling injection system (ECCIS) are the most frequently 
reported in LWRs. 
Table 4.31 Systems Involved In generic Initiating action for LWRs 
Response 
Consequence Op® Main^ 
Significant SNS (7, 32)C ECCIS(5, 45) 
Event Consequence RPCS (5, 23) IMS (2, 18) 
ECCIS(3, 14) 
WPS (2, 9 ) 
Potentially Significant AEPS (6, 33) ECCIS(9, 50) 
Event Consequence ECCIS(5, 28) AEPS (4, 22) 
ASNO (3. 17) SNS (2, 11) 
RPS (2. 11) 
Significant SNS (8, 29) ECCIS(6, 40) 
Human Deficiency ECCIS(5, 18) IMS (2, 13) 
RPCS (5, 18) RPCS (2, 13) 
AEPS (3. 11) 
WPS (2, 7 ) 
IMS (2, 7 ) 
Potentially Significant ECCIS(6. 25) ECCIS(13 ,45) 
Human Deficiency AEPS (6. 25) AEPS (4, 14) 
ASNO (3. 13) ASNO (3. 10) 
RPCS (2. 8 ) SNS (3, 10) 
RPS (2, 8 ) IMS (2. 7 ) 
^Op = abbreviation of operator. 
^Maln - abbreviation of maintenance group. 
'^(n^, n^) • nj^ Is the frequency of error involved In the system, n^ 
Is the percentage of total category events. For example, SNS(7> 32)^; 
seven operator errors and 32 percent of total response errors caused by 
the operator for the significant event consequence Involved in SNS. 
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Behavior 
Op Main 
WPS (2, 29) ECCIS(3, 33) 
ECCIS(6, 35) 
AEPS (3, 18) 
ASNO (2, 12) 
MRCS (2, 12) 
RPCS (3, 23) 
ECCIS(2, 15) 
MRCS (2. 15) 
RPS (2, 15) 
AEPS (3, 25) 
CS (2, 17) 
SNS (2, 17) 
WPS (2, 17) 
ECCIS(3. 25) 
RPCS (3, 25) 
RPS (2, 17) 
ECCIS(8, 28) 
ASNO (4, 14) 
AEPS (3, 10) 
IMS (3, 10) 
MRCS (3, 10) 
CS (3, 10) 
SNS (2, 7 ) 
SNS (3, 23) 
ECCIS(2, 15) 
MRCS (2, 15) 
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V. IDENTIFICATION OF SW^IIFICANT TRENDS IN 
HUMAN RELATED EVENTS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
The purpose of this part of the study is to identify significant 
trends of the human related events in nuclear power plants. The Impact 
of human error on the safety of LWR power plants requires that specific 
types of human error problems and generic causes be identified to mitigate 
recurrent problems. For the purposes of this study the following are 
performed: 
• Identification of transient periods in learning trends for human 
related events using developed K-Heans clustering program. 
• Identification of generic systems involved in human initiated 
actions for learning period and stationary status. 
• Identification of generic components involved in initiated actions 
for learning period and stationary status, 
• Construction of tables on the observed value, the fitted value, 
and Freeman-Tukey (F-T) deviates for the various combinations 
of the factors. The tables for the fitted value and F-T 
deviates can be obtained through modeling the tables on the 
corresponding observed value. 
• Identification of generic association among factors. 
A. Transient Periods in Learning Trends for Human Related 
Events Using Developed K-Means Clustering Program 
In Chapter 4, trending analysis has been performed for the plant age, 
reactor mode, and initiating action opposed to other various variables 
such as: initiator, significance (S,P, and I) on human deficiency and 
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event consequence, significance criteria, status of system Involved, 
systems, and components. The coarse screening in the previous chapter 
includes analyses of tables and polygons, and indicates needs for 
grouping and matching of plant experience into reasonably homogeneous 
groups to support meaningful analysis. As an effort clustering analysis 
using K-Means algorithm is used to identify cut points between two 
phases: earlier failure and stationary status. Table 5.1 indicates that 
the first three years after commercial operation in nuclear power plants 
can be considered as an earlier failure phase (generally high error rate) 
and stationary status (low error rate) follows for over three-year 
experience. The program developed here is listed In Appendix A and the 
number of clusters is selected on the basis of sum of squared distances 
empirically. For BWRs, the data for the first three years are lack of 
information (e.g., no power plants operating on age groups 0 <x <1 
and 2 j&x <3 for 1978 and age group 1 ^ x <2 for 1977). However, the 
human error rates on BWRs is likely to behave those of PWRs based on the 
results from clustering analysis In Table 5.1. 
B. Generic Systems Involved In Human Initiated Actions for 
Learning Period and Stationary Status 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show a general ordering for the systems Involved 
in human errors for PWRs and BWRs, respectively. Table 5.4 gives the 
number of frequencies of system Involvement for the initiating actlor 
In the learning and stationary periods for the reactor type. General 
ordering and percentage of system Involvement in generic initiating 
action category are shown In Tables 5.5 through 5.8 for two different 
Table 5.1 Summary of clustering on human error rates in PWRs/BWRs 
Reactor No. of No. of No. of 
Description Type Case Variables Clusters 
Plant Age — — — 
Operator (Op) PWR 8 2 3 
and 
Maintenance (Main) BWR 8 2 2 
Reactor Mode PWR 8 7 3 
BWR 8 7 2 
Initiating Action PWR 8 5 2 
BWR 8 5 2 
Event Consequence PWR 8 3 2 
BWR 8 3 2 
Human Deficiency PWR 8 3 3 
BWR 8 3 2 
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Clustered Age Groups 
0 . 5  1 . 5  2 . 5  3 . 5  4 . 5  5 . 5  6 . 5  7 . 5  
1 2 2 3 3 3 2  3  
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
1  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  
3  
2 
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Table 5.1 (continued) 
Mean Error Rate (Error/Plant-Year) 
Description Variables* Ist 2nd 3rd 
Operator (Op) Op 
and Main 
Maintenance (Main) Op 
Main 
Reactor Mode 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Initiating Action Per 
Cog 
Dec 
Res 
Beh 
Per 
Cog 
Dec 
Res 
Beh 
Event S 
Consequence P 
I 
S 
P 
I 
Human Deficiency S 
P 
1 
S 
P 
I 
6.96 2.70 0.97 1.215 
1.58 1.27 0.98 
2.75 0.75 6.297 
2.55 1.45 
6.33 2.59 1.58 
0.63 0.73 0.34 
0.63 0.07 0.05 1.510 
0.95 0.15 0.07 
0.63 0.94 0.25 
0.00 0.34 0.13 
0.32 0.20 0.10 
4.80 1.44 
0.40 0.27 
0.20 0.05 5.307 
0.40 0.16 
0.20 0.35 
2.00 0.17 
0.00 0.10 
0.11 0.17 
0.47 0.12 
0.53 0.07 6.050 
3.16 1.33 
2.02 0.70 
0.80 0.22 
0.60 0.39 4.619 
0.20 0.03 
2.80 0.94 
2.80 0.76 
1.35 0.33 
1.18 0.53 7.756 
3.98 1.67 
0.85 0.42 
0.95 0.49 3.420 
4.70 1.24 
2.22 1.11 0.36 
2.85 1.10 0.78 3.462 
4.43 2.04 0.77 
0.85 0.52 
1.80 0.74 3.980 
3.85 0.89 
defers to classification scheme in Chapter 3. 
^SuD of sum of squared distance. 
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Table 5.2 Systems involved in human errors (or the PWRs for the 
period between 1977 and 1978 
Plant System Number of Percent of Total 
Age Involved Events Events 
SNS 25 22.9 
ECCIS 20 18.3 
AEPS 12 11.0 
CS 11 10,1 
IMS 11 10.1 
BPCS 10 9.2 
ASNO 8 7.3 
MRCS 5 4.6 
WPS 4 3.7 
CSRS 1 0.9 
RPS 1 0.9 
Unknown 1 0.9 
Total 109 
SNS 26 20.5 
ECCIS 20 15.7 
AEPS 14 11.0 
IMS 14 11.0 
CS 12 9.4 
RPCS 10 7.9 
ASNO 9 7.1 
RPS 7 5.5 
MRCS 5 3.9 
WPS 5 3.9 
CSRS 4 3.1 
Unknown 1 0.8 
Total 127 
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Table 5.3 Systems involved in human errors for the BWRs for the 
period between 1977 and 1978 
Plant System Nuoter of Percent of Total 
Age Involved Events Events 
ECCIS 18 30.5 
IMS 10 16.9 
SNS 4 6.8 
WPS 4 6.8 
CS 4 6.8 
ECCRS 4 6.8 
Unknown 4 6.8 
ASNO 3 5.1 
RPCS 3 5.1 
MRCS 2 3.4 
AEPS 2 3.4 
CSRS J, 1.7 
Total 59 
ECCIS 26 27.7 
MRCS 8 8.5 
AEPS 8 8.5 
ASNO 7 7.4 
SNS 7 7.4 
IMS 7 7.4 
RPCS 6 6.4 
RPS 6 6.4 
WPS 6 6.4 
CS 5 5.3 
Unknown 4 4.3 
CSRS 2 2.1 
ECCRS 2.1 
Total 94 
Table 5.4 Number of frequencies on initiating action for the different systems in PWR/BWR for 
the period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Plant System 
Type Age Involved Response Behavior Cognition Decision Perception Unknown Total 
PWR Under 3 AEPS 7 
ASNO 3 
CSRS 0 
CS 4 
ECCIS 11 
IMS 6 
RPCS 5 
MRCS 0 
RPS 1 
SNS 16 
WPS 1 
Unknown 1 
Over 3 AEPS 7 
ASNO 5 
CSRS 2 
CS 7 
ECCIS 11 
IMS 4 
RPCS 4 
MRCS 1 
RPS 4 
SNS 15 
WPS 2 
Unknown 1 
BWR Under 3 AEPS 1 
ASNO 2 
CSRS 1 
CS 0 
3 1 0 0 1 12 
4 1 0 0 0 8 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
3 3 0 0 1 11 
7 0 2 0 0 20 
2 1 2 0 0 11 
0 2 2 1 0 10 
3 0 2 0 0 5 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
6 0 1 0 2 25 
1 0 0 0 2 4 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
4 1 1 0 1 14 
2 1 1 0 0 9 
0 0 0 1 1 4 
4 0 0 0 1 12 
4 2 1 0 2 20 
4 1 0 2 3 14 
3 0 1 2 0 10 
3 1 0 0 0 5 
1 0 0 0 2 7 
8 2 0 1 0 26 
2 0 0 0 1 5 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 0 2 
0 1 0 0 0 3 
0 0 0 0 0 1 
3 0 1 0 0 4 
Table 5.4 (continued) 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Plant System 
Type Age Involved Response Behavior Cognition Decision Perception Unknown Total 
Over 3 
ECCIS 8 4 0 0 1 5 18 
ECCRS 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 
IMS 0 4 2 0 2 2 10 
RPCS 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 
MRCS 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
RPS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SNS 2 1 1 0 0 0 4 
WPS 1 0 1 0 2 0 4 
Unknown 0 3 1 0 0 0 4 
AEPS 6 2 0 0 0 0 8 
ASNO 3 2 0 0 1 1 7 
CSRS 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
CS 1 2 1 0 0 1 5 
ECCIS 16 7 0 1 1 1 26 
ECCRS 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
IMS 2 2 1 1 0 1 7 
RPCS 3 2 0 0 1 6 
MRCS 4 3 0 0 0 1 8 
RPS 1 4 0 0 0 1 6 
SNS 1 4 1 0 0 1 7 
WPS 3 1 1 0 0 1 6 
Unknown 0 2 1 0 0 1 4 
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time periods for the reactor type. Comparison of Tables 5,5 through 5.8 
show little difference between initiating action category and system 
relationship for PWRs and BWRs. 
C. Generic Components Involved in Initiating Actions for 
Learning Period and Stationary Status 
Table 5.9 lists the percentage of individual component Involvement 
in two plant age periods for the reactor type. Valves, switches, and 
control rods are common to most of the plant age groups in the reactor 
types. The component involvements in the generic Initiating action 
category are shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 for the PWRs and BWRs, 
respectively. Valves are common to most of the generic initiating 
action, however, switches and control rods which are other major 
components are somewhat different depending on the reactor type and 
periods for learning and stationary. 
D. Tables on the Observed Value, the Fitted Value, and the Freeman-Tukey 
Deviates for the Various Combinations of the Factors 
In this section multiway contingency tables on the observed value, 
the fitted value and the Freeman-Tukey (F-T) deviates are provided. 
The tables for the cross-classified categorical human related events 
are related to the various combinations of the factors; reactor type, 
plant age, system, component, initiating action, and other variables in 
the TRACE classification scheme. 
The division of age groups in two phases is useful to provide reduced 
data for the analysis of multiway contingency tables which provide more 
accurate estimates for the probabilities of the events by forming a 
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Table 5.5 Systems Involved in generic problems for initiating action in 
PWRs whose plant ages are under 3 years 
Initiating System Number of Percent of 
Action Involved Events Total Category Events 
Response SNS 
ECCIS 
AEPS 
IMS 
RPCS 
CS 
ASNO 
BPS 
WPS 
Unknown 
Total 
Behavior ECCIS 
SNS 
ASNO 
AEPS 
CS 
MRCS 
IMS 
CSRS 
WPS 
Total 
Cognition CS 
RPCS 
IMS 
AEPS 
ASNO 
Total 
Decision ECCIS 
IMS 
RPCS 
MRCS 
SNS 
Total 
16 29.1 
11 20.0 
7 12.7 
6 10,9 
5 9.1 
4 7.3 
3 5.5 
1 1.8 
1 1.8 
1 1.8 
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7 23.3 
6 20.0 
4 13.3 
3 10.0 
3 10.0 
3 10.0 
2 6.7 
1 3.3 
1 3.3 
30 
3 37.5 
2 25.0 
1 12.5 
1 12.5 
1 12.5 
8 
2 22.2 
2 22.2 
2 22.2 
2 22.2 
1 11.1 
9 
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Table 5.6 Systems Involved In generic problems for Initiating action In 
PWRs whose plant ages are over 3 years 
Initiating System Number of Percent of 
Action Involved Events Total Category Events 
Response SNS 15 23.8 
ECCIS 11 17.5 
CS 7 11.1 
AEPS 7 11.1 
ASNO 5 7.9 
IMS 4 6.3 
RFCS 4 6.3 
RPS 4 6.3 
CSRS 2 3.2 
WPS 2 3.2 
MRCS 1 1.6 
Unknown _1 1.6 
Total 63 
Behavior SNS 8 22.9 
ECCIS 4 11.4 
IMS 4 11.4 
AEPS 4 11.4 
CS 4 11.4 
RPCS 3 8.6 
MRCS 3 8.6 
ASNO 2 5.7 
WPS 2 5.7 
RPS _1 2.9 
Total 35 
Cognition SNS 2 25.0 
ECCIS 2 25.0 
AEPS 1 12.5 
ASNO 1 12.5 
IMS 1 12.5 
MRCS 12.5 
Total 8 
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Table 5.7 Systems Involved In generic problems for Initiating action in 
BWRs whose plant ages are under 3 years 
Initiating Systems Number of Percent of 
Action Involved Events Total Category Events 
Response ECCIS 
SNS 
ASNO 
AEPS 
CSRS 
ECCRS 
RPCS 
WPS 
Total 
8 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
17 
47.1 
11.8 
11.8 
5,9 
5.9 
5.9 
5,9 
5.9 
Behavior 
IMS 
CS 
Unknown 
AEPS 
MRCS 
SNS 
Total 
4 
4 
3 
3 
1 
1 
_1 
19 
23,5 
23.5 
17.6 
17.6 
5.9 
5.9 
5.9 
Cognition IMS 
ASNO 
ECCRS 
RPCS 
SNS 
WPS 
Unknown 
Total 
25,0 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12.5 
12,5 
12,5 
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Table 5.8 Systems Involved In generic problems for Initiating action in 
BWRs whose power plant aRes are over 3 vears 
Initiating System Number of Percent of 
Action Involved Events Total Category Events 
Response ECCIS 16 40.0 
AEPS 6 15.0 
MRCS 4 10.0 
WPS 3 7.5 
ASNO 3 7.5 
RPCS 3 7.5 
IMS 2 5.0 
SNS 1 2.5 
RPS 1 2.5 
CS _1 2.5 
Total 40 
Behavior ECCIS 7 21.9 
RPS 4 12.5 
SNS 4 12.5 
MRCS 3 9.4 
AEPS 2 6.3 
ASNO 2 6.3 
CS 2 6.3 
IMS 2 6.3 
RPCS 2 6.3 
Unknown 2 6.3 
ECCRS 1 3.1 
WPS _1 3.1 
Total 32 
Table 5.9 Most frequent components Involved for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Reactor Plant Number of Percent of Total 
Type Age Component Events/Category Events/Category 
0 < X < 3 Valve/valve operator/valve motor 24 24.5 
Control rod/control blade/CHI 7 7.1 
Tank 7 7.1 
Switch 6 6.1 
Breaker 5 5.1 
Door/Hatch 5 5.1 
Pump/pump seal 5 5.1 
Monitor, Radiation 4 4.1 
3 < X Valve/valve operator/valve motor 37 30.6 
Switch 9 7.4 
Pump/pump seal 8 6.6 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 7 5.8 
Door/Hatch 5 4.1 
Tank 5 4.1 
Trip unit/Trip mechanism 4 3.3 
Monitor, radiation 4 3.3 
0 < X < 3 Valve/valve operator/valve motor 13 26.5 
Monitor, radiation 5 10.2 
Door/Hatch 3 6.1 
3 < X Valve/valve operator/valve motor 24 28,2 
Switch 12 14.1 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 5 5.9 
Table 5.10 Most frequent components Involved In generic initiating action In PWRs 
Plant Initiating Component Number of Percent of 
Age Action Involved Events Total Category Events 
Response Valve/valve operator/valve motor 12 21.8 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 4 7.3 
Tank 4 7.3 
Switch 4 7.3 
Breaker 3 5.5 
Behavior Valve/valve operator/valve motor 9 37.5 
Pump/pump seal 2 8.3 
Tank 2 8.3 
Cognition Valve/valve operator/valve motor 3 42.9 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 2 28.6 
Response Valve/valve operator/valve motor 21 33.9 
Switch 6 9.7 
Water box 4 6.5 
Pump/pump seal 3 4,8 
Door/Hatch 3 4.8 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 3 4.8 
Behavior Valve/valve operator/valve motor 10 29.4 
Tank 3 8.8 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 3 8.8 
Table 5.11 Most frequent components involved in generic initiating action in BWRs 
Plant Initiating Component Number of Percent of 
Age Action Involved Events Total Category Events 
0 < X < 3 Response Valve/valve operator/valve motor 7 43.8 
Behavior Valve/valve operator/valve motor 4 26.7 
Controller, pressure or flow 2 13.3 
Door/Hatch 2 13.3 
3 < X Response Valve/valve operator/valve motor 11 28.9 
Switch 5 13.2 
Pump/pump seal 3 7.9 
Behavior Valve/valve operator/valve motor 6 19.4 
Switch 4 12.9 
Piping/piping material/pipe clamp 3 9.7 
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parsimonious model to fit the data well and describe the relationship 
between the factors of the following subjects: 
1. If some categories of Initiating action are highly associated with 
particular reactor modes in the learning period and stationary 
status for the reactor type (e.g., PWR and BWR). 
2. For the case of slgnflciance of event consequence instead of the 
Initiating action in 1. 
3. Same as the number 1 except the variable of significance of the 
human deficiency Instead of initiating action. 
4. If some categories of initiating action are highly associated 
with particular systems in the learning and stationary periods 
for the reactor type. 
5. For the particular components instead of systems in number 4. 
6. For the particular systems which are connected with valve/valve 
operator/valve motor Instead of systems in number 4. 
7. Combination of numbers 1 and 2, It is to identify the 
categories of significance of event consequence in each initiating 
action that are highly associated with particular reactor modes in 
the learning and stationary status for the reactor type, 
8. Without consideration of age groups (learning and stationary phases) 
it is to determine which categories of initiating action are highly 
associated with particular generic systems in PWRs and BVTRs. 
9. Same as number 8 except particular components Instead of systems. 
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10. Same as number 8 except particular systems which are involved in 
valve/valve operator/valve motor instead of systems. 
11. Same as number 7 except without consideration of age groups. 
These analyses are achieved by using recent editions of commercially 
available computer packages such as the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) 
(33) and the Biomedical Computer Programs (BMDP) (3). For the analyses 
here, data and the program BMDP3F for the analysis of multiway frequency 
tables using log-linear model are called by a SAS program since it is 
much more convenient to manage data files with SAS than with the BMDP 
package. Chapter 2 includes general description for the analysis of mul­
tiway frequency table. For convenience, concise steps to solve the above 
eleven subjects using BMDP3F are listed: 
Step 1; Select a model using screening specified models. Interactions 
among factors are examined and models which contain the most significant 
factors, including two-factor or three-factor interactions, all possible 
combinations of the moderately large interactions, and interactions that 
are unlikely to be necessary are fitted to the data. Marginal and partial 
association are tested to screen the vatious interactions to determine if 
2 2 they are necessary (high G ), if they are questionable (moderate G ) or 
2 2 if they are unnecessary (low G ). Also values of G printed for the var­
ious fitted models by BMP3F are examined to select the proper model. For 
2 
the sparce data the difference of G for a test of the two or three-factor 
interaction can be used. 
Step 2; Freeman-Tukey (F-T) residuals are printed for the selected model 
and examined to identify highly associated categories with various 
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variables specified in the above eleven subjects. 
Large positive F-T deviates (here approximately more than 2.0) 
indicate that a category of action is highly associated with other 
variables. 
Tables 3.12 through 5.22 corresponding to the above eleven sub­
jects are used as input data for the program BMDP3F. 
To avoid zero expected frequencies in the log-linear model a con­
stant (0.5) is added to each cell before fitting models and the sig­
nificance level for the goodness-of-fit test is used by default (0.05). 
Table 5.23 summarizes the selected models for the data, which are 
corresponding to 11 subjects using step 1. Various combinations of all 
possible factors for the data are tested and an appropriate model for 
2 
each subject is selected using small G and chl-square statistic with 
high probability for each statistic. The model in Table 5.23 can be 
described by minimal hierarchical form using a log-linear model. For 
example, (IM, AT) represents the log-linear model 
*ljk2 ° "l(i) "M(j) "A(k) "T(A) "iM(lj) "AT(kil) 
where " expected value of the observed frequencies and u's satisfy 
the constraints 
I "1(1) • ^ "MO) • I "ACk) • I "T«)- " 
J "iMdJ) " J "IMCIJ) • ^ "AT(kll) " J "AT(1C«,)" "• (5.2) 
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The first model (I, M, AT) in Table 5.23 Indicates that there is 
one two-factor interaction: AT, where I, M, A, and T are the 
abbreviations for initiating action, reactor node, age, and reactor 
type. The fitted values and F-T deviates for the models in Table 5.23 
are shown in Figures 5.1 through 5.22. For the first subject (factors 
among I, M, A, and T) the observed, the expected values, and F-T 
deviates for the model (I, M, AT) can be found in Table 5.12, Figures 
5.1 and 5.2, respectively. The subjects 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11 in Table 
5.23 are independent among factors and the subjects 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 
include two-factor interactions. Specially the models (AT, HMA, HMT) 
and (AT, EMT) involve three-factor interactions. 
E. Generic Association Among Factors 
Inconsistencies in the pattern of association across the various 
systems and reactor types are investigated using F-T deviates. 
Largest F-T deviates in each selected model are summarized and 
probable generic association (moderate and high) among some combinations 
of factors (T, A, M, S, C, I, E, and H) are shown in Table 5.24. 
Decision error type is highly associated with startup reactor 
mode in the PWRs of age group under 3. 
Response error type is highly associated with Secondary Non«-Nuclear 
Systems (SNS) in PWRs and significance error type of event consequence 
in BWRs. It is assumed that less than 1.4, between 1.4 and 1.8, and 
over 1.8 for the values of F-T deviates are considered as not associated, 
moderately, and highly associated, respectively. 
Table 5.12 Number of frequencies on initiating action for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Plant Reactor 
Type Age Mode Response Behavior Cognition Decision 
Under 3 Steady state 30 20 5 1 
Start-up 7 1 1 4 
Cold shutdown 9 4 0 2 
Over 3 Steady state 44 20 5 2 
Start-up 7 4 2 0 
Cold shutdown 7 4 0 1 
Under 3 Steady state 10 7 3 2 
Start-up 1 0 0 0 
Cold shutdotm 1 1 1 0 
Over 3 Steady state 27 14 4 0 
Start-up 7 5 0 1 
Cold shutdown 3 4 1 0 
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Figure 5.1 The estimated expected values for the model (I, M, AT) 
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Figure 5.2 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (I, M, AT) 
Table 5.13 Number of frequencies on event consequence for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Event Consequence 
Reactor Plant Reactor . 
Type Age Mode Slg.* Pot. Sig. Inslg.^ 
Under 3 Steady state 12 9 38 
Start-up 7 1 5 
Cold shutdown 0 5 11 
Over 3 Steady state 13 12 54 
Start-up 0 5 9 
Cold shutdown 0 5 8 
Under 3 Steady state 2 6 21 
Start-up 1 0 1 
Cold shutdown 2 0 2 
Over 3 Steady state 7 18 31 
Start-up 3 2 7 
Cold shutdown 1 3 4 
^Significant. 
Potentially significant. 
^Insignificant. 
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Figure 5.4 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (AT, EMT) 
Table 5.14 Number of frequencies on human deficiency for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Human deficiency 
Reactor Plant Reactor , 
Type Age Mode Sig.* Pot. Slg. Insig.^ 
Under 3 Steady state 16 15 26 
Start-up 8 2 3 
Cold shutdown 2 6 8 
Over 3 Steady state 19 21 39 
Start-up 0 9 5 
Cold Shutdown 0 8 4 
Under 3 Steady state 2 10 15 
Start-up 1 0 1 
Cold shutdown 2 0 2 
Over 3 Steady state 8 25 20 
Start-up 4 2 6 
Cold shutdown 2 5 1 
^Significant. 
^Potentially Significant. 
^Insignificant. 
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Figure 5.6 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (AT, HMA, HKT) 
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Table 5.15 Number of frequencies on Initiating action for the different 
systems in PWR/BWR for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Plant 
Type Age System Response Behavior Cognition 
PWR Under 3 
Over 3 
BWR Under 3 
Over 3 
AEPS 7 3 1 
ASNO 3 4 1 
CS 4 3 3 
ECCIS 11 7 0 
IMS 6 2 1 
RPCS 5 0 2 
MRCS 0 3 0 
SNS 16 6 0 
WPS 1 1 0 
AEPS 7 4 1 
ASNO 5 2 1 
CS 7 4 0 
ECCIS 11 4 2 
IMS 4 4 1 
RPCS 4 3 0 
MRCS 1 3 1 
SNS 15 8 2 
WPS 2 2 0 
AEPS 1 1 0 
ASNO 2 0 1 
CS 0 3 0 
ECCIS 8 4 0 
IMS 0 4 2 
RPCS 1 0 1 
MRCS 0 1 0 
SNS 2 1 1 
WPS 1 0 1 
AEPS 6 2 0 
ASNO 3 2 0 
CS 1 2 1 
ECCIS 16 7 0 
IMS 2 2 1 
RPCS 3 2 0 
MRCS 4 3 0 
SNS 1 4 1 
WPS 3 1 1 
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Figure 5.7 The estimated expected values for the model (I, ST, AT) 
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Figure 5.8 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (I, ST, AT) 
Table 5.16 Number of frequencies on initiating action for the generic components in PWR/BWR for the 
period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Plant 
Type Age Component Involved Response Behavior 
PWR 0 < X < 3 Breaker 3 0 
Controller, Pressure or flow 2 1 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 4 0 
Door/Hatch 2 1 
Radiation monitor 2 1 
Pump/pump seal 1 2 
Relay 2 1 
Switch 4 1 
Tank 4 2 
Valve, valve operator, valve motor 12 9 
3 < X Breaker 0 0 
Controller, pressure or flow 1 0 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 3 3 
Door/Hatch 3 2 
Radiation monitor 2 0 
Pump/pump seal 3 0 
Relay 2 0 
Switch 6 1 
Tank 1 3 
Valve, valve operator, valve motor 21 10 
BWR 0 < X < 3 Breaker 0 1 
Controller, pressure or flow 0 2 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 0 0 
Door/Hatch 1 2 
Radiation monitor 1 1 
Pump/pump seal 0 1 
Table 5.16 (continued) 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Plant 
Type Age Component involved Response Behavior 
Relay 1 0 
Switch 1 0 
Tank 0 0 
Valve, valve operator, valve motor 7 4 
Breaker 2 0 
Controller, pressure or flow 2 0 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 2 2 
Door/Hatch 0 2 
Radiation monitor 1 1 
Pump/pump seal 3 0 
Relay 0 0 
Switch 5 4 
Tank 0 1 
Valve, valve operator, valve motor 11 6 
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Figure 5.10 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (I, C, A, T) 
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Table 5.17 Number of frequencies on Initiating action for the systems 
Involved which are connected with valve/valve operator/valve 
motor In PWR/BWR for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Plant System 
Type Age Involved Response Behavior 
PWR Under 3 AEPS 1 0 
ASNO 2 2 
CSRS 0 0 
CS 0 2 
ECCIS 2 2 
MRCS 0 1 
SNS 6 1 
WPS 1 1 
Over 3 AEPS 1 1 
ASNO 2 1 
CSRS 1 0 
CS 4 2 
ECCIS 6 2 
MRCS 0 2 
SNS 7 1 
WPS 0 1 
BWR Under 3 AEPS 0 0 
ASNO 2 0 
CSRS 1 0 
CS 0 0 
ECCIS 4 2 
MRCS 0 1 
SNS 0 0 
WPS 0 0 
Over 3 AEPS 1 0 
ASNO 2 1 
CSRS 0 0 
CS 1 1 
ECCIS 4 1 
MRCS 1 1 
SNS 0 2 
WPS 1 0 
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Figure 5.11 The estimated expected values for the model (I, S, A, T) 
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Figure 5.12 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (I, S, A, T) 
Table 5.18 Human errors on event consequence caused by Initiating 
action In PWR/BWR for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Reactor Plant Initiating Action Response 
Type Age Reactor Mode Event Consequence Slg.a Pot. Slg.° Inslgf 
PWR Under 3 Steady state 7 6 17 
Startup 4 0 3 
Cold shutdown 0 2 7 
Over 3 Steady state 8 8 28 
Startup 0 3 4 
Cold shutdown 0 3 4 
BWR Under 3 Steady state 0 3 7 
Startup 1 0 0 
Cold shutdown 0 0 1 
Over 3 Steady state 4 8 15 
Startup 3 2 2 
Cold Shutdown 0 2 1 
^Significant. 
^Potentially significant. 
^Insignificant. 
Slg 
4 
1 
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2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
3 
0 
1 
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Behavior Cognition Decision 
Pot. Slg. Insig. Slg. Pot. Slg. Insig. Slg. Pot. Slg. Insig. 
2 14 1 0 4 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 
2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 
4 14 1 0 4 1 0 1 
2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
2 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 4 0 0 3 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
8 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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Figure 5.13 The estimated expected values for the model (IM, EM, AT) 
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Figure 5.14 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (IM, EM, AT) 
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Table 5.19 Hunian errors on Initiating action for the generic systems In 
PWR/BWK for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor System 
Type Involved Response Behavior Cognition 
PWR AEPS 14 7 2 
ASNO 8 6 2 
CS 11 7 3 
ECCIS 22 11 2 
IMS 10 6 2 
RPCS 9 3 2 
MRCS 16 1 
SNS 31 14 2 
WPS 3 3 0 
BWR AEPS 7 3 0 
ASNO 5 2 1 
CS 1 5 1 
ECCIS 24 11 0 
IMS 2 6 3 
RPCS 4 2 1 
MRCS 4 4 0 
SNS 3 5 2 
WPS 4 1 2 
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Figure 5.16 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (I, ST) 
185 
Table 5.20 Human errors on initiating action for the generic components 
in PWR/BWK, for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor Component 
Type Involved Response Behavior 
PWR Breaker 3 0 
Controller, pressure or flow 3 1 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 7 3 
Door/Hatch 5 3 
Radiation monitor 4 1 
Pump/pump seal 4 2 
Relay 4 1 
Switch 10 2 
Tank 5 5 
Valve/valve operator/valve motor 33 19 
BWR Breaker 2 1 
Controller, pressure or flow 2 2 
Control rod/control blade/CMI 2 2 
Door/Hatch 1 4 
Radiation monitor 2 2 
Pump/pump seal 3 1 
Relay 1 0 
Switch 6 4 
Tank 0 1 
Valve/ valve operator/valve motor 18 10 
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Figure 5.17 The estimated expected values for the model (I, C, T) 
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Figure 5.18 The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (I, C, T) 
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Table 5.21 Human errors on Initiating action for the systems involved 
which are connected with valve/valve operator/valve motor 
in PWR/BWR for the period between 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action 
Reactor System 
Type Involved Response Behavior 
AEPS 2 1 
ASNO 4 2 
CSRS 1 0 
CS 4 4 
ECCIS 8 4 
MRCS 0 3 
SNS 13 2 
WPS 1 2 
AEPS 1 0 
ASNO 4 1 
CSRS 1 0 
CS 1 1 
ECCIS 8 3 
MRCS 1 2 
SNS 0 2 
WPS 1 0 
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Figure 5.20. The Freeman-Tukey deviates for the model (I, S, T) 
Table 5.22 Human errors on event consequence caused by Initiating action in PWR/BWR for the 
period 1977 and 1978 
Initiating Action Response Behavior 
Reactor Reactor . 
Type Mode Event Consequence Slg.* Pot. Sig. Inslg.^ Sig. Pot. Sig. Inslg. 
PWR Steady state 
Start-up 
Cold shutdown 
BWR Steady state 
Start-up 
Cold shutdown 
15 14 45 
4 3 7 
0 5 11 
4 11 22 
4 2 2 
0 2 2 
6 6 28 
12 2 
0 4 6 
4 10 7 
0 14 
2 12 
^Significant. 
''potentially significant. 
^Insignificant. 
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Figure 5.21 The estimated expected values for the model (E, I, M, T) 
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Table 5.23 Seclected models for the corresponding 11 subjects for the analysis of multiway 
contingency tables 
Subject No. Model* D.F.^ LR. CHISQ^ Prob.^ P. CHISQ® Prob.^ 
1 (I,M,AT) 39 33.13 0.7340 38.64 0.4862 
2 (AT,EMT) 16 19.16 0.2604 17.67 0.3434 
3 (AT,HMA, MNT) 8 11.01 0.2012 10.10 0.2581 
4 (I,ST,AT) 86 66.18 0.9445 66.38 0.9425 
5 (I,C,A,T) 67 45.63 0.9789 44.99 0.9822 
6 (I,S,A,T) 53 29.92 0.9956 28.37 0.9978 
7 (IM,EM,AT) 123 67.72 1.0000 69.42 1.0000 
8 (I.ST) 34 39.08 0.2520 37,28 0.3207 
9 (I.C.T) 28 17.49 0.9383 16.44 0.9588 
10 (I,S,T) 22 22.53 0.4288 20.98 0.5220 
11 (E,I,M,T) 29 32.20 0.3112 33.00 0.2779 
®I; Initiating action (Response, Behavior, Cognition, and Decision). 
D: Event consequence (S,P, and IX 
M: Reactor mode (Steady state, Start-up, and Cold shutdown). 
A: Plant age (under 3 and over 3). Three year operation of reactor is included in over 3. 
T: Reactor type (PWR and BWR). 
S: System (AEPS, ASNO, CS, ECCIS, IMS, RPCS, MRCS, SNS, and WPS). 
C: Component (up to 10 types). 
^Degree of freedom. 
likelihood ratio chi-square (G^). 
^he probability of exceeding the computed test statistic, 
^Pearson chi-square. 
^The probability of exceeding the computed chi-square test statistic. 
Table 5.24 Probable generic association among factors 
Subject Reactor Reactor 
No. Model Type Age Mode System Component 
8 
9 
10 
11 
(T) (A) (M) (S) 
1 (I, M. AT) PWR Under 3 Startup 
2 (AT, EMT) PWR Under 3 Startup 
3 (AT, HMA, BWR Over 3 Startup 
HMT) 
4 (I, ST, BWR Under 3 CS 
AT) 
BWR Under 3 IMS 
BWR Under 3 IMS 
5 (I. c. BWR Under 3 
A, T) 
(I. S, 
A. T) 
(IM. EM 
AT) 
(I, ST) 
PWR 
PWR 
PWR 
BWR 
Under 3 
Under 3 Shutdown 
(I. C, T) BWR 
(I, S, T) PWR 
(E, I, M, BWR 
T) 
BWR 
Steady 
State 
Startup 
SNS 
MRCS 
IMS 
SNS 
(C) 
Controller, 
pressure or 
flow 
Door/Hatch 
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Initiating 
Action 
Event 
Consequence 
Human De­
ficiency 
Observed 
Value 
Expected 
Value 
F-T De­
viates 
Comment 
on Asso­
ciation 
(I) (E) (H) 
Decision 4 0.937 2.288 High 
Sig. 7 3.645 1.707 Moderate 
Sig. 4 2.479 1.163 Not 
Behavior 3 1.298 1.504 Moderate 
Behavior 
Cognition 
4 
2 
1.817 
0.666 
1.581 
1.538 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Behavior 2 0.774 1.428 Moderate 
Response 6 3.328 1.505 Moderate 
Response insig. 7 3.952 1.554 Moderate 
Behavior 
Cognition 
6 
3 
3.316 
1.376 
1.511 
1.442 
Moderate 
Moderate 
Behavior 4 2.074 1.417 Moderate 
Response 13 7.517 1.908 High 
Behavior Pot. Sig. 10 5.940 1.655 Moderate 
Response Sig. 4 1.485 1.832 High 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIWS 
A methodology is developed to identify and flag significant trends 
related to safety and availability of U.S. commercial nuclear power 
plants. The development is intended to aid in reducing likelihood of 
human errors. To assure that the methodology can be easily adopted 
to various types of classification schemes of operation data, a data 
bank classified by TRACE is selected for the following: 
The methodology developed involved the following: 
• Review of all the classified LERs to find out meaningful 
combinations of the variables in the classification scheme. 
• Reduction of the data using clustering for the homogeneous 
grouping of the data. 
• Construction of multiway contingency tables for cross-classified 
categorical data to describe the relationships among the 
factors. Factors considered included plant age, reactor type, 
and other ^ variables in the classification scheme such as 
event consequences, and human deficiencies. 
•Modeling of the cross-classified categorical data. 
• Identification of inconsistencies in the pattern of associated 
data using the large Freeman-Tukey (F-T) deviates. 
•Recommendation of changes or means as necessary to mitigate those 
inconsistencies. 
The significance criteria for human-initiated events affecting the 
systems and for events caused by human deficiencies were developed. For 
the consequences of human initiated events, an event was considered 
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significant (potentially significant) if that event led (could have led) 
to one or more of the following consequences: loss of safety function, 
abnormal or unexpected transient, loss of indication, or operation de­
gradation. For the nature of human deficiency, a significant event is 
considered as one which has led to any of the above consequences or 
which was caused by symptomatic problems or involved overriding engineered 
safety features. These criteria can provide preliminary flagging for 
significance of events as they were being reviewed. In reviewing LERs 
classified by TRACE, several trends in performing operation and main­
tenance tasks have been observed. There were several cases where an event 
was insignificant considering its consequences on the system, however, 
it was categorized as significant considering human deficiencies. Out 
of the 368 events including three more double classified events for 
human deficiency (HD) or event consequence (EC), there were 227 events 
for PWRs and 141 events for BWRs. Out of 227 events reviewed for PWRs, 
22.9% and 16.3% were found to be significant for HD and EC, respectively, 
and 30.0% and 18.9% were potentially significant. 
About 71.1% of the significant events for HD of PWRs involved 
operators, 21.2% involved maintenance personnel and the rest involved 
other personnel. About 58.8% of the potentially significant events for 
HD of PWRs involved operators and 35.3% involved maintenance personnel. 
In BWRs, operator and maintenance errors occupied 26.9% and 65.4% of the 
significant events for HD and BWRs, respectively. Fifty-one percent and 
38.8% of the potentially significant events for HD of BWRs corresponded 
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to operator and maintenance personnel errors, respectively. For EC 
approximately the same ratio was applied. Symptomatic human déficiences 
seemed to be the major cause of human initiated events. Most of the 
significant events caused by operators resulted in abnormal or 
unexpected transients while the most of the significant events which 
involved maintenance personnel resulted in operation degradation. 
Errors caused by operator and maintenance personnel during steady state 
dominated significant events. Response and behavioral errors were major 
contributors to the significant events. 
Error rates (error/plant-year operation) for different initiator 
(operator, maintenance, and technical groups) for PWRs and BWRs were 
calculated and tabulated according to plant age. 
The first three years of reactor operation for both reactor types 
were identified as the learning period with higher rates then those which 
had approximately low constant rates in the range of 0.3 to 0.5 error/ 
plant-year after that period. Rates of significant, potentially signifi­
cant events showed the same trend for event consequences and human 
deficiencies. 
Steady state, startup, and cold shutdown phases of operation were 
identified as the phases where there exists major contributors to the 
event rates for the significant and potentially significant events. 
For PWRs response errors caused by operators during normal operation 
were identified as the most frequent errors and response errors caused 
by maintenance personnel were observed as the most frequent errors during 
test, the former representing 16.2% and the latter 11,3% of all human 
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cases were observed as the most frequent errors. These cases were 
Involved In 12.8% and 9.5%, respectively, of all human deficiencies 
for BWRs. The most frequent significant event Involving operators 
for LWRs affected RPCS with control rod and for maintenance personnel 
ECCIS were Identified as the most frequent significant events. ECCIS 
valves were involved in more events than other components. 
Clustering analysis was used to verify the learning trend in 
multidimensional histograms. A computer code was developed based on 
the K-Means algorithm and applied to determine the learning period in 
which error rates are monotonously decreasing with plant age. Reduced 
data for multiway contingency tables were obtained by conglomerating 
similar plant age groups on human performance data. The first three 
years of the commercial operation of reactors are identified as the 
learning period. 
Several multiway contingency tables were constructed to relate 
selected variables such as learning period and stationary period, re­
actor type, initiating action, event consequence, and human deficiency. 
To investigate the impacts of man-machine interfaces, factors such as 
reactor type, system, component, and initiating action are considered. 
Interrelations among factors are investigated and selected for modeling 
the data in a multiway table. The P3F program in the Biomedical Computer 
Programs (BMDP), which is commercially available, was used to provide more 
accurate estimates for the probabilities of the events by forming a 
parsimonious model to fit the data well. The program was designed to 
fit a hierarchical log-linear model to the cell frequencies in the table 
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and has three functions. These are to print a multiway frequency table, 
to screen for an appropriate model, and to fit specified models. 
The Freeman-Tukey (F-T) deviates are used to select generic 
problems by a large positive value (here approximately over 2.0) for the 
deviate because the F-T transformation Is a variance stabilizing 
transformation and they appear to perform well for the model fitting to 
sparse frequency tables. The deviates are printed using an option 
statement FREEMAN in the BMDP3F program. The identified generic 
problems are; decision errors which are highly associated with startup 
reactor mode in the learning period of PWRs, response errors which are 
highly associated with Secondary Non-Nuclear Systems (SNS) in PWRs, 
and significant errors affecting systems and which are caused by response 
action are highly associated with startup mode in BWRs. Those are 
corresponding to inconsistencies in the pattern of associated data. 
However, the BMDP3F program may provide incorrect estimates for the 
expected frequencies if structural zeros, where the frequency is 
constrained to be zero, occur. Therefore, to get reasonable results 
efforts to eliminate zero entries in multlway tables should be made. 
This may be accomplished by redefining the multlway tables or by using 
a more general computer program for the multlway tables. 
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IX. APPENDIX A: PROGRAM FOR CLUSTERING 
A. Program Listing for the K-Means Clustering 
Used on the VAX Computer System 
c 
c MAIN  p rogram fo r  K-MEANS c lus te r ing  
c  I t  i s  purposed  to  read  i n  da ta  and  to  p r in t  K  c lus te r  
c  number  and  mean  and  sum o f  souared  d is tances  f a r  each  
c  c lus te r  cen te r»  
c  A  =  M by  L  bordered  a r ray  
c  M =  Number  o f  cases  
c  L  =  Number  o f  va r i ab les  
c  K1  =  I n i t i a l  c lus te r  number  
c  K2  =  Las t  c lus te r  number  
c  lOPT  =  1  {p r in t  cu r ren t  va lue  o f  D  
c  =  0  *do  no t  p r in t  the  cur ren t  D  
c  IPOPT  =  0  {p rogram genera tes  the  i n i t i a l  pa r t i t i on  
c  fo r  each  K  c lus te r  number  
c  =  Any  non -ze ro  va lue  !  an  i n i t i a l  pa r t i t i on  
c  <p ( i ) , i = l , * »« ,m)  i s  read  i n  fo r  each  n=k l r , . . pk2  
c  SSD =  Sum o f  the  souared  d is tances  
c  D  =  Sum o f  SSD 
c  C  =  Cen t ro id  o  
c  ^  
d imens ion  a (100 ,12 ) ,p (100 ) , c (10 ,12 )»ssd<10 )  
in teger  p 
n in=5  
nou t=6  
1  read (n in *100 fend=999 )  m»1 tk l»k2» iop t» ipop t  
100  fo rmat (16 i5 )  
i f (m , l e« l ,o r ,m .g t . lOO«or . l . l t , l , o r . l «g t , 12«or .  
I k l ,g t ,m ,o r , k l . l t . l *o r . k2 , l t «k l ,o r *k2«g t , 10 )  s top  
w r  i  te (nou t *  200 )  
200  fo rmat ( ' 1 ' f ' c lus te r  ana lys is  us ing  K-MEANS a lgor i thm ' )  
wr i t e (nou t»210 )  m»1»k l»k2» iop t»  ipop t  
210  fo rmat ( ' 0 ' , '  M= ' , i 3 , '  L= ' , i 2 , '  K l= ' , i 2 , '  K2= ' ,  
1  i 2 , '  IOPT= ' , i l , '  IPOPT= ' , i l )  
wr i t e (nou t f211>  
211  fo rmat ( ' 0 ' » ' i npu t  da ta  »  A (MfL ) ' >  
wr i t e (nou t f212 )  
212  fo rmate '0 ' )  
do  10  k~ l» ] .  
r ead (n i r i »  101  > ( 3 ( i , k ) , i  =  l ,m )  
wr i t e (nou t  f  213 )  ( a ( i  »k ) , i  =  l rm)  
10  con t inue  
101  fo rmat ( lA fS .O)  
213  fo rmat< lx ,10 f7 .3 )  
do  90  n=k l fk2  
wr i t e (nou t f212 )  
i fdpoF- t .ne«0>  So  to  21  
k=0  
do  20  i = l ;m  
k=k+ l  
i f ( k . s i t . r i )  k=k -n  
p ( i ) =k  
20  con t inue  
ao  to  22  
21  read (n in»100 )  (n ( i ) , i = l ,m)  
22  wr i t e (nou t»214 )  ( p ( i ) , i  =  l ,m )  
214  fo rmat  (  1> ;  »  lO i7  )  
ca l l  kmeans (mf l ra rP^n fC f  ssd*  d  »  i op t )  
wr i t e (nou t , 212 )  
wr i t e (nou t f214 )  (p ( i ) , i = l ,m)  
wr i t e (nou t *212 )  
w r  i  te (nou t , 215 )  
215  fo rmat ( ' 0 ' » ' cen t ro id  (no .o f  c lus te r rL ) ' )  
do  30  k==  1 , 1  
wr i t e (nou t , 213 ) (c (J ,k ) , J= l ,n )  
30  con t inue  
wr i t e (nou t , 216 )  
216  fo rmat ( ' 0 ' , 'SSD  (no«  o f  c lus te r )  and  D  fo r  the  l as t  va lue ' )  
wr i t e (nou t , 213 )  ( ssd (J ) , J= l ,n ) ,d  
90  con t inue  
So  to  1  
999  con t inue  
end 
subrou t ine  kmeans (m, l , a ,p ,n ,c ,ssd ,d , iop t )  
i: 
c  Bu i lds  K  c lus te rs  by  K-MEANS method .  
c  The  number  o f  c lus te rs  i s  inc reased  by  one  a t  each  s tep .  
(: 
c  A  =  Inpu t  vec to rs  w i th  M x  L  a r ray  
c  P  =  Ar ray  con ta ins  the  number  o f  c lus te r  w i th  i - th  vec to r  
c  where  P ( i )  i s  l ess  than  o r  eaua l  to  n  and  g rea te r  than  
c  o r  eaua l  to  1 .  
( :  SSD =  Sum o f  the  SQuared d is tances  be tween  the  member  o f  
c  J - th  c lus te r  and  the i r  cen t ro id .  
c  D  =  Sum o f  SSD 
c  C  =  Cen t ro id  
c  X  -  Scra tch  vec to r  
c 
dimension a(100,12) fp(100) , c(10fl2)fssd(10 ) , x(10) 
i n teger  f -»  k»  r  »u»  v»  w 
nout=6  NJ 
do  20  J= l»n  S  
x (J )=0  
ssd (J )=0 .  
do  10  k= l , l  
c (J»k )=0 .  
10  con t inue  
20  con t inue  
do  40  i = l »m 
r=p ( i )  
i f ( r . l t . l «o r . r . a t«n )  re tu rn  
x< r )=x ( r )+ l  
do  30  k= l f l  
c ( r f l < )=c ( r»k )+a ( i »k )  
30  con t inue  
40  con t inue  
do  60  J= lpn  
r=x<J )  
if(r»eo.O) return 
f=1,/flo3t(r) 
do  50  k= l» l  
c (J rk )=c (J fk ) * f  
50  con t inue  
60  con t inue  
do  80  i = l ,m  
r=p ( i )  
f =0 .  
do  70  k= l , l  
t =c ( r»k ) -3 ( i  ?k )  
f = f+ t * t  
70  con t inue  
ssd ( r )=ssd ( r )+ f  
80  con t inue  
d=0 .  
do  90  J= l»n  
d=d+ssd (J )  
90  con t inue  
i =0  
i t =0  
91  i = i+ l  
i f ( i , 3 t .m)  i= i -m  
i f ( i t . eQ .m)  re tu rn  
r=p ( i )  
u=x ( r )  
i f (u * l e . l )  ao  to  91  
h= f loa t (u )  
h=h / (h - l . )  
f=0«  
do  100  k= l» l  
t =c ( r»k ) -a ( i  »k )  
f = f+ t * t  
100  con t inue  
y=h* f  
b= l . e30  
do  120  J= l»n  
i f ( J . eo . r )  So  to  120  
u=x (J )  
h=f loa t (u )  
h=h / (h+ l .  )  
f =0 .  
do  110  k -1»  1  
t=c (J fk ) -3 ( i  »k )  
f = f+ t * t  
110  con t inue  
f=h* f  
i f ( f . a t ,b )  do  to  120  
b= f  
v=J 
w=u  
120  con t inue  
i f (b . l t . y )  do  to  121  
i t = i t+ l  
do  to  91  
121  i t =0  
ssd<r )=ssd ( r ) - «  
ssd(v) =ssd(v) +b  
d=d -y+b  
h=flo3t(x(r)) 
d=flo3t(w) 
y=l. / ( h -1 . )  
b= l . / <a+ l . )  
do  130  k= l» l  
f=a( i r k )  
c< r»k )  =  <  h *c ( r , k ) - f ) * y  
c (v»k )s= (  d *c  (  V  »  k  )  + f  )  *b  
130  con t inue  
p<  i ) =v  
x ( r )=x ( r ) - l  
x (v )=x (v )+ l  
i f ( i op t«ea .1 )  wr i t e (nou t , 200 )  i yd» (p (u ) ru= l  
200  fo rmatdx f  i 4» f  12 .3 ,2313 , / ,  <173 ,23 i3 )  )  
do  to  91  
end  
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B. Input Data Sets for K-Means Clustering Program 
The K-Means clustering program was used on the VAX computer system 
at Iowa State University. Table 9.1 describes several Input data 
s e t s  f o r  t h e  p r o g r a m .  A c t u a l  I n p u t  d a t a  s e t s  a r e  s h o w n  I n  F i g u r e  9 . 1 .  
The first statement for each data set (Ex. $ TYPE POM78.DAT;l) should 
be eliminated for the execution of the program because the statement 
Is the command statement for printing the Information from the directory 
In the computer. 
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Table 9.1 Description of several Input data sets 
Data Set Description 
POM78 Error rates caused by operator and maintenance person­
nel in PURs for the period between 1977 and 1978. 
BOM78 Error rates caused by operator and maintenance person­
nel in BWRs for the period between 1977 and 1978. 
PRM78 Human error rates (HERs) occurred in various reactor 
mode; steady state, startup, hot standby, hot shutdown, 
cold shutdown, refueling, and unknown in PHRs for the 
period between 1977 and 1978. 
BRM78 HERs occurred in the above reactor modes In BWRs for 
the period between 1977 and 1978. 
PIA78 HERs caused by InltlatlnK action; response, behavior, 
decision, coRnltlon, and perception in FWRs for the 
period between 1977 and 1978. 
BZA78 HERs caused bv the InltlatlnK action in BWRs for the 
period between 1977 and 1978. 
PEC 78 HERs for the event consequences: slKnlfleant (S), 
potentially significant (P), and insignificant (I) 
in PWRs for the period between 1977 and 1978. 
BEC78 HERs for the event consequences in BWRs for the period 
between 1977 and 1978. 
PHD78 HERs for the human deficiencies; S, P, and I in PWRs 
for the period between 1977 and 1978. 
BHD78 HERs for the human deficiencies in BWRs for the period 
between 1977 and 1978. 
212 
S TYOE P0M78.DAT;1 
8 2 2 5 0 0 
6.96 3.13 2.63 1.33 1.33 0.63 2.33 0.58 
1.58 1.25 1.57 1.33 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.83 
« TYPE BOM78.DAT;1 
8 2 2 5 0 0 
0.00 2.50 3.00 1.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.83 
0.60 1.50 3.60 1.00 1.00 1.60 1.80 2.67 
$ TYPE PRM78.DAT;1 
8 7 2 5 0 0 
6.33 2.75 2.43 2.00 1.58 1.00 2.00 1.33 
0.63 0.75 0.71 0.17 0.25 0.38 0.83 0.08 
0.63 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 
0.95 0.00 0.29 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.08 
0.63 0.88 1.00 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.25 
0.00 0.25 0.43 0.42 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 
0.32 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.08 
S TYPE BRM78.0AT;1 
8 7 2 5 0 0 
0.60 2.00 4.80 1.67 1.67 1.40 1.83 0.93 
0.00 0.00 0.40 0.22 0.00 0.40 1.17 0.07 
0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.60 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 1.50 0.20 0.33 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.21 
0.00 0.50 2.00 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.29 
0.00 0.50 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S TYPE PIA78.0AT;1 
8 5 2 5 0 0 
0.32 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.00 
0.63 0.50 0.29 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.17 
0.63 0.25 0.71 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.08 
3.80 3.25 2.43 1.75 1.00 1.13 1.83 0.92 
3.48 0.88 1.71 0.75 0.83 0.25 1.17 0.50 
S TYPE RIA78.DAT;1 
8 5 2 5 0 0 
0.00 1.00 0.80 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.00 
0.60 1.50 0.60 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.14 
0.00 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
0.60 0.50 2.80 1.33 1.00 1.40 1.17 0.57 
0.00 1.50 2.80 1.11 0.67 0.80 0.50 0.71 
S TYPE PEC78.0AT;1 
8 3 2 5 0 0 
1.90 1.00 1.14 0.25 0.08 0.25 0.67 0.42 
2.22 0.88 0.43 0.50 0.75 0.63 0.50 0.25 
5.38 3.00 3.57 2.42 1.25 1.00 2.50 1.17 
Figure 9.1 Input data sets used on VAX Computer System 
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» TYPE BEC78.DAT;1 
8 3 2 5 0 0 
0.60 0.50 1.20 0.56 0.50 0.20 0.50 0.14 
0.00 0.50 1.40 0.67 0.33 0.80 0.50 0.64 
0.60 4.00 5.40 1.44 1.33 1.20 2.00 0.86 
S TYPE PHD78.0AT;1 
8 3 2 5 0 0 
2.22 1.13 2.14 0.33 0.42 0.25 0.83 0.42 
2.85 1.75 0.57 0.75 0.92 1.00 1.33 0.42 
4.43 2.00 2.57 2.08 0.75 0.63 1.50 0.92 
$ TYPE BHD78.DAT;1 
8 3 2 5 0 0 
0.60 0.50 1.20 0.56 0.83 0.40 0.50 0.21 
0.00 1.00 2.60 1.33 0.50 1.20 0.83 0.57 
0.60 3.50 4.20 0.78 0.83 0.60 1.67 0.86 
Figure 9.1 (continued) 
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C. Sample Run for the Human Error Rates as a Function of Reactor 
Operation Mode In PWRs, 1977/1978 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS USING K-MEANS ALGORITHM 
M= Q L= 7 KL= 2 K2= 5 I0PT=0 IP0PT=0 
INPUT DATA • A(M,L) 
6.330 2. 750 2.430 2. 000 1 .580 1.000 2. 000 1. 330 
0.630 0. 750 0.710 0. 170 0.250 0.380 0. 830 0. 080 
0.630 0. 000 0.140 0. 080 0.000 0.000 0. 170 0. 000 
0.950 0. 000 0.290 0. 080 0.000 0.000 0. 1 70 0. 080 
0.630 0. 880 1 .000 0. 330 0.250 0.250 0. 170 0. 250 
0.000 0. 250 0.430 0. 420 0.000 0.250 0. 000 0. 000 
0.320 0. 250 0.140 0. 080 0.000 0.000 0. 330 0. 080 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
CENTROIO (NO. OF CLUSTER. L) 
6.330 1.870 
0.630 0.453 
0.630 0.056 
0.950 0.089 
0.630 0.447 
0.000 0.193 
0.320 0.126 
SSO (NO. OF CLUSTER) AND O FOR THE LAST VALUE 
0.000 3.940 3.940 
t 2  3  t 2 3  1 2  
CENTROIO (NO. OF CLUSTER, L> 
6.330 2.590 1.582 
0.630 0.730 0.342 
0.630 0.070 0.050 
0.950 0.145 0.066 
0.630 0.940 0.250 
0.000 0.340 0.134 
0.320 0.195 0.098 
ISJ 
SSD (NO. OF CLUSTER) AND D FOR THE LAST VALUE & 
0.000 0.133 1.376 1.510 
3 
CENTROIO (NO. OF CLUSTER, L) 
2.590 1.303 6.330 2.000 
0.730 0.237 0.630 0.500 
0.070 0.000 0.630 0.125 
0.145 0.027 0.950 0.125 
0.940 0.250 0.630 0.250 
0.340 0.083 0.000 0.210 
0.195 0.027 0.320 0.205 
SSD (NO. OF CLUSTEP) AND D FOR THE LAST VALUE 
0.133 0.265 0.000 0.358 0.756 
4 2 2 3 11 
CENTROID (NO. 1 OF CLUSTER, L) 
1 .303 2.590 2.000 6. 330 2 .000 
0.237 0.730 0.170 0. 630 0 .830 
0.000 0.070 0.080 0. 630 0 .170 
0.027 0.145 0.080 0. 950 0 .170 
0.250 0.940 0.330 0. 630 0 .170 
0.083 0.340 0.420 0. 000 0 .000 
0.027 0.195 0.080 0. 320 0 .330 
SSD (NO. OF CLUSTER) AND 0 FOR THE LAST VALUE 
0.265 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.398 
218 
D. Sample Run for the Human Error Rates as a Function of Reactor 
Operation Mode in BWRs, 1977/1978 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS USING K-MEANS ALGORITHM 
M= M L= 7 KL= 2 K2= 5 IOPT=0 IP0PT=0 
INPUT DATA . A(M,L) 
0. 600 2 .000 4 .800 1. 670 1 .670 1 . 400 1. 830 0. 930 
0. 000 0 .000 0 .400 0. 220 0 .000 0. 400 1 . 170 0. 070 
0. 000 0 .000 0 .2 00 0. 000 0 .330 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 
0. 600 0 .500 0 .400 0. 000 0 .000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 
0. 000 1 .500 0 .200 0. 330 0 .0 00 0. 400 0. 000 0. 210 
0. 000 0 .500 2 .000 0. 220 0 .170 0. 000 0. 000 0. 290 
0. 000 0 .500 0 .000 0. 220 0 .000 0. 000 0. 000 0. 000 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
2 ? 1 2 2 2 2 2 
CENTROID (NO. OF CLUSTER, L) 
4*800 1.44? 
0.400 0.266 
0.200 0.047 
0.400 0.157 
0.200 0.349 
2.000 0.169 
0.000 0.103 
N> 
M VC 
SSD (NO. OF CLUSTER) AND 0 FOR THE LAST VALUE 
0.000 5.307 5.307 
1 2 3 1 
2  1 3  1  
CENTROIO (NO. OF CLUSTER. L) 
1.714 0.766 4.800 
0.358 0.035 0.400 
0.066 0. 000 0.200 
0.100 0.300 0.400 
0.446 0.105 0.200 
0.178 0.145 2.000 
0.144 0.000 0.000 
SSD (NO. OF CLUSTER) AND 0 FOR 
3.309 0.301 0.000 3. 610 
12 3 4 
4 2 12 
CENTROIO (NO. I 
4.800 1.685 
0.400 0.155 
0.200 0.082 
0.400 0.125 
0.200 0.557 
2.000 0.222 
0.000 0.160 
CLUSTER, L» 
1.830 0.765 
1.170 0.035 
0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.300 
0.000 0.105 
0.000 0.145 
0.000 0 .000 
2 3 1 2 
1 1 1 2  
ro 
ro 
THE LAST VALUE ° 
12 3 4 
2 2 3 4 
SSD (NO. OF CLUSTER) AND O FOR THE LAST VALUE 
0.000 2.136 0.000 0.301 2.437 
1 4 5 3 3 3 
CENTROIO (NO. OF CLUSTER, L) 
0.765 T .830 1 .580 2. 000 4 .890 
0.035 1.170 0.207 0. 000 0 .400 
0.000 0.000 0.110 0. 000 0 .200 
0.300 0.000 0.000 0. 500 0 .400 
0.105 0. 000 0.243 1. 500 0 .200 
0.145 0. 000 0.130 0. 500 2 .000 
0.000 0.000 0.073 0. 500 0 .000 
SSD (NO. OF CLUSTER) AND D FOR THE LAST VALUE 
0.301 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.653 
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X. APPENDIX B; SAMPLE RUN FOR MULTIWAY 
CONTINGENCY TABLES USING THE BMDP3F PROGRAM 
A. Input Data for Model Screening 
//C300 JOB U1234.CHO 
//SI EXEC SASBMOP 
//SYSIN 00 • 
OATA HUMANL: 
INPUT IACT ION RMOOE AGE RTYPE FREO: 
CARDS; 
1 1 1 1 30 
2 1 1 1 20 
3 1 1 1 5 
4 1 1 1 1 
1 2 1 1 7 
2 2 1 1 1 
3 2 1 1 1 
4 2 1 1 4 
1 3 1 1 9 
2 3 1 1 4 
3 3 1 1 0 
4 3 1 1 2 
1 1 2 1 44 
2 1 2 1 20 
3 1 2 1 5 
4 1 2 1 2 
1 2 2 1 7 
2 2 2 1 4 
3 2 2 1 2 
4 2 2 1 0 
1 3 2 1 7 
2 3 2 1 4 
3 3 2 1 0 
4 3 2 1 1 
1 1 1 2 10 
2 1 1 2 7 
3 1 1 2 3 
4 I 1 2 2 
1 2 1 2 1 
2 2 1 2 0 
CARD-NUMBER 
1 . 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
8 .  
9. 
10. 
1 1 . 
12.  
13. 
14. 
1 5 .  
1 6 .  
17. 
1 8 .  
19. 
20.  
2 1  .  
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26.  
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
3 2 1 2 0 37. 
4 2 1 2 0 38. 
1 3 1 2 t 39. 
2 3 1 2 1 40. 
3 3 1 2 1 41. 
4 3 1 2 0 42. 
1 1 2 2 27 43. 
2 I 2 2 14 44. 
3 1 2 2 4 45. 
4 1 2 2 0 46. 
1 2 2 2 7 47. 
2 2 2 2 5 48. 
3 2 2 2 0 49. 
4 2 2 2 1 50. 
1 3 2 2 3 51. 
2 3 2 2 4 52. 
3 3 2 2 1 53. 
4 3 2 2 0 54. 
PROC 1 PRINT; 55. 
PROC BMOP PRQG=BM3!>3F UNIT=3 COOE=HOMANt ; 56» 
PARMCAROS; 57. 
/PROBLEM TITLE=*HJMAN ERROR STUDY FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS*• 58» 
/INPUT UNIT=3. C0DE='HUMAN1'. CASES ARE 48. REMIND. 59. 
/TABLE INDICES ARE I ACT ION. RHODE. AGE» RTYPE. 60. 
SYMBOLS ARE I, M, A, T. 61. 
ASSOCIATION. 62. 
DELTA IS O.S. 63. 
COUNT=FREQ. 64. 
/CATEGORY CODES(l) ARE 1. 2. 3. 4. 65. 
NAMESd ) ARE RESPONSE. BEHAVIOR. COGNITION. DECISION. 66. 
COOESiZ) ARE I. 2. 3. 67. 
NAMES(2) ARE 'STEADY STATE". 'START-UP'. 'SHUTDOWN'. 68. 
COOES(3) ARE 1. 2. 69. 
NAMES(3) ARE 'UNDER 3*. 'OVER 3'. 70. 
COOES(4) ARE 1. 2. 71. 
NAMES(4) ARE PMR. BWR. 72. 
/END 73. 
// 74. 
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B. How to Select a Model by BMDP3F Program 
The previous Section A Is an Input data for the analysis of the 
4x3x2x2 Table (Table 5.12) of frequencies for the human error standard 
for nuclear plants. In this case the program P3F in BMDP (BMDP3F) is 
called by a SAS program. Each card (cards 7-55) contains information 
describing a cell in the table and the total number of individuals 
observed in that cell. Each line in Section A corresponds to one 
computer card. 
Cards 1-3 
Cards 4-14 
Card 55 
Card 56 
Card 57 
Card 58 
Card 59 
Cards 60-64 
Cards 65-72 
Control cards 
Reads a SAS data file (HUMANl) from cards. The 
first four variables describe the categories 
while the fifth variable is the observed 
frequency for that cell. 
Prints the data set by a SAS procedure. 
Cells the program BMDP3F. 
Indicates that BMDP program cards will follow, 
BMDP manual (3) describes cards 58-73 under 
the program BMDP3F. 
Assigns a title to the Input data. 
Has four statements; the statements UNIT and 
CODE should match the card 57. The REWIND 
Indicates that the file (HUMANl) is positioned 
at the beginning before it is read. 
Describes how the data is being entered, 
requests some analysis (hero ASSOCIATION), 
and adds a constant (DELTA) to each cell to 
avoid zero expected frequencies. 
Gives labels to each coded numerical value for the 
indicier. 
Card 73 Indicates the end of the SAS input data. 
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Figure 10.1 shows the test results for partial and marginal 
association for each subset of factors, where the notations and 
T Indicate Initiating action by human, reactor age, reactor mode, and 
reactor type, respectively. The tests of marginal and partial associa­
tion are highly significant for AT; two factor Interaction between 
A and T. Tests for IM, lA, IT, MA and MT are not significant. For 
model fitting the following input data are used for P3F: 
Cards 1-61 
Cards 63-72 
^IT MODEL IS I, M, AT. 
EXPECTED , 
STANDARDIZED . 
FREEMAN . 
LAMBDA 
Cards 73-74 
If the tests of partial and marginal association were doubtful for IM, 
the following input data can be used for model selection: 
Cards 1-61 
Cards 63-72 
A IT MODEL IS I, M, AT. 
MODEL IS IM, AT, 
Cards 73-74 
Figure B.2 shows output for fitting specified models (I,M,AT) and 
(IM, AT) by the program BMDP3F. The output indicates that the fit of the 
model (I, M, AT) is nonsignificant; therefore this model is sufficient to 
PARTIAL ASSOCIATION 
OF THLI FACTORS 
MARGINAL A5S0CIAT|0N 
OF THE FACTORS 
EFFECT J.F. LR: CHISQ PHUS. ITERATIONS LR CHISO PROB. ITERATIONS 
I 3 172.36 0.0 
M 2 [50.LO OTTO ^ ^ M-
A 1 9.18 0.0024 i 
T 1 26.56 0.0 
IM 6 —orrm? —4-'i ; g .42 D .T5r2r ^ 
LA 3 4.94 0.1763 3 4.61 0.2031; 2 
IT 3 : 1.74 0.6290 3 L.SI 0.66021 2: MA 2 1.11 0.5735 4 .1.13 0.5690 G' 
WT 2 I 0.12 0.9396 ^ JTZS— 0.8838 — V 
AT 1 7.43 0.0064 3 7.36 0.0067* G 
IMA 6 I 3.47 0.7474 3 , 4.21 0.64821 3 
THT ^ ' 4.53 ' •  0 . 6 0 * 7  3 H  5 T T U  O . ï s T T T  
I AT 3 1.04 0.7914 4 1.09 0.779S 4 
MAT 2 , 2.37 0.3064 3 ; 2.49 0.2676 ,3} 
IMAT 6 3.37 0.7^7 ^ -
Figure 10.1 Output for model screening by the program BMDP3F using 
input data in Section A of the Chapter 10 
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explain the relationship between the factors In Table 5.12, The diff­
erence between the fits of the model (IM, AT) is a test of the two-
factor interaction IM. 
From the Figure 10.2. 
" 33.13-23.71*9.44 with 39-33*6 degrees of freedom. This 
is not a significant result and therefore, the model (I, M, AT) is 
selected. 
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No. Model D.F. LR, CHISQ PROS. PEARSON CHISQ PROS. 
1 I,M,AT 39 33.13 0.7340 38.64 0.4862 
2 IM.AT 33 23.71 0.8828 25.56 0.8191 
Figure 10.2 Output for fitting specified models by the program BMDP3F 
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APPENDIX C; SAMPLE OF HUMAN ERROR 
DATA BANK (TBACE) 
• 13
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Reference Ikimber 
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• -s s i  - •  5 
: - : 
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1 ! 04
06
78 
05
02
78 
Cvcnt/Report Data 
Reactor Mode 
M
a
in
t
a
n
a
n
c
*
 
a
r
r
o
r
 
I
n
c
o
r
r
a
c
t
 
t
o
r
q
u
a
 
R
a
a
p
o
o
a
a
 
O
p
a
r
a
t
o
r
 
D
id 
n
o
t
 
is
o
­
l
a
t
e
 
s
t
a
a
a
 
D
a
e
l
a
l
o
o
,
 
R
a
a
p
o
s
a
a
 
M
a
in
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
a
r
r
o
r
 
B
in
di
n
g
 
B
e
ha
v
io
r
,
 
Initiator/ 
Initiating Event 
'=111 » ^ ^ 11# i 
S"' -i 
System/Component 
Involved (Number) 
1 1 I System Status 
" i l  g lis 111 "Il 1 
lï ! ! 
5 
Systeas/Coaiponanta 
Affected 
Failure Mada 
(number) 
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i 
s s 
m 
i H 
li 
e o 
*-* CL 
W *«4 
w W 
II 
73% MA. 
0% 3.0 
90% N.A. 
T)i« pw#p case bolting had not bten torqued 
correctly during a previou» a;#e*bly. 
The electric 722543 magnetic pickup failed, 
allowing the HPCl turbine control to in­
crease pump speed rapidly which resulted 
in a pressure transient in the pump case 
A gasket failed and a significant amount 
of water was blowing from around the pump 
case flange. The gasket and pickup were 
replaced and the bolts torqued correctly. 
After a scram from a turbine trip, the 
operator did not Isolate steam to the main 
feedwater system immediately. The auxil. 
iary feedwater pumps auto started on low. 
low steam generator level. Cold aux. feed 
water was introduced while a pressuriser 
spray valve was leaking. Three hours later 
a safety injection occurred as a result of 
low pressuriser pressure and level. The 
operator was reprimanded. The pressuriser 
spray valve will be replaced. Automatic 
main steam recirculation isolation will be 
implemented. 
A switch/pointer mechanism (Yarway: Model 
4320 PE) was binding on a scale plate in­
side the cover. During a load rejection 
caused by a loss of the 13» kV transmis 
sion line, the level sensors RE20A and 
RE06B became stuck at *3" drum level. One 
of the two low drum level scram sensors in 
each of 2 reactor protection channels 
failed to operate. The reactor scrammed 
on low vacuum a few seconds prior to oper-
ation of the remaining 2 drum level sen­
sors. All 4 sensors were repaired and 
retestad prior to plant startup. 
# 
"tï S 
m g Il Ô Es II 
II h n 
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1 
• 1 
S 
M < US 
w w w  
• • • 
§ 
S M 
S 
i  
Il Î! •s J 5 s t l  1 & u. > w «g W ## M its it 
141063 
SO.334 
(021646) 
Biavir 
Vttl«y 1 
PW* 
West. 
Stont t 
Webster 
042178 
062978 
1 Operator 
Inadvertent 
actuation 
Response 
EPS EOF. 
Breaker (1) 
Nor. CVCS 
Charging pump 
THPT-
141073 
S0-S2S 
Brunswick 1 
BWR 
G.E. 
UEtC 
080478 
082078 
N.A. Operator 
Communications 
breakdown 
Perception, 
Cognitive 
R.WPSLM 
Tank 
(1) 
Nor. None 
Non* 
1410C0 
SO 3W 
North Ann*. 
1 
PWR 
West. 
Stone i 
Webster 
071778 
081678 
1 Maintenance 
error 
Improper assem­
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100 0.02 X S 
I 
The lA charging pump wat being overhauled 
and IB charging pump was removed from 
service to change oil coolers. The oper« 
a tor racked the lA charging pump breaker 
onto the same bus as the IC charging pump. 
The IC charging pump tripped but the 
operator recognized the problem and re­
started pump a ter 55 sec. There was no 
significant change in volume control tank 
or pressurtzer levels. 
N.A. T 1 
F 
A routine release of floor drain sample 
tank A was planned. Operator sampled the 
tank and established the discharge monitor 
set point. After 2180 gallons of water 
had been released, the radwaste operator 
recognized the wrong tank, FOST-B was 
being emptied. The release was Immediately 
terminated. 
92 3.16 Y X s 
î 
Due to an improper seal assembly, the seal 
on charging pump IC leaked and this ren­
dered the punp inoperable. The charging 
pump IB was not made operable until 3:U 
hours later when Its outboard seal leak­
age had been reduced. The charging 
pump lA was the operating punp all this 
time. Tech. Spec, requires 2 operable 
charging pumps. 
4 0.88 X X s 
r 
The unit was unloaded from 57% by bora-
tlon to stay within the axial flux tar­
get band and then held at 40% for 53 min. 
for turbine cooling. The control rods 
were maintained too far out to compensate 
for xenon transient. The reactor coolant 
Tav. decreased to 540.2oF twice and was 
recovered each time-once for 10 min. and 
the second time for 9 min. 
90 .0008 Y p 
T 
The Instantaneous contacts on an Agastat 
2400 series relay were Improperly adjust­
ed. Upon restoration of emergency power 
after station blackout, there was a 3-
second delay In the starting of an aux. 
feedwater pump. Adjustment of relay con­
tacts corrected the delay. Further In­
vestigation revealed the contacts to be 
not seismically qualified. 
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$0 33# PWR 090S7S 
West. Did not test Air lock None 
St. ( Web. Behavioral 2 
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of 360 ptig in Ittt than 1 ainut*. Tech. 
Spec, liait RCS presture to 350 psig with 
LMS out of service. Wiring error was 
corrtttod and valve was tested successful• 
l y .  
At 0400, the loss of condensate pump and 
loss of feedwater resulted in a turbine 
trip. The pressuriser relief valve opened 
to relieve RCS pressure. Reactor trip 
occurred due to high RCS pressure. When 
RCS pressure decreased, PORV stayed open. 
ECCS high pressure injection was initiated, 
but it was throttled when the pressuriter 
level increased. The aux. feedwater valves 
reawined closed for 8 minutes. They were 
opened to initiate aux. feedwater flow. 
Seven minutes later, the RC drain tank 
rupture disk blew. The open poRV allowed 
RC drain tank to open to reactor building 
sump. About 1 hour later, RC pumps were 
turned off. The sump was pumped to aux. 
building. Radioactivity was released. Th< 
tripping of RC pumps resulted in core dam-
age. 
While investigating a possible leak in the 
condenser, a waterbox was removed from 
service. The condenser cooling water out­
let temperature exceeded a temperature 
change rate of 3*F/hour. No detrimental 
evidence discovered in river environment. 
(Xiring power operation, an operator left 
the containment isolation valve unattended 
thinking he had been relieved from sta­
tioning near the valve. Tech. Spec, re­
quired the manual containment isolation 
valve for instrument air be maintained 
under administrative control during normal 
operations. 
During normal operation, it was discovered 
that the containment air locks had not 
been tested in the six month surveillance 
interval. The test was completed 3 days 
later. 
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XII. APPENDIX D: ABBREVIATIONS OF SYSTEMS/SUBSYSTEMS 
IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (PWRs AND BWRs) 
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Auxiliary Electrical Power Systems (AEPS) 
1. EPS-OFF: Off-site AC Power system 
2. EPS-AC: On-site AC Power system - 2 DG 
3. EPS-DC; On-site DC power system - 4 batteries 
4. EPS-EQP: Auxiliary equipment for AEP/EPS - Transformer 
cable, bus protective devices 
Auxiliary System for Normal Operation (ASNO) 
1. FCPCCS (BWR) SFPCS (PWRJ 
FCPCCS: Fuel and containment pools cooling and cleanup: 
system; heat exchanger filter 
SFPCS: Spent fuel pit cooling system; pump, pit, heat 
exchanger, filter, demlnerallzer 
2. RWCUS: Reactor water cleanup system 
3. CCWS (BWR) Closed cooling water system for reactor service 
CCS (PWR): Component cooling system 
4. RCCS: Reactor coolant chemistry system 
5. SWS: Service water system 
6. FSF: Fuel storage/hauling facilities including RWST 
(Refueling water storage tank) 
Containment Spray and Recirculation System (CSRS) 
1. VSS(BWR): Vapor Suppression system 
2. RHR-CSS(BWR)/CSIS(PWR) 
RHR-CSS: Residual heat removal containment spray system 
CSIS: Containment spray injection system 
3. CSRS(PWR): Containment spray recirculation system 
4. SHAS(PWR): Sodium hydroxide addition system 
5. CHRS(PWR): Containment heat removal system 
Other Containment Systems (CS) 
1. CL (containment leakage): CIS (Containment isolation system) 
2. SCS: Secondary containment system 
3. SBGTS (BWR): Standby gas treatment system 
4. CADS: Containment atmosphere dilution system 
5. CPES: Containment purge and exhaust system 
6. CFCS (PWR): Containment fan cooler system 
7. ICRCS (PWR): Ice condenser reactor containment system 
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Emergency Core Coolant Injection Systems (ECCIS) 
1. ACC(PWR); Accumulation system 
2. ADS(BWR): Automatic depressurizatlon system 
3. ADS-ICS(BWR): Automatic depressurizatlon-Instrumentation and 
control system 
4. CSIS(BWR): Core spray injection system 
5. CSIS -ICS(BWR): Core spray injection-Instrumentation and control 
systems 
6. CVCS(PWR): Chemical volume and control system 
7. HPCIS(BWR)/HPISCPWR) 
HPCIS: High pressure core spray Injection system 
HPCIS: High pressure injection system 
8. HPCIS-ICS(BWR) : High pressure core spray injection system-
Instrumentation and control system 
9. LPCS(BWR): Low pressure core spray 
10. RHR-LPCIS(BWR)/LPIS(PWR) 
RHR-LPCIS: Residual heat removal system: Low pressure coolant 
injection system 
LPIS: Low pressure injection system 
11. RCICS(BWR): Reactor core isolation cooling system 
12. RHR-SC(BWR): Steam condensing function (Hot standby) 
13. RHR'SHC: Shutdown cooling function 
14. RHR-SPC(BWR): Reheat removal-suppression pool cooling function 
15. SBLCS(BWR): Standby liquid control system: Pump and Injection 
valve 
16. SICS(PWR): Safety injection control system 
17. SIS(PWR): Safety injection system 
18. Other ECCIS 
Emergency Core Coolant Recirculation Systems (ECCRS) 
1. CSRS(BWR): Core spray recirculation system 
2. EECS(BWR): Emergency equipment cooling system 
3. ESWS(BWR): Emergency service water system 
4. HPRS(PWR): High pressure recirculation system 
5. HPSWS(BWR): High pressure service water system 
6. LPCRS(BWR)/LPRS(PWR) 
LPRS: Low pressure core recirculation system 
7. TORUS; 
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Instrumentation and Monitoring Systems 
1. ARMS: Area radiation monitoring system 
2. ICIS: Incore instrumentation system 
3. IMS: Instrumentation and monitoring system or unknown 
4. LDS: Leak Detection system 
5. PRMS: Process radiation monitoring system 
6. RCIS: Reactor control and information system 
7. RINMS: Reactor instrumentation neutron monitoring system 
Reactor Power Control System (RPCS) 
1. CPS(BWR)/CPCS(PWR) 
CPS: Chemical power control systems (of SBLCS) 
CPCS: Chemical power control systems (of CVCS) 
2. CRS: Control Rod System (shim control) 
3. RPCS: Unknown 
4. RWRS(BWR): Reactor water recirculation system (using pressure, 
flow rate) 
Main Reactor Cooling Systems (MRCS) 
1. MSLS: Main Steam line system 
2. RCS: Other or unknown 
3. RFWS: Reactor feed water system 
4. RVI: Other reactor vessel internals 
Reactor Protection System (RPS) 
1. RPCRS: Reactor protection control rod system 
2. RPLS: Reactor protection logic system 
Secondary Non-Nuclear Systems (SNS) 
1. AFWS(PWR); Auxiliary feed water system 
2. CAS: Compressed air system 
3. CHVS: Cooling, heating and ventilation system 
4. CHWS(BWR); Chilled water systems 
5. ECS: Emergency condenser system 
6. FPS: Fire protection system 
7. MCS: Main Condenser system 
8. MFWS(PWR); Main feedwater system 
9. PCS: Power conversion/generator systems 
10. PSS: Process sampling system 
11. SECS: Seismic control system 
12. TBS: Turbine bypass system 
13. WES; Water exhaust system (non-nuclear) 
14. WSS: Water supply system (non-nuclear) 
15. WTS: Water treatment system (non-nuclear) 
16. Other SNS: Unknown or others 
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Waste Processing Systems (WPS) 
1. WPS-GH; gas handling 
2. WPS-LH: liquid handling 
3. WPS-SH: solid handling 
Source: Sabri (10) 
